Proviso to Section 8(1)(i) - Cabinet papers exemption - disclosure after decision/matter over - ACC note - CPIO duty to provide information under the RTI Act - Right to InformationProviso to Section 8(1)(i) - Cabinet papers exemption - disclosure after decision/matter over - ACC note - CPIO duty to provide information under the RTI Act - Whether the ACC note and related file pages withheld as part of Cabinet papers are required to be disclosed under the proviso to Section 8(1)(i) of the RTI Act once a final decision has been taken and the matter is over. - HELD THAT: - The Commission found that a final decision in respect of the matter to which the ACC note related has been taken and the matter is no longer pending. In view of the proviso to Section 8(1)(i), information forming part of Cabinet papers must be made public once the decision is complete. The respondent's reliance on an earlier High Court stay in unrelated proceedings did not preclude disclosure here, and the missing file referenced in the RTI application had been traced for provision of available information. Consequently, the CPIO is directed to furnish the pages of the ACC note and the information pertaining to the specified file within the period fixed by the Commission. [Paras 7]CPIO directed to provide copies of the ACC note pages sought and information pertaining to File 6/7/2007EO MMI within four weeks.Final Conclusion: The appeal is allowed to the extent indicated; the CPIO must supply the ACC note pages and the identified file information within four weeks and the appeal is disposed of.

Right to Information - duty to furnish information - first appellate authority's order - oversight in supply of information - direction to furnish particulars within timeRight to Information - duty to furnish information - oversight in supply of information - direction to furnish particulars within time - Whether interference with the order of the First Appellate Authority was justified and whether the CPIO should be directed to furnish the names and designations of officers responsible for uploading notifications and circulars on the official website. - HELD THAT: - The FAA acknowledged that the CPIO had omitted the names and designations of the officers responsible for timely uploading of Central Excise, Customs and Service Tax notifications and circulars, and directed additional information be provided. The Commission found that the FAA's order was legally tenable despite the oversight, since the omission was admitted by the respondent and remedial direction had already been given. The Commission noted the respondent's assurance to supply the requisite information by a specified date and, while declining to interfere with the FAA's order, issued a clear direction to the CPIO to furnish the missing particulars by 15-7-2015. The Commission also observed that, as a matter of good practice, the FAA should, where possible, prescribe a time limit for compliance when directing the provision of information. [Paras 5, 6]The FAA's order is upheld as legally tenable; the CPIO is directed to furnish the names and designations of the officers responsible for uploading the specified notifications and circulars to the appellant by 15-7-2015, and the appeal is disposed of.Final Conclusion: The Commission declined to interfere with the First Appellate Authority's order, directed the CPIO to supply the omitted names and designations by 15-7-2015, and disposed of the appeal; the Commission recommended that FAAs prescribe time limits for compliance when directing information to be furnished.

Right to Information Act, 2005 - obligation of Public Information Officer to furnish information - duty of First Appellate Authority to dispose of first appeal - second appeal remedy before the Central Information Commission - direction to furnish information issue-wise - invocation of Section 5(4) of the RTI Act, 2005Obligation of Public Information Officer to furnish information - duty of First Appellate Authority to dispose of first appeal - second appeal remedy before the Central Information Commission - direction to furnish information issue-wise - Whether the appellant's second appeal should be allowed because respondents failed to furnish information and the First Appellate Authority did not dispose of the first appeal - HELD THAT: - The Commission found that the respondents had not furnished the information sought by the appellant under his RTI application dated 24-1-2015 and that the First Appellate Authority had not disposed of the first appeal. The respondent representative was unable to explain whether the information had been provided or why the first appeal remained undisposed. The Commission concluded that the appellant had been deliberately deprived of the benefits of the RTI Act for over five months, thereby defeating the object of the legislation. In these circumstances the Commission held that it was appropriate to decide the matter on second appeal rather than remanding the matter back to the FAA for disposal, and directed the respondents to provide complete and categorical information, issue-wise, in accordance with the RTI Act within a specified time; the Commission also permitted invocation of Section 5(4) if needed. [Paras 2, 3, 5, 6]Second appeal allowed in toto; respondents directed to provide complete, issue-wise information as per the RTI application within 30 days and Section 5(4) may be invoked if necessary.Final Conclusion: The Commission allowed the second appeal, directed the public authority to furnish the complete information sought by the appellant issue-wise within 30 days, and noted that Section 5(4) of the RTI Act could be invoked if required.

Delay in delivery of possession - compensation for delay - unfair trade practice - binding effect of contractual terms subject to unconscionability - ejusdem generis construction of 'slow down' - continuous wrong and limitation - jurisdiction of the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission based on pecuniary value - arbitration clause not ousting consumer forum jurisdiction - distinction between original allottees and subsequent purchasers for entitlement to relief - allocation of increased service taxDelay in delivery of possession - compensation for delay - Opposite party liable to pay compensation for delay in delivering possession and quantum/rate of such compensation - HELD THAT: - The complainants were not interested in refund and sought possession; thus the remaining question was compensation until possession. The Buyers Agreement provided for possession within 36 months subject to specified exceptions. The developer failed to prove any exception under clause 4.a.ii and therefore cannot rely on those grounds to escape liability. The contract term limiting compensation to Rs.5/- per sq.ft. was examined and found to be unconscionable in context. The Commission awarded compensation in the form of simple interest at 12% per annum from the date of expiry of 36 months under the initial agreement until actual delivery of possession for original allottees and those who repurchased within one year of initial allotment. For those who repurchased more than one year after initial allotment, interest at 12% per annum is payable from 36 months after the date of repurchase, with Rs.5/- per sq.ft. payable for the interim period between 36 months from initial allotment and 36 months from repurchase. The decision declines to award compounded interest at 18% claimed by complainants, holding compensation should correspond to actual financial loss and not produce windfall. [Paras 13, 14, 19, 20, 23]Opposite party to deliver possession by dates in its letter dated 27.05.2015 and to pay simple interest at 12% p.a. as compensation in the manner and for the periods specified; compounded 18% claim rejectedUnfair trade practice - binding effect of contractual terms subject to unconscionability - Whether clause fixing nominal compensation at Rs.5/- per sq.ft. is enforceable or constitutes an unfair trade practice permitting revision by the forum - HELD THAT: - Although parties are ordinarily bound by freely agreed contractual terms, a term will not be enforced if consent was not voluntary or the term is unfair. The Commission found that standard buyer agreements offered by large builders, providing nominal delay compensation while charging high compound interest on buyers, operate in a take it or leave it context and are one sided and unreasonable. That practice facilitates diversion of funds and constitutes an unfair trade practice under the Consumer Protection Act. Complainants had pleaded these aspects, so the clause limiting compensation to Rs.5/- per sq.ft. was not treated as inviolable and the forum reallocated a fairer rate of compensation. [Paras 11, 12, 13]Clause limiting compensation to Rs.5/- per sq.ft. is unconscionable/unfair and the forum may award adequate compensation insteadEjusdem generis construction of 'slow down' - Meaning of 'slow down' in clause 4.a.ii and whether economic recession qualifies as 'slow down' excusing delay - HELD THAT: - The word 'slow down' appears alongside 'lock out' and 'strike' and must be read ejusdem generis, referring to labour or site slowdowns rather than a general economic recession. The developer produced no evidence that labour or material shortages were proven despite efforts (such as tenders/contracting evidence). Notifications relied upon were old and in force when the 36 month promise was made. Commonwealth Games and other broad contentions were held irrelevant on facts. Consequently, the OP could not invoke clause 4.a.ii to excuse the delay. [Paras 7, 8, 9]'Slow down' construed as site/labour slowdown; developer failed to establish any exception under clause 4.a.ii and cannot avoid liability for delayContinuous wrong and limitation - Whether complaints are barred by limitation under Section 24A of the Consumer Protection Act - HELD THAT: - Failure to deliver possession is a continuous wrong and constitutes a recurrent cause of action so long as possession is not delivered. Time for limitation would begin only if the seller unequivocally refused to deliver possession. Here, the developer never refused possession; hence complaints are not barred by limitation. [Paras 17]Complaints are maintainable and not barred by limitation as the cause of action continued until delivery of possessionArbitration clause not ousting consumer forum jurisdiction - Whether existence of an arbitration clause renders consumer complaint maintainable before consumer forum inapproriate - HELD THAT: - Section 3 of the Consumer Protection Act renders remedies under the Act additional to other remedies. Reliance on Supreme Court authority and precedents shows that an arbitration clause does not oust consumer fora jurisdiction where allegations of deficiency of service or unfair trade practice are made. Hence arbitration clause in the agreement does not preclude maintainability of these complaints. [Paras 18]Arbitration clause does not bar complainants from approaching the consumer forum; complaint maintainableJurisdiction of the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission based on pecuniary value - Whether this Commission has pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain the complaints - HELD THAT: - Although the sale consideration paid by complainants was less than Rs.1 crore, complainants claimed and the record showed current market value of the flats exceeded Rs.10,000 per sq.ft., putting the pecuniary value of relief (including direction to hand over possession) above Rs.1 crore. Accordingly, the NCDRC has jurisdiction to entertain these complaints. [Paras 16]This Commission has jurisdiction as the pecuniary value of relief sought exceeds Rs.1,00,00,000/- in each caseDistinction between original allottees and subsequent purchasers for entitlement to relief - Whether purchasers who acquired allotment within one year of initial allotment are entitled to same compensation as original allottees and treatment of purchasers after one year - HELD THAT: - Following principle in Haryana Urban Development Authority v. Raje Ram, purchasers who acquired allotments within one year of initial allotment are to be treated at par with original allottees and awarded interest from 36 months of initial agreement. Purchasers who acquired resales more than one year after initial allotment are deemed to have foreseen possible delay; they are entitled to interest at 12% only from 36 months after the date of their repurchase, and for the interim period (36 months from initial allotment to 36 months from repurchase) compensation at Rs.5/- per sq.ft. is payable in terms of the agreement. [Paras 19, 23]Purchasers within one year of initial allotment treated like original allottees with interest from 36 months of initial agreement; later purchasers get interest from 36 months after repurchase and limited interim compensationBinding effect of contractual terms subject to unconscionability - Whether complainants are entitled to claim consumer status where flats may be intended for future occupation or temporary letting (commercial purpose argument) - HELD THAT: - The expression 'commercial purpose' must be given its ordinary meaning. Purchase of a house as an investment or for future residential occupation does not ipso facto make it a commercial purchase. Mere intention to let the flat temporarily until a later date (e.g., retirement) does not make the acquisition a commercial purpose excluding consumer protection. Absent proof of trading in properties as a business, purchasers remain consumers under the Act. [Paras 15]Purchasers are consumers; mere postponement of occupation or letting out in the interim does not convert purpose into commercial purposeAllocation of increased service tax - Whether increase in service tax effective from 01.06.2015 is to be borne by developer or purchasers - HELD THAT: - Had possession been delivered in time the complainants would have paid service tax at the earlier rate. The Commission holds that increase in service tax effective 01.06.2015 must be borne by the developer. [Paras 21]Increase in service tax from 01.06.2015 shall be borne by the opposite partyCompensation for further delay - Rate of compensation if the developer fails to honour its revised schedule of possession dated 27.05.2015 - HELD THAT: - To ensure compliance with the revised delivery schedule, the Commission directed that if possession is not delivered by the last dates in the developer's letter dated 27.05.2015, the developer shall pay simple interest at 18% per annum for the period of delay beyond those dates. [Paras 22, 23]If revised dates are not honoured, developer to pay simple interest at 18% p.a. for delay beyond the stipulated revised datesFinal Conclusion: Complaints allowed in part: opposite party directed to deliver possession by dates in its letter dated 27.05.2015; to pay specified compensation (simple interest at 12% p.a. in the differentiated manner set out, Rs.5/- per sq.ft. for limited interim periods where applicable), bear increased service tax from 01.06.2015, pay higher interest of 18% p.a. if revised dates are missed, and pay litigation costs of Rs.5,000/- in each complaint

Failure to provide information under the Right to Information Act - complaint jurisdiction under Section 18(1)(a)-(e) of the RTI Act, 2005 - satisfaction to proceed under Section 18(2) of the RTI Act, 2005 - inquiry and report by the concerned public authority for identification of responsible officers - proceedings under Section 18 read with Section 20 of the RTI Act, 2005Failure to provide information under the Right to Information Act - complaint jurisdiction under Section 18(1)(a)-(e) of the RTI Act, 2005 - Whether there are reasonable grounds under Section 18(1) and Section 18(2) of the RTI Act, 2005 to proceed with an inquiry into the complainant's allegations of non-provision of information. - HELD THAT: - The Commission examined the record of responses by the respondents and the submissions made at the hearing. The respondents had admitted that most of the RTI queries did not pertain to their office but failed to identify the exact concerned public authority; only partial information (Issue No. 6) was provided. The Commission noted that the statutory criteria in Section 18(1)(a)-(e) include giving incomplete or misleading information, refusal of access, failure to respond, unreasonable fees and refusal to accept applications. Applying Section 18(2), the Commission found prima facie that there are reasonable grounds to institute an inquiry into the alleged non-provision of information and to proceed further under Section 18 read with Section 20 of the RTI Act, 2005. [Paras 3, 4, 5, 6]The Commission is prima facie satisfied that there are reasonable grounds under Section 18(2) to proceed with an inquiry into the alleged non-provision of information.Inquiry and report by the concerned public authority for identification of responsible officers - proceedings under Section 18 read with Section 20 of the RTI Act, 2005 - Direction to the department to conduct an inquiry and produce a report and records for further proceedings under Section 18 read with Section 20. - HELD THAT: - Having reached prima facie satisfaction to inquire, the Commission directed Shri Udai Singh Kumawat, Joint Secretary (Revenue), Department of Revenue, to conduct a thorough inquiry to identify officers responsible for not providing the required information and to submit an exhaustive report within four weeks. The Commission further directed that the concerned First Appellate Authority and/or CPIO be deputed along with the inquiry report and the complete case record to present the respondents' case; failure to do so would oblige the Commission to proceed on the basis of the record in the file. The direction is procedural and seeks fresh verification and reporting by the public authority to enable further adjudication under the RTI Act. [Paras 6, 7]The Joint Secretary (Revenue) is directed to inquire, identify responsible officers and submit an exhaustive report within four weeks, and the FAA/CPIO is to be deputed with the report and records for further proceedings under Section 18 read with Section 20.Final Conclusion: The Commission, being prima facie satisfied that an inquiry is warranted under Section 18(2) of the RTI Act, 2005, has directed the Department of Revenue to carry out a detailed inquiry, identify responsible officers, submit an exhaustive report within four weeks and produce the FAA/CPIO and the complete record for further proceedings under Section 18 read with Section 20; the matter is listed for further hearing on the specified date.

Failure to comply with the 48 hour requirement for information affecting life and liberty - failure to transfer an RTI application to the appropriate public authority - penalty proceedings on account of delayed/non furnishing of information under the RTI Act - obligation of public authorities to establish a mechanism to respond to life and liberty RTI requestsFailure to comply with the 48 hour requirement for information affecting life and liberty - Whether the Home Department failed to comply with the statutory requirement to respond within 48 hours to an RTI request concerning life and liberty and whether such delay amounted to breach of the RTI Act. - HELD THAT: - The Commission found that the RTI application concerning the complainant's apprehension to life and property was not answered within the statutory 48 hour period. The Home Department treated the request as a routine file and replied after a delay, affording no urgency to the life and liberty nature of the request. The objective of the 48 hour proviso is to elicit a responsive attitude from agencies entrusted with protection; the Home Department's conduct fell short of that standard. The Commission observed that, had the threat persisted, the delay could have exposed the complainant to serious risk. The delay therefore constituted a breach of the RTI Act's requirement for timely response to life and liberty related requests. [Paras 8, 9, 10]Findings recorded that there was an unjustified delay in responding to a life and liberty RTI request and that the Home Department breached the 48 hour obligation.Failure to transfer an RTI application to the appropriate public authority - Whether the Home Department should have immediately transferred the RTI request to Delhi Police and whether forwarding the representation after delay was deficient. - HELD THAT: - The Commission noted that instead of transferring the RTI application to Delhi Police when received, the Home Department merely forwarded the applicant's representation and did so after seven days. Even if the request were not treated as life and liberty related, it ought to have been transferred within five days. The delayed forwarding/processing impeded prompt action by the police and exemplified an unresponsive approach by the Home Department. [Paras 10]Held that the Home Department improperly handled the request by not transferring it promptly to the appropriate authority and that the delayed forwarding was deficient.Penalty proceedings on account of delayed/non furnishing of information under the RTI Act - Whether penalty proceedings should be initiated against the PIO for failure to timely respond to the life and liberty RTI request. - HELD THAT: - Given the failure to respond within the mandated time for a life and liberty matter and the Home Department's unresponsive conduct, the Commission concluded that the matter warranted initiation of penalty proceedings. The Commission directed the PIO to explain within a stipulated period why the maximum penalty should not be imposed for the delay in responding to the RTI application. [Paras 11]Directed the PIO to show cause within 21 days why maximum penalty should not be imposed; penalty proceedings to be considered.Obligation of public authorities to establish a mechanism to respond to life and liberty RTI requests - Whether the Delhi Police (and relevant authorities) should be directed to develop and report a mechanism for responding to life and liberty RTI requests within 48 hours and to publish the same. - HELD THAT: - To ensure compliance with the statutory objective of prompt responses in life and liberty cases, the Commission directed the police authority to develop a mechanism to respond to such RTIs within 48 hours, to report the mechanism to the Commission within 48 hours, and to post it on the official website. The direction is preventive and administrative, aimed at inculcating responsiveness and ensuring future compliance. [Paras 12]Directed the police authority to devise, report and publish a mechanism to respond to life and liberty RTI requests within the specified timelines.Final Conclusion: The Commission found that the Home Department failed to treat an RTI request concerning life and liberty with requisite urgency and did not promptly transfer it to the appropriate authority; it directed the PIO to explain why maximum penalty should not be imposed and ordered the police to formulate, report and publish a mechanism to respond to life and liberty RTIs within the prescribed timelines.

Public documents arising from adjudication proceedings - exemption under Section 24 read with the Second Schedule to the RTI Act - disclosure of third party submissions in adjudicatory records - right to information and purpose of the RTI Act - exemptions for quasi judicial proceedings under the RTI regimeExemption under Section 24 read with the Second Schedule to the RTI Act - disclosure of third party submissions in adjudicatory records - Whether denial of information on the ground of Section 24 read with the Second Schedule is legally tenable in respect of documents (written submissions, vakalatnama and case laws) submitted by a noticee during adjudication proceedings. - HELD THAT: - The Commission examined the RTI request which sought copies of written submissions, vakalatnama and case laws submitted by a co noticee during adjudication leading to an order in original. It found that the documents sought were not part of a current DRI investigation nor did they originate from investigative material; rather they were submissions made before the adjudicating authority. Having regard to the principle that documents submitted by parties in adjudication become part of the public record of those proceedings, the Commission held that respondents could not legitimately refuse disclosure by invoking Section 24 read with the Second Schedule (Entry No. 3). The plea that the papers related to DRI investigation or were protected as quasi judicial material under exemptions was rejected on the facts, since adjudication had commenced/completed and the documents were party submissions in that process. [Paras 6, 7]Invocation of Section 24 read with the Second Schedule to deny the requested documents was not legally tenable and the documents are to be treated as disclosable public records of the adjudication.Public documents arising from adjudication proceedings - right to information and purpose of the RTI Act - Relief to be granted where disclosure has been wrongly denied and the consequential direction to the respondents. - HELD THAT: - After finding the respondents' denial unlawful and observing that the appellant had been deprived of his rights under the RTI Act for an extended period, the Commission concluded that the second appeal should be allowed in entirety. The Commission directed the respondents to furnish complete and categorical information, issue wise, as per the RTI application within 30 days of receipt of the order and indicated that Section 5(4) may be invoked if necessary to ensure compliance. [Paras 9, 10, 11]Second appeal allowed; respondents directed to provide the requested information issue wise within 30 days and to intimate compliance to the Commission.Final Conclusion: The Commission allowed the second appeal, held that documents submitted by a party in adjudication are disclosable public records and that the invocation of Section 24 read with the Second Schedule to refuse them was untenable; respondents were directed to furnish the requested information issue wise within 30 days.

Violation of principles of natural justice - section 7(9) of the RTI Act - disproportionate diversion of resources - inspection as the primary mode of access where voluminous records are sought - proactive disclosure obligation of public authorities - setting aside first appellate order for raising a new defence not pleaded by CPIOViolation of principles of natural justice - setting aside first appellate order for raising a new defence not pleaded by CPIO - First Appellate Authority's order upholding CPIO's denial was set aside for breach of procedure and natural justice. - HELD THAT: - The Commission found that the FAA passed the impugned order without issuing a hearing notice and without affording the appellant an opportunity to be heard, thereby breaching the requirements of natural justice. The FAA also introduced a defence of safety/preservation of records which the CPIO had not advanced, effectively deciding the appeal on a new ground not pleaded by the public authority. For these procedural and substantive defects the FAA order was set aside and the Commission recommended disciplinary action against the concerned FAA for acting contrary to the RTI Act. [Paras 14]FAA order set aside for breach of natural justice and for raising a new defence; recommendation for disciplinary action against the concerned FAO.Section 7(9) of the RTI Act - disproportionate diversion of resources - inspection as the primary mode of access where voluminous records are sought - proactive disclosure obligation of public authorities - Appellant was entitled to the information sought; Section 7(9) could not be validly invoked to refuse the present request and the respondent was directed to furnish certified copies. - HELD THAT: - The Commission analysed the scope of the appellant's request and concluded that it related to fourteen files only and therefore did not attract the restriction under Section 7(9) as applied by the CPIO/FAA. While recognising the practical difficulties in compiling voluminous records, the Commission found no mala fide denial and accepted that inspection is the appropriate mode where records span large periods; inspection should be facilitated so the requester can identify documents for copying. The Commission also noted the DoPT Office Memorandum mandating proactive disclosure of RTI applications and responses and directed the Department of Legal Affairs to comply. In consequence, the respondent authority was directed to furnish certified copies of the information sought in the RTI application within the stipulated period, and coordinated measures (inspection facilitation, rationalisation of requests, and prior facilitation before invoking Section 7(9)) were recommended. [Paras 8, 15, 16, 17, 18]Respondent directed to furnish certified copies of the information sought within 21 days; inspection should be facilitated and DoPT directions on proactive disclosure complied with; Section 7(9) could not be invoked for the present request.Final Conclusion: The Commission set aside the First Appellate Authority's order for breach of natural justice and for deciding the appeal on a new ground; it directed the Department of Legal Affairs to furnish certified copies of the information sought within 21 days, to facilitate inspection for voluminous records, and to implement DoPT's proactive disclosure measures.

Sharing of inter-State transmission losses - embedded intra-State entity - dedicated transmission line treated as part of ISTS - application of zonal transmission losses on scheduled energy - scheduling by RLDC and SLDC coordination - loop flow and meshed network connectivity - review jurisdiction - error apparent on recordEmbedded intra-State entity - dedicated transmission line treated as part of ISTS - loop flow and meshed network connectivity - application of zonal transmission losses on scheduled energy - scheduling by RLDC and SLDC coordination - Whether SAIL-BSP, though connected by a dedicated line, is liable to share inter-State transmission losses under the Sharing Regulations as an intra-State embedded entity - HELD THAT: - The Commission concluded that SAIL-BSP is an intra-State entity embedded within the Chhattisgarh control area and that the NSPCL-BSP dedicated transmission line functions, in practice, as part of the meshed ISTS network. WRLDC's studies of actual power flows under multiple scenarios demonstrated loop flows and use of ISTS to carry power to SAIL-BSP. NSPCL's generation is scheduled by WRLDC for the Chhattisgarh control area; WRLDC therefore prepares schedules for the State as a whole and applies zonal transmission losses on the scheduled energy of the State control area. Chhattisgarh SLDC prepares the drawal schedule for SAIL-BSP based on allocations by WRLDC, and SLDC display of implemented schedules treats CSPDCL as buyer for NSPCL allocations including BSP. Given the connectivity and scheduling regime, the Commission held that losses are to be applied on the schedule (not actual flow) and that the allocation of losses to CSEB/CSPDCL necessarily results in application of those losses to SAIL-BSP as an embedded intra-State entity. [Paras 9, 11, 12]SAIL-BSP is liable to share inter-State transmission losses under the Sharing Regulations because its allocations are scheduled through the Chhattisgarh control area and the dedicated line functions as part of the meshed ISTS for scheduling and loss allocation purposes.Review jurisdiction - error apparent on record - Whether the impugned order dated 20.11.2013 contains any error apparent on the face of the record warranting review - HELD THAT: - The petitioner's submissions re-argued factual and merits contentions addressed in the impugned order concerning status of the dedicated line, actual flows and contractual arrangements with CSPDCL. The Commission explained that these matters were examined on merits in the impugned order (paras 17-20 of that order, quoted in this review) and that the challenge amounted to an attempt to re open findings that properly belong to appeal, not review. Reliance was placed on the principle that review lies only for mistakes or errors apparent on the face of the record and not for re hearing merits. The Commission found no self evident error in its reasoning or conclusion and therefore declined to exercise review jurisdiction. [Paras 13, 14]No error apparent on the face of the record; the review petition is dismissed.Final Conclusion: The Review Petition is dismissed: the Commission's finding that SAIL BSP, as an intra State embedded entity whose allocations are scheduled through the Chhattisgarh control area, is liable to share inter State transmission losses stands, and no error apparent on the face of the impugned order has been shown.

Penalty under section 20(1) of the RTI Act - Delay in furnishing third party information - Obligation to communicate decision on third party representations - Photocopying charges and Section 7(6) of the RTI Act - Recovery of penalty from salary of public servantPenalty under section 20(1) of the RTI Act - Delay in furnishing third party information - Obligation to communicate decision on third party representations - Whether Shri Victor James, the then CPIO, is liable to penalty for delay in providing third party information - HELD THAT: - The Commission found that although notices were issued to third parties and the CPIO contends that the ACC permitted disclosure and the Supreme Court declined, the CPIO failed to establish dispatch of his order dated 18 11 2011 to the appellant and did not provide the third party information until after the FAA's order dated 1 2 2012. The FAA observed that the CPIO had not informed the appellant of the decision after receipt of replies from third parties, attributing this to oversight. On the material before it the Commission concluded that the delay in furnishing third party information amounted to 89 days for which the CPIO was liable under section 20(1) of the RTI Act and that penalty should be imposed; the penalty was calculated at Rs. 250 per day for 89 days. [Paras 6, 7, 8]Penalty of Rs.22,250 assessed under section 20(1) of the RTI Act on Shri Victor James for delay of 89 days in providing third party information; penalty to be recovered in five monthly instalments.Photocopying charges and Section 7(6) of the RTI Act - Refund of erroneous charges - Whether the appellant was erroneously made to pay photocopying charges in contravention of Section 7(6) and whether refund is due - HELD THAT: - The Commission held that charging photocopying fees at the appellate stage as directed by the FAA was violative of Section 7(6) of the RTI Act. The record showed that the appellant had been asked to deposit Rs.68 for supply of copies and that the FAA's direction in this regard was erroneous. The Commission therefore directed refund of the amount to the appellant. [Paras 7]The respondent public authority to refund Rs.68 to the appellant for improper charging of photocopying fees.Recovery of penalty from salary of public servant - Mechanism for recovery and remittance of the imposed penalty - HELD THAT: - The Commission directed recovery of the imposed penalty from the salary of Shri Victor James by deductions in five monthly instalments and required the Head of Public Authority to remit the recovered amount by demand draft/Banker's cheque in favour of the Pay & Accounts Officer, CAT, payable at New Delhi, to the Commission's registry within the stipulated schedule. [Paras 8, 9]Amount of Rs.22,250 to be recovered @ Rs.4,450 per month from the salary of Shri Victor James from July to November 2014 and remitted to the Commission as directed.Final Conclusion: The Commission imposed a penalty of Rs.22,250 on the then CPIO for delay of 89 days in furnishing third party information, directed recovery of that amount from his salary in five monthly instalments and remittance to the Commission, and ordered refund of Rs.68 to the appellant for improper photocopying charges.

Delay in furnishing information - penalty under Section 20(1) of the RTI Act - exemption under Section 8(1)(h) of the RTI Act - confidentiality of investigation report - movement and dispatch of U.O. NoteDelay in furnishing information - penalty under Section 20(1) of the RTI Act - Whether the CPIO caused undue delay in providing information and whether proceedings under Section 20(1) should be initiated. - HELD THAT: - The Commission noted that the appellant received the information on 21-6-2013 and that the subject RTI application dated 11-10-2011 resulted in a delay exceeding 100 days in furnishing information to the appellant. Having recorded that prima facie the delay occurred, the Commission directed initiation of a show cause proceeding under Section 20(1) of the RTI Act against the CPIO to explain why a penalty should not be imposed. The order therefore does not impose the penalty but issues a separate show cause notice to the CPIO for the delay. [Paras 6]Prima facie delay of more than 100 days established; show cause notice under Section 20(1) to be issued to the CPIO for explanation why penalty should not be imposed.Movement and dispatch of U.O. Note - confidentiality of investigation report - exemption under Section 8(1)(h) of the RTI Act - Whether the U.O. Note was dispatched to JS (Revenue) on 4-11-2011 and the scope for disclosure of the investigation report. - HELD THAT: - On consideration of the file movement chart and office records, the Commission recorded that only the U.O. Note was dispatched on 4-11-2011 (dispatch No. 4483) as reflected on the office copy. The record of the earlier FAA decision and CPIO's response that the investigation report had been forwarded and that part of the information was claimed to be exempt under Section 8(1)(h) were noted. The Commission accepted the respondents' account of file movement and the claim of confidentiality over parts of the investigation material as reflected in the file, while the CPIO's competence to disclose a superior authority's investigation report was earlier upheld by the FAA consistent with the Commission's precedent. [Paras 5]Recorded that the U.O. Note was dispatched on 4-11-2011; respondents' account of file movement accepted and exemption claimed for portions of the investigation report noted.Final Conclusion: The Commission found a prima facie delay in furnishing information and directed issuance of a show cause notice under Section 20(1) of the RTI Act to the CPIO; it also recorded that the office copy shows dispatch of the U.O. Note on 4-11-2011 and noted the claimed exemption for parts of the investigation report.

Restoration of revision petition - recall of dismissal for non-prosecution - admission of negligence and compensation awarded - maintainability of consumer complaint against telecom service providers - scope of "Telegraph Authority" under the Indian Telegraph Act - competence of Consumer Forums to entertain disputes with private telecom service providersRestoration of revision petition - recall of dismissal for non-prosecution - Application for restoration of the revision petition and recall of the order dismissing the petition for non-prosecution was allowed. - HELD THAT: - The application seeking restoration of the revision petition and recall of the dismissal order dated 04.02.2014 was considered on the basis of the reasons stated in the application. The Commission found those reasons sufficient to permit recall of the earlier order and to restore the revision petition to its original position. [Paras 1]Application allowed; order dated 04.02.2014 recalled and the revision petition restored to its original position.Admission of negligence and compensation awarded - maintainability of consumer complaint against telecom service providers - scope of "Telegraph Authority" under the Indian Telegraph Act - competence of Consumer Forums to entertain disputes with private telecom service providers - Revision petition dismissed on merits: the State Commission's compensation award was not interfered with and the complaint was held maintainable before the consumer forum. - HELD THAT: - The State Commission recorded that the petitioner-company admitted that the SIM card and mobile number in question had been allotted to another person and that outgoing/incoming call facility could not be provided to the complainant, and offered to compensate for the inadvertent mistake. Having regard to that admission of negligence and the quantum of compensation awarded, the Commission did not find grounds to interfere with the State Commission's order in revisionary jurisdiction. Separately, although maintainability was a core question in view of the Supreme Court's decision in M. Krishnan, the Government of India's communication clarified that the Supreme Court's case involved a dispute with the Department of Telecommunications as a statutory "Telegraph Authority" prior to hiving off of telecom services; since powers of a "Telegraph Authority" are not vested in private telecom service providers (and BSNL), Section 7B of the Indian Telegraph Act is inapplicable, and therefore Forums constituted under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 are competent to entertain disputes between individual telecom consumers and private telecom service providers. In the light of that clarification the objection to maintainability lacked merit. [Paras 2, 3]Revision petition dismissed; the State Commission's award upheld and the complaint held maintainable before the consumer forum.Final Conclusion: The application for restoration was allowed and the revision petition restored; on merits the revision petition was dismissed-the respondent's admission of negligence and the compensation awarded warranted non-interference, and consumer fora are competent to adjudicate disputes against private telecom service providers.

Right to Information - CPIO's duty to provide factual information - Furnishing of incorrect or misleading information under the RTI regime - Disclosure of existence of records, minutes and agendas - Penalty under the RTI Act for providing incorrect informationCPIO's duty to provide factual information - Disclosure of existence of records, minutes and agendas - Whether the CPIO furnished incorrect or misleading information regarding the meeting dated 20-12-2012 called to discuss ISO 9001 implementation. - HELD THAT: - The Commission examined the CPIO's initial reply denying the existence of records and the subsequent modified reply stating that Secretary (PM) met Shri H.K. Sharan on 20-12-2012 without a formal agenda. Documentary material before the Commission, including letters from Shri H.K. Sharan and a confirming letter from Dr. Prajapati Trivedi, indicate that a meeting took place in the Secretary's chamber on 20-12-2012 and that there was no formal agenda. The CPIO's modification of his earlier response was made after obtaining the Secretary's remark that the meeting did occur. On this factual basis the Commission found that the information supplied by the CPIO was factual and not incorrect or misleading. [Paras 10]No case of furnishing incorrect information is made out; the CPIO's reply is factual and correct.Penalty under the RTI Act for providing incorrect information - Administrative notice of concerns - Whether penal action is warranted against the CPIO and what administrative steps should follow the complaint. - HELD THAT: - Having concluded that the CPIO furnished factual information based on the Secretary's confirmation, the Commission held that penal action under the RTI Act is not justified. Nevertheless, the Commission recognised the complainant's expressed concerns about the conduct of the officer involved and directed that those concerns be brought to the notice of Dr. Prajapati Trivedi, Secretary (PM). The Commission therefore ordered that a copy of this order be sent to the Secretary (PM) for his information. [Paras 10]No penalty; concerns to be brought to Secretary (PM)'s notice and a copy of the order sent to him.Final Conclusion: The complaint is disposed of: the CPIO's replies were held to be factual and not misleading, no penal action is imposed, and the complainant's concerns are to be forwarded to the Secretary (Performance Management Division) with a copy of this order.

Treatment of information as third-party information and requirement of third-party consent under the RTI Act - disclosure of information already in the public domain and applicability of exemption for personal information - inspection of records and files under the RTI Act - application of Section 8(1)(j) and Section 10(1) principles to RTI requests - duty to avoid unnecessary delay in seeking third-party response and the ten-day mandateTreatment of information as third-party information and requirement of third-party consent under the RTI Act - disclosure of information already in the public domain and applicability of exemption for personal information - duty to avoid unnecessary delay in seeking third-party response and the ten-day mandate - Whether the CPIO correctly treated the common order in the case of Shri C.J. Karira as third-party information and was justified in seeking his consent before furnishing certified copies to the appellant. - HELD THAT: - The Commission examined earlier CIC decisions cited by the appellant which hold that information forming part of public documents under the RTI Act, including uploaded orders and synopses, ordinarily cannot be treated as confidential third-party information and that invocation of Section 11 requires care; waiting beyond the ten days for a third-party response when the referral was made as a mere precaution is unnecessary. Applying those principles, the Commission agreed with the appellant that the CPIO should not have treated the common order as third-party information or awaited consent in a manner that caused delay. The Commission directed that the Nodal CPIO circulate this position to all CPIOs for guidance. [Paras 4]CPIO's treatment of the common order as third-party information was not justified; the Commission agreed with the appellant and directed circulation of the position to all CPIOs.Inspection of records and files under the RTI Act - Whether the appellant is entitled to inspection of the files relating to the appeals/complaints listed at (A)(iii) and (A)(iv) of his RTI application. - HELD THAT: - The CPIO stated that the two files are available in the Registry of IC(YA) and that inspection can be provided with prior appointment. The Commission directed the CPIO responsible for the Registry of IC(YA) to provide inspection of the files to the appellant within 15 working days from receipt of the order, ensuring the appellant's right to inspect records is honoured subject to administrative convenience of appointment. [Paras 5]Inspection of the specified files shall be provided to the appellant within 15 working days from receipt of the order.Inspection of records and files under the RTI Act - disclosure of information already in the public domain and applicability of exemption for personal information - Whether information and files pertaining to items (A)(i), (A)(ii), (A)(v), (C) and (D) of the RTI application, relating to the Registry of former CIC(SM), were to be furnished and by when. - HELD THAT: - The Commission noted no response had been provided in respect of those items. Given the appellant's entitlement and in view of the principles on disclosure and third-party treatment, the Commission directed Shri Vijay Bhalla, CPIO, to furnish the information relating to the Registry of former CIC(SM) within 15 working days from receipt of the order. [Paras 6]The CPIO Shri Vijay Bhalla is directed to furnish the requested information within 15 working days from receipt of the order.Final Conclusion: Appeal disposed. The Commission agreed that the common order should not have been treated as third-party confidential information and directed circulation of that position; ordered inspection of specified files in IC(YA) within 15 working days; and directed the CPIO of the Registry of former CIC(SM) to furnish the remaining requested information within 15 working days.

Transfer of RTI application to the concerned CPIO - disclosure under Right to Information - exemption as personal information under Section 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act - principles of natural justiceTransfer of RTI application to the concerned CPIO - principles of natural justice - Whether the Nodal CPIO was entitled to handle and decide the RTI request relating to his own personal/establishment records instead of transferring it to the Administration Division CPIO - HELD THAT: - The Commission found that a separate CPIO existed for the Administration Division which held custody of the records in question, and that the appropriate course was for the Nodal CPIO to transfer the RTI application to that concerned CPIO. The mere fact that the information pertained to the personal file of the Nodal CPIO did not empower him to deal with the matter personally when it was under the Administration Division. The website description of the Nodal CPIO's jurisdiction did not encompass Administration and Establishment matters. On these grounds the Commission held that the Nodal CPIO should not have handled the RTI requests himself. [Paras 7]Nodal CPIO erred in handling the requests; the matter should have been transferred to the Administration Division CPIO.Disclosure under Right to Information - exemption as personal information under Section 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act - Which portions of the file held against the RTI request are exempt as personal information and which are not, and what relief is to be granted - HELD THAT: - The Commission examined the specific note sheet pages and correspondence. It held that the note sheet entries at pages 18 and 19 relating to sanction of leave, leave with LTC and transmission of a 'no objection' communication for pursuing part time Ph.D. are routine administrative information and not exempt under Section 8(1)(j). By contrast, pages 45 to 57 (the APAR) are personal information protected by Section 8(1)(j) and are exempt from disclosure as there is no public interest to override the exemption. Pages 28 and 29 relating to the officer's property return are also personal information and protected under Section 8(1)(j), but the Commission noted that similar information is available on the Ministry's website. Page 23, being an intimation of a property transaction, was also held to be protected under Section 8(1)(j). In light of these findings the Commission directed the CPIO to provide the information that is not exempt (e.g., the material on pages 18 and 19 and any other non protected records) within a specified time frame. [Paras 8]Pages 18 and 19 are not exempt and must be provided; pages 45-57 (APAR), pages 28-29 (property return) and page 23 (property transaction intimation) are personal information exempt under Section 8(1)(j), although pages 28-29 were noted to be available on the Ministry's website; CPIO directed to furnish the non exempt information within the prescribed time.Final Conclusion: Both appeals were disposed of. The Commission held that the Nodal CPIO should not have handled the requests instead of transferring them to the Administration Division CPIO, and ordered production of the non exempt information (including pages 18-19) while upholding exemption over the APAR and specified property related pages; the CPIO was directed to provide the information within ten working days and the appellant was informed of his right to prefer an appeal under the RTI Act within ninety days.

Duties of Central Assistant Public Information Officer under Section 5(2) of the RTI Act - obligation of Central Public Information Officer to furnish information under Section 7(1) of the RTI Act - status of the Office of the Solicitor General of India as a public authority under the RTI ActDuties of Central Assistant Public Information Officer under Section 5(2) of the RTI Act - obligation of Central Public Information Officer to furnish information under Section 7(1) of the RTI Act - Whether the CAPIO is authorised to respond to an application made under Section 6(1) of the RTI Act - HELD THAT: - The Commission examines Section 5(2) and finds that a CAPIO's duties are limited to receiving RTI applications or appeals and forwarding them forthwith to the CPIO/SPIO or other specified authorities. The duty to respond to a request received under Section 6 is expressly entrusted to the CPIO/SPIO under Section 7(1). On this basis the CAPIO/SAPIO is not lawfully authorised to answer RTI applications; the statutory scheme permits the CAPIO only to add five days to the response period when forwarding an application and to transmit the application to the appropriate designated officer. The Commission therefore records that the CAPIO acted beyond the limited functions assigned by Section 5(2) when she furnished a substantive reply instead of forwarding to the CPIO for disposition. [Paras 12, 13, 14]The CAPIO is not authorised to respond to RTI applications; the duty to provide information lies with the CPIO/SPIO and the CPIOs and CAPIOs of the Ministry of Law & Justice are advised to act in accordance with the statutory scheme.Administrative responsibility for the Office of the Solicitor General of India - How the RTI application filed with the Office of the Solicitor General of India reached the CAPIO, Department of Legal Affairs - HELD THAT: - The Respondents have explained to the Commission that no CPIO is designated at the Office of the Solicitor General of India and that the Department of Legal Affairs handles administrative matters for that office; accordingly the RTI application filed with the Office of the Solicitor General was dealt with by the Department of Legal Affairs. The Commission notes this explanation in the record. [Paras 15]The RTI application came to the Department of Legal Affairs because no CPIO had been designated at the Office of the Solicitor General of India and the Department handles its administrative functions.Status of the Office of the Solicitor General of India as a public authority under the RTI Act - applicability of the Commission's Full Bench decision regarding the Office of the Attorney General of India - What is the status of the Office of the Solicitor General of India under the RTI Act - HELD THAT: - The question whether the Office of the Solicitor General of India is a 'public authority' within the meaning of the RTI Act and whether the Commission's Full Bench decision concerning the Office of the Attorney General of India applies equally to the Solicitor General was not finally determined on the materials before the Commission. Instead, the Commission directed the Department of Legal Affairs (which administers administrative matters for the Solicitor General's Office) to file a written submission supporting its contention that the Solicitor General's Office stands on the same footing as the Attorney General's Office and that the Full Bench decision is applicable. The Department was directed to file that submission by a specified date and to serve it on the appellant so that rejoinder, if any, may be filed, with further hearing fixed thereafter. [Paras 16]The question is left for fresh consideration; the Department of Legal Affairs is directed to file a written submission on the legal status of the Office of the Solicitor General of India under the RTI Act, after which the Commission will proceed to adjudicate the issue.Final Conclusion: The CAPIO acted beyond the limited forwarding role prescribed by Section 5(2) and is not authorised to respond to RTI requests; the Department of Legal Affairs' factual explanation that the application reached them because no CPIO is designated at the Office of the Solicitor General is recorded; the legal question whether the Office of the Solicitor General is a public authority under the RTI Act is left open for further written submissions and subsequent hearing.

Interpretation of Section 6(3) regarding transfer of RTI applications between public authorities and within the same public authority - role and primacy of the CPIO as the fulcrum of the RTI regime under Section 7(1) - limitations on the powers of the APIO-receipt and transmission only - permissibility of transfer of an RTI application or part thereof by a CPIO to another CPIO within the same public authority - transfer of first appeals by FAA for want of jurisdiction and territorial competence of FAA - principle that only one first appeal lies against a CPIO's orderInterpretation of Section 6(3) regarding transfer of RTI applications between public authorities and within the same public authority - permissibility of transfer of an RTI application or part thereof by a CPIO to another CPIO within the same public authority - A CPIO may transfer an RTI application, or part of it, to another CPIO within the same public authority. - HELD THAT: - The text of Section 6(3) contemplates transfer where information is held by another public authority or where the subject matter is more closely connected with another public authority. For practical reasons and administrative necessity-given large public authorities with multiple CPIOs and overlapping jurisdictions-the Commission has interpreted Section 6(3) to allow transfer by one CPIO to another CPIO within the same public authority so as to facilitate timely supply of information within statutory time-limits. This internal-transfer practice has evolved to ensure effective administration of RTI obligations.Permissible for a CPIO to transfer an RTI application or part thereof to another CPIO within the same public authority.Role and primacy of the CPIO as the fulcrum of the RTI regime under Section 7(1) - Only the CPIO (not the APIO) is empowered to transfer RTI applications to another CPIO. - HELD THAT: - Section 7(1) places the mandate of providing information on the CPIO. The Commission emphasised that RTI applications can be validly transferred only by the CPIO to another CPIO. The APIO, being distinct in function, does not possess the power to effect such transfers under the scheme prescribed for furnishing information.Transfer of RTI applications may be effected by the CPIO; APIOs do not have authority to transfer applications in place of the CPIO.Permissibility of transfer of an RTI application or part thereof by a CPIO to another CPIO within the same public authority - A CPIO may transfer the RTI application either in entirety or in part without necessarily specifying the subject matter where the queries are self speaking. - HELD THAT: - The Commission accepted that a CPIO can transfer the whole application or an appropriate part of it. If the queries themselves are self speaking, specifying the subject matter in the transfer instrument is not essential. The transfer may therefore be of the whole application or of selected portions as appropriate to the functions of the transferee CPIO.CPIO may transfer the entire application or part thereof; explicit statement of subject matter is unnecessary where queries are self evident.Limitations on the powers of the APIO-receipt and transmission only - The functions of APIO and CPIO are distinct; the APIO is empowered only to receive RTI applications and transmit them to the CPIO, and cannot be equated with the CPIO. - HELD THAT: - Under the statutory scheme, APIOs perform a limited role of receipt and transmission of applications to the concerned CPIO. The CPIO alone is vested with the authority to receive applications directly and to respond. Therefore the roles are not co equal and delegation of CPIO's statutory functions to APIO is impermissible.APIOs may only receive and transmit RTI applications; they cannot exercise the substantive functions assigned to CPIOs.Transfer of first appeals by FAA for want of jurisdiction and territorial competence of FAA - An FAA who lacks jurisdiction may transfer the first appeal to the FAA having territorial jurisdiction; if the FAA/PHQ is the competent FAA he must decide the appeal on merits. - HELD THAT: - Where the FAA at PHQ is the FAA of competent jurisdiction, he is required to adjudicate the first appeal on merits. Conversely, if the FAA/PHQ does not have jurisdiction over the appeal, the proper course is to transfer the appeal to the jurisdictional FAA. The Commission therefore recognises the FAA's power to transfer appeals when territorial or subject matter jurisdiction is absent, and the corresponding duty to decide where competency is present.FAA must decide appeals on merits if competent; where not competent, the FAA may transfer the appeal to the territorially competent FAA.Principle that only one first appeal lies against a CPIO's order - Only one first appeal lies against the order of the CPIO, and the law does not contemplate filing two first appeals before two different FAAs in respect of the same matter. - HELD THAT: - The Commission noted that the statutory scheme provides for a single first appeal from a CPIO's order. Filing of two separate first appeals before two different FAAs in respect of the same CPIO order is not contemplated by law, and the occurrence of two different orders by two FAAs in respect of the same appeal is not understandable under the scheme.There can be only one first appeal against a CPIO's order; concurrent first appeals before different FAAs are not recognised by the law.Final Conclusion: The Commission clarified that CPIOs may transfer RTI applications (whole or part) to other CPIOs within the same public authority for practical administration; APIOs are limited to receipt and transmission and cannot transfer in place of a CPIO; the CPIO is the statutory authority to provide information; an FAA must decide appeals within its competence but may transfer appeals when lacking jurisdiction; and only a single first appeal is available against a CPIO's order. The matter is disposed of.

Right to Information - Public authority's duty under Section 4(2) - Definition of information under Section 2(f) - Non-victimisation of information-seekersDefinition of information under Section 2(f) - Public authority's duty under Section 4(2) - Right to Information - Whether the CPIO correctly construed Section 2(f) and whether the queries in the RTI application fall within the obligation to provide information under Section 4(2). - HELD THAT: - The CPIO had treated the queries in Paras 1, 2, 3 and 5 as falling outside Section 2(f) and therefore refused to provide information, while providing some information on para 4. On a review of the queries, the Commission found that those requests do constitute 'information' within the meaning of Section 2(f) and are linked to the public authority's obligation under Section 4(2) to publish relevant rules/policies and records. Consequently the CPIO's interpretation was held to be incorrect. The order of the CPIO is set aside and he is directed to furnish the requested information, item wise, to the appellant within three weeks, thereby enforcing the public authority's disclosure duties under the RTI regime. [Paras 3, 4]CPIO's order set aside; directed to provide para-wise information in three weeks.Non-victimisation of information-seekers - Right to Information - Allegation of victimisation of the appellant for exercising RTI rights and the Commission's stance on departmental harassment for use of RTI. - HELD THAT: - The appellant alleged that departmental officers threatened him and issued a warning letter in retaliation for his RTI application; the officer named denied the allegations and suggested the appellant's dissatisfaction arose from posting preferences. The Commission stated that it cannot adjudicate purely departmental or interpersonal disputes, but emphasised the settled principle that no public officer may victimise an individual for seeking information under the RTI Act. The Commission declined to investigate the departmental personnel dispute but issued a clear admonition that victimisation for exercising RTI rights is impermissible and will not be condoned. [Paras 5, 6]Commission warns that victimisation for exercising RTI rights is impermissible and will not be tolerated; departmental disputes not adjudicated by the Commission.Final Conclusion: The CPIO's refusal under Section 2(f) is set aside and he is directed to furnish the requested information item wise within three weeks; the Commission also admonishes that officers must not victimise persons for invoking the RTI Act and will not countenance such malfeasance.

Non-application of mind - quasi-judicial duty to apply mind - quashing of mechanically signed order - remand for fresh consideration - right to personal hearing before appellate authorityNon-application of mind - quasi-judicial duty to apply mind - quashing of mechanically signed order - Validity of the first Appellate Authority's order in view of the Appellate Authority having signed a draft prepared by the CPIO and whether the order was a product of application of mind. - HELD THAT: - The Commission found that both the CPIO and the Appellate Authority acted in quasi-judicial capacities and were therefore required to apply independent mind before passing orders. The CPIO's contemporaneous record showed that he prepared and put up a draft order which the Appellate Authority signed on the same day. This conduct indicated that the Appellate Authority did not apply independent judicial consideration but mechanically endorsed the draft. An order signed in such circumstances cannot stand as a valid quasi-judicial determination. Consequently, the impugned appellate order was quashed for want of application of mind and for being a mechanical endorsement of the CPIO's draft. [Paras 6, 8]The Appellate Authority's order is quashed for non-application of mind and for being mechanically signed.Remand for fresh consideration - right to personal hearing before appellate authority - Relief and directions following quashing - whether the matter should be remanded and what procedural steps the Appellate Authority must take on fresh consideration. - HELD THAT: - Having quashed the impugned order, the Commission remanded the matter to the Appellate Authority for fresh adjudication. The Appellate Authority was directed to decide the appeal afresh after affording the appellant an opportunity of personal hearing. A specific time frame for compliance was imposed to ensure expeditious disposal. The Commission also recorded a caution to the Appellate Authority for future adherence to the letter and spirit of the RTI Act in discharging quasi-judicial functions. [Paras 6, 7]Matter remanded to the Appellate Authority to decide afresh after affording personal hearing to the appellant; compliance directed within five weeks and Appellate Authority cautioned.Final Conclusion: The Appellate Authority's order was quashed for lack of application of mind; the appeal is remitted for fresh decision after personal hearing, to be completed within five weeks, and the Appellate Authority is cautioned to observe the quasi-judicial duty to apply independent mind in future.

Disclosure of personal information in larger public interest - vigilance clearance and public scrutiny - right of an appellant to an opportunity of personal hearing before the Appellate Authority - duty of the CPIO to verify records and disclose information if larger public interest is established - application of the Right to Information framework to vigilance-related recordsRight of an appellant to an opportunity of personal hearing before the Appellate Authority - procedural fairness in disposal of first appeals under the RTI regime - Whether the Appellate Authority should have granted the appellant an opportunity of personal hearing before disposing of the first appeal. - HELD THAT: - The Appellate Authority disposed of the appeal without granting the appellant the personal hearing he had expressly requested. Although the RTI Act and rules do not prescribe detailed procedures for first appeals, the Commission holds that, by convention and as a matter of procedural fairness, the Appellate Authority ought to afford an opportunity of hearing to an appellant who expressly requests it. The Commission records that the Appellate Authority should bear this convention in mind and, wherever such requests are made, afford the opportunity of hearing to the appellant. [Paras 4]Appellate Authority should, as a matter of convention and procedural fairness, grant an opportunity of personal hearing to an appellant who expressly requests it.Disclosure of personal information in larger public interest - vigilance clearance and public scrutiny - duty of the CPIO to verify records and disclose information if larger public interest is established - Whether the information sought concerning vigilance-related records of the three officers is to be disclosed on the ground of larger public interest, and what verification steps are required. - HELD THAT: - While such vigilance-related material ordinarily attracts protection as personal information, the Commission follows the principle that personal information may be disclosed if disclosure serves a larger public interest. The determinative question is whether disclosure would serve that larger public interest. The appellant has alleged that vigilance clearance was granted to the officers despite pending vigilance complaints or enquiries; if this allegation is true, disclosure would serve the public interest by exposing conduct affecting public administration and appointments. The Commission therefore directs the CPIO to revisit the records in respect of the three officers to ascertain whether vigilance clearance was granted while enquiries were pending either in the CVC or elsewhere. If the CPIO finds the appellant's claim to be true, the CPIO must disclose the requested information in totality. The CPIO is to complete this exercise and communicate the information or findings to the appellant within 15 working days of receiving the order. [Paras 6]CPIO directed to verify whether vigilance clearance was granted while enquiries were pending and, if so, to disclose the requested information forthwith within 15 working days; otherwise to communicate the finding to the appellant.Final Conclusion: The appeal is disposed of by (a) recording that Appellate Authorities should afford a personal hearing when expressly requested, and (b) directing the CPIO to verify the vigilance-clearance records of the three officers and disclose the information if the verification establishes that vigilance clearance was granted while enquiries were pending, with the exercise to be completed within 15 working days.