TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
The recent order of the Bombay High Court in Gulermak TPL Pune Metro Joint Venture Versus Union of India & Ors. - 2026 (3) TMI 1359 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT, once again exposes a recurring institutional tendency within indirect tax administration-to enforce first and justify later.
The petition in Gulermak raised a substantial challenge to notifications issued under Section 168A of the CGST Act extending limitation for passing orders. The contention was neither peripheral nor technical. It went to the root-whether Section 168A permits extension of time for adjudication under Section 73(4) at all. This very issue already stood admitted for consideration in Shyam Udyog Versus Union of India & Ors. - 2025 (4) TMI 1168 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT and had been followed in Rite Equipments Pvt. Ltd. Versus State of Maharashtra & Ors.-2026 (2) TMI 1330 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT.
Yet, despite the pendency of such a fundamental legal challenge, the Department proceeded to pass the impugned order and immediately triggered coercive consequences-blocking of the electronic credit ledger and attachment.
The High Court intervened, as it had to. The impugned order was stayed. More importantly, all consequential coercive measures were also stayed and/or vacated. The Court did not embark upon a final pronouncement on vires. It did something more basic-it restored balance.
This sequence is telling.
The statutory scheme under Section 73 is structured around adjudication preceding recovery. Liability must first be lawfully determined. Only thereafter can enforcement follow. Section 168A, introduced in the context of extraordinary circumstances, cannot be read as a carte blanche to rewrite limitation principles or to legitimise belated adjudication. Whether such extension is intra vires or ultra vires is a matter squarely within judicial domain.
When that very domain is already seized of the issue, the Department's insistence on pressing coercive measures betrays a deeper administrative impatience.
This impatience manifests in a predictable pattern. Orders are passed at the edge of extended timelines. Immediately thereafter, Rule 86A is invoked to block input tax credit. Bank accounts are attached. Recovery is set in motion. The taxpayer is then compelled to approach the High Court-not for adjudication of liability, but for protection against enforcement.
The process becomes the penalty.
What is striking is that such actions are not taken in ignorance of judicial developments. The precedents are cited before the authorities themselves. The pendency of writ petitions is known. Yet, the administrative response remains unchanged-secure the demand first, leave legality to be sorted later.
This approach is incompatible with constitutional discipline.
Judicial review is not an afterthought in tax administration. It is an integral safeguard. When a High Court admits a petition on a substantial question-particularly one concerning jurisdiction or limitation-the executive is expected to exhibit restraint. Passing an order may be driven by perceived statutory compulsion, but enforcing it through coercive means while the issue is sub judice amounts to pre-empting the court.
The order in Gulermak implicitly recognises this. By staying not only the adjudication order but also the blocking of the electronic credit ledger and attachment, the Court reaffirms a critical principle:
coercive power must remain subservient to judicial scrutiny.
The consequences of ignoring this principle are not merely procedural. Blocking of credit under Rule 86A directly impacts liquidity. Attachment paralyses operations. In commercial reality, these measures can achieve what even a confirmed demand may not-immediate financial strangulation. When such steps are taken in cases where the very legality of the demand is under challenge, the administration effectively imposes a sanction without authority.
It is here that the institutional mindset requires recalibration.
Revenue protection cannot be equated with revenue pre-emption. The anxiety to safeguard tax cannot justify bypassing the hierarchy of legal determination. A demand that may ultimately fail on limitation or vires cannot be allowed to produce irreversible consequences in the interim.
The repeated need for judicial intervention, as seen in Shyam Udyog, Rite Equipments, and now Gulermak, suggests that the problem is not doctrinal but systemic. The law is clear. The courts have spoken. What remains is administrative alignment.
A mature tax administration recognises that restraint is not weakness. It is fidelity to law.
Until such maturity is institutionalised, High Courts will continue to perform the corrective function-granting interim protection, staying coercive measures, and restoring equilibrium. But each such intervention carries an implicit indictment: that the executive has once again moved ahead of legality.
Gulermak is therefore not just another interim order. It is a reminder.
A reminder that in tax law, authority flows from legality, not from the urgency to enforce.
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By Adv. G. Jayaprakash(Former Central Excise Officer)