Issues: (i) Whether the Government could direct shifting or deletion of a school reservation on a final plot and permit residential development by resorting to Rule 13.5, Section 37, Section 50 or Section 154 of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966; (ii) whether the landowner's claimed residential user under the erstwhile town planning scheme survived against the later development plan reservation and whether the acquisition had lapsed or the civil suit was maintainable; (iii) whether the adverse remarks against the Chief Minister, the Minister of State and the Municipal Commissioner, and the direction for criminal investigation, were sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether the Government could direct shifting or deletion of a school reservation on a final plot and permit residential development by resorting to Rule 13.5, Section 37, Section 50 or Section 154 of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966.

Analysis: The sanctioned development plan has primacy and must ordinarily be implemented as framed. A reservation for a public amenity such as a primary school cannot be deleted or shifted by executive instruction or by invoking a development control rule beyond its limited field. Rule 13.5 permitted only a limited shifting within specified distance and within the owner's holding, not a transfer to a distant site. Deletion or alteration of a reservation required compliance with the statutory procedure under Section 37, and where the change was substantial, the stricter procedure applicable to substantial modifications had to be followed. Section 50 could operate only at the request of the appropriate authority itself, which was not the case. Section 154 conferred general administrative control and could not authorize action contrary to the Act.

Conclusion: The Government-directed deletion of reservation and the resultant development permission were illegal and unjustified.

Issue (ii): Whether the landowner's claimed residential user under the erstwhile town planning scheme survived against the later development plan reservation and whether the acquisition had lapsed or the civil suit was maintainable.

Analysis: The Act treats the development plan as the governing instrument for planned development, and the town planning scheme must be varied to the extent necessary to bring it in line with the final development plan. The existence of a prior residential user under the saved town planning scheme did not entitle the landowner to defeat the later reservation for a public amenity, particularly after the land had been acquired and compensation accepted. A land acquired for one public purpose does not become invalid merely because the user is later adjusted to another public purpose. The civil court had no jurisdiction to test the validity of the acquisition in the manner attempted.

Conclusion: The landowner's plea based on the erstwhile scheme was rejected, and the acquisition was held valid and complete.

Issue (iii): Whether the adverse remarks against the Chief Minister, the Minister of State and the Municipal Commissioner, and the direction for criminal investigation, were sustainable.

Analysis: The materials on record supported the inference that the public process was bent to favour a private developer connected with the Chief Minister, and the strictures against the Chief Minister and the Minister of State were warranted. The Commissioner's conduct was criticized, but the Court found no basis to attribute a personal motive sufficient to sustain criminal investigation against him. In light of the governing principles on investigation directions, a blanket order for impartial criminal investigation into whether offences had been committed could not be maintained on the record as it stood.

Conclusion: The strictures against the Chief Minister and the Minister of State were maintained, the remarks against the Municipal Commissioner were deleted, and the direction for criminal investigation was set aside.

Final Conclusion: The illegal development permission and the challenge to the public reservation failed, the demolition direction was substantially upheld, the landowner's alternative claim under the old scheme was rejected, and only limited relief was granted by deleting the remarks against the Commissioner and the criminal investigation direction while maintaining the adverse findings against the Chief Minister and the Minister of State.

Ratio Decidendi: A development plan reservation for a public amenity cannot be overridden by executive instruction or an inapplicable development control rule, and any deletion or shifting of such reservation must strictly follow the statutory procedure prescribed by the planning law.

Issues: (i) whether the writ petition was barred by delay and laches; (ii) whether the impugned circulars and regulations were beyond the power under the Aircraft Act, 1934 and the Aircraft Rules, 1937, arbitrary, discriminatory, or violative of Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India; (iii) whether the petitioners had any vested or legitimate expectation to continue self-ground handling and whether the circulars and regulations conflicted with Rule 134 of the Aircraft Rules, 1937.

Issue (i): whether the writ petition was barred by delay and laches.

Analysis: The challenge was not rejected on the ground of delay because the policy had been kept in abeyance and modified from time to time, and the matter was heard on merits.

Conclusion: The writ petition was not barred by delay and laches.

Issue (ii): whether the impugned circulars and regulations were beyond the power under the Aircraft Act, 1934 and the Aircraft Rules, 1937, arbitrary, discriminatory, or violative of Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India.

Analysis: Section 5A of the Aircraft Act, 1934 was construed broadly and contextually to permit directions for aviation security and aircraft safety. Rule 92 of the Aircraft Rules, 1937 was held not to confer an indefeasible right of self-handling on airline operators, but to require a competitive environment subject to security clearance. The policy choice was treated as one based on security and public interest, and the Court held that the classification was supported by intelligible differentia. The restriction on self-ground handling was found to be a reasonable restriction in the interest of general public and national security, and not arbitrary or capricious.

Conclusion: The circulars and regulations were within power, valid, and not violative of Articles 14 or 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India.

Issue (iii): whether the petitioners had any vested or legitimate expectation to continue self-ground handling and whether the circulars and regulations conflicted with Rule 134 of the Aircraft Rules, 1937.

Analysis: The Court held that the licence conditions and earlier practice did not create a vested right to self-ground handling. Legitimate expectation could not override a valid change in policy made in public interest. Rule 134 and Schedule XI were held not to confer a right to self-handle, and the Regulations fixing revised conditions for ground handling did not conflict with the statutory framework.

Conclusion: The petitioners had no enforceable vested right or legitimate expectation to continue self-ground handling, and there was no inconsistency with Rule 134 of the Aircraft Rules, 1937.

Final Conclusion: The challenged ground-handling policy was upheld in substance, and the petition failed on all substantive grounds.

Ratio Decidendi: A security-based policy regulating ground handling at airports, if enacted within statutory power and supported by public interest, may validly restrict airline self-handling without offending equality, trade rights, or legitimate expectation.

1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED

The core legal issues considered in this judgment are:

• Whether the writ petition is maintainable given the availability of an alternative statutory remedy and the non-joinder of a necessary party, JICA.
• Whether the conditions in the bid documents regarding average annual production turnover and production experience are unreasonable, irrational, or illegal.
• Whether the conditions are intended to create a monopoly or are anti-competitive, thus violating the Competition Act, 2002.
• Whether the terms in the bid documents violate the petitioner's constitutional rights under Articles 14, 19, and 21 of the Constitution of India.

2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS

Issue 1: Maintainability of the Writ Petition

• Legal Framework: The writ petition's maintainability was challenged based on the availability of alternative remedies under the Competition Act, 2002, and the non-joinder of JICA, a necessary party.
• Court's Interpretation: The court held that the Competition Act provides a comprehensive mechanism for addressing anti-competitive practices and abuse of dominant position, making it the appropriate forum for such disputes.
• Conclusions: The writ petition is not maintainable due to the availability of an alternative remedy under the Competition Act and the non-joinder of JICA.

Issue 2: Reasonableness and Legality of Bid Conditions

• Legal Framework: The court examined the bid conditions under the principles of administrative law, focusing on reasonableness, fairness, and the absence of arbitrariness.
• Court's Interpretation: The court found that the conditions were within the discretion of the tendering authority and were not arbitrary or discriminatory. The conditions were aimed at ensuring the capability and reliability of bidders.
• Conclusions: The bid conditions were reasonable and necessary to ensure the quality and timely execution of the project.

Issue 3: Anti-Competitive Nature of Bid Conditions

• Legal Framework: Sections 3 and 4 of the Competition Act, 2002, which prohibit anti-competitive agreements and abuse of dominant position.
• Court's Interpretation: The court held that no agreement had been entered into that would trigger the application of Section 3. Additionally, GMDA was not in a dominant position in the relevant market.
• Conclusions: The bid conditions did not violate the Competition Act as there was no anti-competitive agreement or abuse of dominant position.

Issue 4: Violation of Constitutional Rights

• Legal Framework: Articles 14, 19, and 21 of the Constitution of India, which guarantee equality, freedom to practice any profession, and the right to life.
• Court's Interpretation: The court found no violation of constitutional rights, as the bid conditions were not arbitrary or discriminatory and served a legitimate public interest.
• Conclusions: The petitioner's constitutional rights were not violated by the bid conditions.

3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS

• Verbatim Quotes: "The terms of the invitation to tender cannot be open to judicial scrutiny because the invitation to tender is in the realm of contract."
• Core Principles Established: The court reaffirmed the principle that the terms of a tender are within the discretion of the tendering authority and are not subject to judicial review unless they are arbitrary, discriminatory, or mala fide.
• Final Determinations: The writ petition was dismissed, and the interim order was vacated. The court upheld the bid conditions as reasonable and necessary for ensuring the quality and timely execution of the project.

Issues: (i) Whether the receipts from international connectivity services were taxable as royalty for use of equipment or use of process under the Income-tax Act and the India-Singapore DTAA. (ii) Whether the assessee had a business connection or permanent establishment in India so as to attract Indian tax.

Issue (i): Whether the receipts from international connectivity services were taxable as royalty for use of equipment or use of process under the Income-tax Act and the India-Singapore DTAA.

Analysis: The receipts were found to arise from dedicated bandwidth and composite telecom connectivity arrangements under which the customer obtained a significant economic and possessory interest in the network capacity for the contract period. Physical possession of the equipment was held not to be essential. The payments were also treated as consideration for use of the underlying process involved in transmitting signals through sophisticated telecom infrastructure, and the absence of a secret process did not take the case outside royalty. The split billing arrangement was treated as a device to reflect the regulatory structure and did not alter the real character of the payment.

Conclusion: The receipts were held to be royalty and taxable in India, against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the assessee had a business connection or permanent establishment in India so as to attract Indian tax.

Analysis: The record showed substantial activities in India through associated entities and service support arrangements, including fault resolution, marketing support, and installation and maintenance of equipment in India. The local entity was treated as a provisioning entity and the overall arrangement showed enduring business links with India. On that basis, the assessee was found to have business connection in India and the factual matrix also supported the existence of a permanent establishment.

Conclusion: The existence of business connection and permanent establishment in India was upheld, against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The taxability of the impugned receipts in India was sustained on royalty principles and on the basis of Indian business connection and permanent establishment, and the assessee's challenge failed in full.

Ratio Decidendi: Consideration for dedicated telecom connectivity that confers a significant economic interest in network capacity, or that is paid for use of the underlying telecom process, constitutes royalty; where the factual arrangement also establishes enduring Indian business links through local support and provisioning functions, Indian tax jurisdiction is attracted.

Issues: (i) Whether the public notices regulating mention and alteration of the destination Container Freight Station in the Import General Manifest were without authority or arbitrary and contrary to the Customs Act, 1962 and Article 14 of the Constitution of India; (ii) Whether change of the destination Container Freight Station in the Import General Manifest amounted to a material amendment attracting penal consequences under Section 30 of the Customs Act, 1962.

Issue (i): Whether the public notices regulating mention and alteration of the destination Container Freight Station in the Import General Manifest were without authority or arbitrary and contrary to the Customs Act, 1962 and Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

Analysis: The Customs framework treats the port, customs area, inland container depot and container freight station as parts of the same controlled customs arrangement for clearance and movement of imported cargo. The destination Container Freight Station is only a facility for decongestion and expeditious customs handling, and the public notices were issued after consultation with stakeholders to regulate operational movement within the customs regime. The notices did not alter the statutory scheme of import clearance or trench upon any enforceable constitutional or contractual right of the petitioners.

Conclusion: The challenge to the public notices on the ground of want of authority and arbitrariness failed.

Issue (ii): Whether change of the destination Container Freight Station in the Import General Manifest amounted to a material amendment attracting penal consequences under Section 30 of the Customs Act, 1962.

Analysis: Section 30 requires a true and timely manifest, but the Court held that omission or alteration regarding the destination Container Freight Station was procedural and did not go to the core of the declaration about the cargo. The customs authorities retained control over the goods after unloading, and the movement to a Container Freight Station remained within the customs area and under customs supervision. On that basis, the Court held that such change did not render the manifest untrue or incomplete so as to attract penal consequences.

Conclusion: The change of destination Container Freight Station in the Import General Manifest was not treated as a penal amendment under Section 30.

Final Conclusion: The writ petitions were rejected, and the impugned trade/public notices regulating Container Freight Station movement were upheld as valid customs facilitation measures.

Ratio Decidendi: A procedural regulation governing the destination of imported cargo within the customs-controlled movement from port to Container Freight Station does not amount to a substantive amendment of the Import General Manifest, and such operational facilitation measures, when issued within the customs framework, are not arbitrary merely because they permit a change in the destination Container Freight Station.

Issues: (i) Whether involuntary administration of narcoanalysis, polygraph examination and the Brain Electrical Activation Profile test violates the protection against self-incrimination under Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India, including whether the results are testimonial in nature; (ii) Whether compulsory administration of those techniques is permissible under Article 21 and the statutory scheme governing medical examination during investigation.

Issue (i): Whether involuntary administration of narcoanalysis, polygraph examination and the Brain Electrical Activation Profile test violates the protection against self-incrimination under Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India, including whether the results are testimonial in nature?

Analysis: Article 20(3) was construed as extending to the investigative stage and protecting not only formally accused persons but also suspects and witnesses whose answers may expose them to criminal liability. The protection was held to cover compulsion that yields statements or information with incriminatory tendency, including material that furnishes a link in the chain of evidence. Narcoanalysis was treated as plainly testimonial because it elicits verbal disclosures in a drug-induced state. Polygraph and BEAP results, though derived from physiological measurements, were also treated as testimonial because they communicate personal knowledge about relevant facts and operate as an indirect mode of compelled disclosure.

Conclusion: Involuntary administration of all three techniques attracts Article 20(3) and is unconstitutional.

Issue (ii): Whether compulsory administration of those techniques is permissible under Article 21 and the statutory scheme governing medical examination during investigation?

Analysis: The Explanation to Sections 53, 53-A and 54 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was held not to extend to these techniques, since the statutory words relating to modern scientific techniques were confined by the common genus of physical or bodily examination and could not be expanded to cover compelled testimonial responses. Compulsory administration was further held to amount to an unjustified intrusion into mental privacy, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, and an interference with fair trial guarantees. At the same time, the Court recognised that voluntary administration is permissible with safeguards, and that any material subsequently discovered with the help of voluntarily obtained results may be used in accordance with Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.

Conclusion: Compulsory administration is impermissible under Article 21, but voluntary administration is allowed with safeguards and derivative discovery may be used under Section 27.

Final Conclusion: The constitutional and evidentiary framework was held to forbid forced resort to these investigative techniques, while preserving a limited voluntary use subject to judicial safeguards and post-test discovery rules.

Ratio Decidendi: Compelled administration of techniques that extract or infer personal knowledge from an accused, suspect or witness is barred when it infringes testimonial compulsion and personal liberty, but voluntary use remains permissible and only subsequently discovered material may be admitted.

Issues: (i) Whether the Indian Olympic Association was a public authority under Section 2(h) of the Right to Information Act, 2005; (ii) Whether the Organizing Committee of the Commonwealth Games, 2010 was a public authority under Section 2(h) of the Right to Information Act, 2005; (iii) Whether Sanskriti School was a public authority under Section 2(h) of the Right to Information Act, 2005.

Issue (i): Whether the Indian Olympic Association was a public authority under Section 2(h) of the Right to Information Act, 2005.

Analysis: The definition of public authority was treated as an inclusive one. The Court held that a non-governmental organization need not be established by a notification if it otherwise falls within the inclusive part of Section 2(h). The expression "substantially financed" was construed in its ordinary and contextual sense, without importing the narrower test from the CAG Act. On the facts, the Indian Olympic Association received significant government funding over several years for international sporting participation and related activities, and its functioning depended materially on such public assistance.

Conclusion: The Indian Olympic Association was held to be a public authority and was amenable to the Right to Information Act, 2005.

Issue (ii): Whether the Organizing Committee of the Commonwealth Games, 2010 was a public authority under Section 2(h) of the Right to Information Act, 2005.

Analysis: The Committee was found to be a non-governmental organization created for organizing the Games, with substantial public financing in the form of large unsecured advances and governmental support that extended beyond an ordinary commercial loan arrangement. The Court emphasized that the waiver of interest from surplus, the commitment to meet shortfalls, and the use of public infrastructure without user charges showed substantial financing by the Government, even though the Committee retained autonomy in its internal affairs.

Conclusion: The Organizing Committee of the Commonwealth Games, 2010 was held to be a public authority and was subject to the Right to Information Act, 2005.

Issue (iii): Whether Sanskriti School was a public authority under Section 2(h) of the Right to Information Act, 2005.

Analysis: The Court held that mere presence of civil servants' spouses in the management did not by itself establish governmental control. However, the record showed substantial public funding for construction and infrastructure, concessional allotment of valuable land, audit conditions, government nominees on the managing committee, and other terms reflecting significant support from public funds. These facts brought the school within the category of a non-governmental organization substantially financed by the appropriate Government.

Conclusion: Sanskriti School was held to be a public authority and was covered by the Right to Information Act, 2005.

Final Conclusion: The writ petitions failed, the impugned orders were sustained, and all three petitioners were required to comply with the disclosure obligations and information-access framework under the Right to Information Act, 2005.

Ratio Decidendi: For purposes of Section 2(h) of the Right to Information Act, 2005, an autonomous non-governmental body may be a public authority if it is substantially financed by public funds, and the expression "substantially financed" is to be construed contextually and not by borrowing a narrower definition from another statute.

Issues: Whether ghee is a product of livestock under the Act; whether the impugned notification under Section 4(4) of the Act is valid without following the procedure under Section 3 and Section 4; and whether traders in ghee are liable to obtain a licence and pay market fee.

Analysis: The first opinion held that ghee, being a derivative of milk through butter, falls within the expression "products of livestock" and that the Government was competent to notify it for regulation. It further held that the scheme of Sections 3 and 4 shows that the objection procedure is confined to the initial declaration of a notified area, while Section 4(4) permits later regulatory changes by notification without repeating the entire Section 3 process. The impugned notification was therefore treated as a valid regulatory measure, and the market committee's power to require licence and levy fee was upheld.

Conclusion: The first opinion was against the writ petitioner and upheld the notification, the levy, and the licensing requirement.

Analysis: The second opinion took the opposite view, holding that ghee does not fall within the statutory definition of livestock product and that the mandatory procedural steps under Sections 3 and 4 were not followed before issuing the notification. It concluded that the notification could not be sustained and that the writ petitioner was entitled to relief.

Conclusion: The second opinion was in favour of the writ petitioner and invalidated the notification.

Final Conclusion: The judgment contains conflicting conclusions on the validity of the notification and the liability to obtain licence and pay market fee, so no single conclusive majority outcome emerges from the text.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a statute specifically empowers the Government to notify products for market regulation, later regulatory notifications may be issued within that framework without repeating the initial objection procedure, but the statutory scheme must still be followed as to any mandatory procedural preconditions.

Issues: (i) whether the evidence established undervaluation and extra cash collection only in respect of the identified dealers or justified confirmation of duty for all clearances; (ii) how assessable value was to be determined for clearances made before 1-7-2000 and after 1-7-2000; (iii) whether confiscation, redemption fine and penalties on the seized goods and concerned dealers were sustainable.

Issue (i): whether the evidence established undervaluation and extra cash collection only in respect of the identified dealers or justified confirmation of duty for all clearances.

Analysis: The record showed extensive investigation, recovery of deleted computer data, corroboration by the computer operator and the managing partner, and statements of several dealers indicating collection of amounts over and above the invoice price. At the same time, the evidence directly covered only some dealers, and the material did not justify a uniform assumption that the same pattern stood proved for every dealer in every area. The demand could not be sustained on a blanket basis for all clearances merely on general probability, but the undervaluation charge itself was not rejected.

Conclusion: Undervaluation was established, but the full demand for all clearances was not finally confirmed.

Issue (ii): how assessable value was to be determined for clearances made before 1-7-2000 and after 1-7-2000.

Analysis: For the period before 1-7-2000, valuation had to proceed on the basis of normal price under the then prevailing Section 4 regime, with the assessable value to be worked out from the evidence in accordance with law. For the period after 1-7-2000, the transaction value under the amended valuation framework had to be applied transaction-wise, and the authorities could not mechanically add a uniform percentage to every clearance. The matter required fresh quantification on the correct legal basis.

Conclusion: The duty issue was remanded for re-quantification under the correct valuation principles applicable to the two periods.

Issue (iii): whether confiscation, redemption fine and penalties on the seized goods and concerned dealers were sustainable.

Analysis: The seized goods were found to have been cleared through undervaluation, supported by the documentary material and statements on record. On that footing, the confiscation and redemption fine were justified, and the penalties on the dealers from whose premises the goods were seized were also sustained. Penalty on the partner was left to be reconsidered after recomputation of duty.

Conclusion: Confiscation, redemption fine and the penalties on the seized-goods dealers were upheld, while the partner's penalty was left open for reconsideration after re-quantification.

Final Conclusion: The matter was partly allowed by sustaining the finding of undervaluation and the confiscation-related consequences, but sending the principal duty demand back for fresh quantification under the correct valuation regime for the relevant periods.

Ratio Decidendi: Where undervaluation is proved, duty must be reworked under the correct statutory valuation method applicable to each relevant period, and a blanket extension of evidence from selected dealers to all clearances is not permissible without adequate proof.

Issues: (i) Whether the right to choose the medium of instruction at the primary level is a fundamental right under the Constitution; (ii) Whether the State can compel students and recognised educational institutions to adopt mother tongue or the regional language as the medium of instruction.

Issue (i): Whether the right to choose the medium of instruction at the primary level is a fundamental right under the Constitution.

Analysis: The Court held that the right to education, read with freedom of speech and expression, carries with it the right to receive and impart knowledge through a medium of one's choice. It further held that the freedom to carry on an occupation and the rights of religious denominations and linguistic or religious minorities to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice include the choice of medium of instruction. The parental role in deciding the child's education was treated as integral to this freedom, and the Court also relied on the constitutional protection against denial of admission on the ground of language.

Conclusion: The right to choose the medium of instruction is a fundamental right of the child, the parent, the citizen, and educational institutions, subject to lawful regulation that does not destroy the right.

Issue (ii): Whether the State can compel students and recognised educational institutions to adopt mother tongue or the regional language as the medium of instruction.

Analysis: The Court distinguished between a permissible regulation and an impermissible restriction. It held that while the State may frame educational policy and regulate standards, curriculum, affiliation, and other matters advancing educational excellence, it cannot compel recognised schools or parents to accept a particular medium of instruction. The impugned clauses were found to go beyond regulation and to operate as a restriction on constitutional rights, and Article 350-A was held to impose an obligation on the State in favour of linguistic minorities rather than a power to compel all students to study only in mother tongue or Kannada.

Conclusion: The State cannot compel the medium of instruction to be only mother tongue or regional language in recognised schools other than Government or aided schools to the extent protected by the decision; the impugned clauses were invalid insofar as they imposed such compulsion.

Final Conclusion: The challenge succeeded in part, the compulsory features of the policy were struck down for recognised schools to the extent they infringed constitutional rights, while the remaining language policy was sustained.

Ratio Decidendi: A State educational policy is valid only so long as it remains regulatory and does not compel a medium of instruction in a manner that infringes the constitutional right to choose the medium of instruction.

Issues: (i) Whether copyright subsisted in the copy-edited version of the Supreme Court judgments as published in SCC, and if so to what extent; (ii) Whether the appellants had copyright in the editorial inputs such as paragraph numbering, internal references, headnotes, footnotes, editorial notes and the presentation of judges' concurring or dissenting opinions.

Issue (i): Whether copyright subsisted in the copy-edited version of the Supreme Court judgments as published in SCC, and if so to what extent.

Analysis: Copyright protection under the Copyright Act, 1957 depends on originality in the protected expression. The text of judicial decisions is a government work and its reproduction or publication is permitted by the statutory exception for judgments and orders, so no monopoly can be claimed in the raw text of judgments merely because editorial labour has been expended on it. For a derivative compilation to attract protection, the work must be independently created and must reflect at least a minimal degree of creativity in selection, coordination or arrangement, beyond trivial or mechanical effort. The Court held that the SCC copy-edited judgments, insofar as they consisted only of corrections, citations, formatting and similar ordinary editorial inputs, did not meet that standard.

Conclusion: The appellants had no copyright in the copy-edited text of the Supreme Court judgments as such.

Issue (ii): Whether the appellants had copyright in the editorial inputs such as paragraph numbering, internal references, headnotes, footnotes, editorial notes and the presentation of judges' concurring or dissenting opinions.

Analysis: The headnotes, footnotes and editorial notes were treated as original editorial creations because they involved skill, labour and independent selection. The same approach was adopted for paragraph numbering, internal paragraph references and the editorial indication of concurring, partly concurring, dissenting or similar judicial opinions, because these required discernment, understanding of the structure of the judgment and legal judgment in presentation. These elements were held to cross the threshold of minimal creativity and therefore to be protectable expressions distinct from the underlying judgments themselves.

Conclusion: The appellants had copyright in the headnotes, footnotes, editorial notes, paragraph numbering, internal references and similar editorial presentation features.

Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded only in part. Protection was denied for the reported judgment text itself, but granted for the original editorial material and presentation features developed by the appellants.

Ratio Decidendi: Copyright in a derivative or compiled work arises only where the editorial contribution reflects independent skill and judgment with a minimal degree of creativity in the protected expression, and it does not extend to the underlying public-domain judgment text or to purely mechanical editorial alterations.

Issues: Whether a negative covenant in a sports management and agency agreement, operating after the contractual term and conferring a right of first refusal, could be enforced by an interim injunction under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

Analysis: The agreement was held to be one of personal, confidential and fiduciary character, involving management of the sportsman's public persona and commercial activities. Such a contract was treated as incapable of specific performance, and the grant of injunction would in substance compel continuance of a personal agency relationship despite loss of confidence. The covenant in question operated after the term of the agreement and restrained the sportsman from dealing with third parties without first offering the petitioner a matching opportunity. A covenant of that nature was held to be in restraint of trade and hit by Section 27 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 was held not to require injunction in every case where the contract contains a negative stipulation; the grant of relief still depends on sound judicial discretion and the circumstances of the case.

Conclusion: The negative covenant was not enforceable by interim injunction, and the application for protection under Section 9 failed.

Issues: (i) Whether the non-resident assessee had income chargeable to tax in India under section 5(2) read with section 9(1)(i) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 on account of a business connection in India; (ii) whether the assessee had a permanent establishment in India under Article 5 of the India-USA DTAA, including a fixed place PE and an agency PE; and (iii) whether any income, if attributable to India, was fully absorbed by the remuneration paid to the Indian distributor so that no further amount remained taxable.

Issue (i): Whether the non-resident assessee had income chargeable to tax in India under section 5(2) read with section 9(1)(i) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 on account of a business connection in India.

Analysis: The business model involved a global reservation system operated from outside India, but the system also extended into India through connectivity, subscriber-side equipment, and distributor-facilitated access. The Tribunal applied the settled test that a business connection requires a real, intimate and continuous relationship between the non-resident's business and activities in India contributing to the earning of income. It found that the Indian-side configuration and connectivity formed part of the revenue-generating process and that bookings made in India generated the assessee's booking fees. It also held that only a part of the operations was carried out in India and that attribution had to be confined to the Indian operations.

Conclusion: The assessee had a business connection in India and part of its income was attributable to operations carried out in India.

Issue (ii): Whether the assessee had a permanent establishment in India under Article 5 of the India-USA DTAA, including a fixed place PE and an agency PE.

Analysis: For a fixed place PE, the Tribunal treated the subscriber-side computers and Indian telecommunications network as an integrated part of the reservation system, noting that the assessee had control over the configuration and connectivity used for bookings in India and that the activity was not merely preparatory or auxiliary. On the agency side, the Tribunal held that Interglobe acted as a dependent agent because it was authorised to enter into subscriber contracts and carried on activities integral to the assessee's business in India, while the contractual denial of agency was not conclusive on the factual matrix. The Tribunal rejected the argument that the Indian activities were too remote or merely ancillary.

Conclusion: The assessee had a fixed place PE and an agency PE in India.

Issue (iii): Whether any income, if attributable to India, was fully absorbed by the remuneration paid to the Indian distributor so that no further amount remained taxable.

Analysis: Although the Tribunal attributed 15 per cent of the booking revenue to Indian operations, it held that the remuneration paid to the Indian distributor consumed the entire income attributable to the Indian PE. Relying on the treaty attribution rules and the principle that no further amount remains to be taxed where the Indian entity is remunerated at arm's length, it concluded that the assessable income stood exhausted.

Conclusion: No further income was taxable in India after giving effect to the remuneration paid to the Indian distributor.

Final Conclusion: The appeals were allowed only to the limited extent that, despite the finding of Indian tax nexus and PE, the assessee's taxable income was held to be nil after attribution and set-off of the distributor remuneration; the revenue's cross objections succeeded on the ancillary issues.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a non-resident's global business system extends into India through integrated connectivity, subscriber-side equipment, and a dependent distributor, the Indian component may constitute both a business connection and a permanent establishment, but only the profits attributable to the Indian operations are taxable and such attribution may be neutralised where arm's length remuneration to the Indian entity exhausts the attributable income.