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Issues: Whether the adjudication order was liable to be set aside on the ground of inordinate delay in pronouncement and consequent prejudice to the appellant.
Analysis: The appeal was decided on the short question of delay in delivery of the adjudication order. The hearing had concluded long before the order was passed, and the appellant contended that the delayed pronouncement resulted in prejudice because the order did not deal with the factual and legal contentions raised before the adjudicating authority. The Court accepted that, in the peculiar facts of the case, the unexplained and undue delay, coupled with the resulting prejudice, justified interference. The Court therefore declined to enter into the merits of the allegations under FERA and confined its decision to the delay issue.
Conclusion: The delay in pronouncing the adjudication order caused prejudice and warranted setting aside of the impugned order in so far as it related to the appellant.
Issues: Whether the notices dated 12-1-2021 for handing over possession violated the earlier status quo order so as to warrant action under Order XXXIX Rule 2A CPC and Section 151 CPC.
Analysis: The Tribunal examined its earlier order of 14-12-2020 and found that it had permitted the respondent to take possession of the two identified properties in the manner contemplated by Rule 5(4) of the 2013 Rules. The later notices were held to be consistent with that direction and not contrary to the status quo observations made in the same order. On that basis, no contemptuous disobedience or violation of the earlier order was made out.
Conclusion: The applications alleging violation of the status quo order were rejected and dismissed.
Issues: Whether the impugned confirmation of provisional attachment was liable to be set aside for non-consideration of the appellant's substitution application and reply, amounting to violation of the statutory procedure and principles of natural justice.
Analysis: The appellant had stepped into the shoes of the original lender by assignment before the attachment proceedings progressed to confirmation. The record showed that the appellant's interest in the mortgaged properties was brought to the notice of the Adjudicating Authority, yet no effective order on substitution was passed and the appellant's reply, oral submissions, and written submissions were not dealt with in the impugned order. In these circumstances, the proceedings under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act required compliance with the notice and hearing requirements under Section 8, and the failure to consider the appellant's stand amounted to a procedural infirmity affecting the validity of the order qua the appellant and the attached properties.
Conclusion: The impugned order was not sustainable against the appellant and was required to be set aside with a direction for fresh adjudication after affording due opportunity.
Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded, the attachment-related adjudication was sent back for reconsideration, and the appellant's claims were left open before the Adjudicating Authority while the existing attachment was directed to continue pending fresh decision.
Ratio Decidendi: Where an assignee secured creditor's interest in mortgaged property is brought on record or otherwise made known, the Adjudicating Authority must consider its substitution request and submissions before confirming attachment under the money-laundering law; failure to do so violates the statutory hearing requirement and natural justice.
Issues: (i) Whether the appellant, as a secured creditor and claimed bona fide third party, could resist attachment and seek release of the mortgaged properties under the PMLA in preference to the Enforcement authorities. (ii) Whether the provisional attachment and its confirmation were invalid for want of material to form "reason to believe" under the PMLA and for non-applicability of Section 3.
Issue (i): Whether the appellant, as a secured creditor and claimed bona fide third party, could resist attachment and seek release of the mortgaged properties under the PMLA in preference to the Enforcement authorities.
Analysis: The properties were found to have been acquired during 2013 and 2014 from funds alleged to be traceable to fraudulent loan transactions and diversion of consortium funds, whereas the appellant's home loans and mortgage were created only in March and April 2016. The Tribunal held that, on the material before it, the properties prima facie constituted proceeds of crime and the appellant's mortgage could not override the attachment merely because SARFAESI proceedings had been initiated. The Tribunal further held that the cited authorities on bona fide third-party rights and priority of secured creditors did not assist the appellant on these facts.
Conclusion: The claim of priority and release was rejected and the attachment was upheld against the appellant.
Issue (ii): Whether the provisional attachment and its confirmation were invalid for want of material to form "reason to believe" under the PMLA and for non-applicability of Section 3.
Analysis: The Tribunal found that the impugned order disclosed the material relied upon, the travel of alleged proceeds of crime, and the conclusions supporting the formation of "reason to believe" for provisional attachment. It also held that the appellant, not being an accused in the scheduled offence or prosecution complaint, did not require a separate finding on Section 3 for the purpose of testing the attachment order, and no legal infirmity was shown in the confirmation order.
Conclusion: The challenge to the attachment on these grounds failed.
Final Conclusion: The confirmation of provisional attachment was sustained in full and the appeal was dismissed with no order as to costs.
Ratio Decidendi: A mortgagee or secured creditor cannot obtain release of property under the PMLA where the property prima facie represents proceeds of crime and the attachment is supported by material forming reason to believe; SARFAESI rights do not defeat such attachment on these facts.
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