CENVAT credit for services used in setting up a manufacturing factory remains available under the principal definition of input service in Rule 2(l) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004, even after "setting up" was removed from its inclusive clause with effect from 1 April 2011. Services with a direct or indirect nexus to manufacture independently qualify because manufacturing cannot commence without the facility. The omission does not limit the principal clause; however, credit is unavailable where a particular service falls within an exclusion, including excluded construction, civil-structure, foundation, or support-structure activities. Eligibility requires service-wise verification against those exclusions.

CENVAT credit on inputs cannot be denied merely on uncorroborated material allegedly recovered from a supplier where the recipient maintains valid invoices, stock records, vendor ledgers, bank-payment evidence and freight-payment details establishing receipt and accounting of goods. Recording the transactions in RG 23A Part I and reporting them in ER-1 returns negates suppression, particularly where the supplier was not made a co-noticee. On the stated facts, denial of credit was unsustainable on merits and the extended limitation period was not invocable; the related demand was set aside.

Pre-1 April 2011, the unamended definition of input service had broad inclusive coverage for services used in activities relating to business. Vehicle insurance and employee accidental and medical insurance, including group health insurance extending to employees' family members, fell within both the main and inclusive limbs of that definition. Eligibility for CENVAT credit did not require proof of an integral connection between each insurance service and the output service. CENVAT credit on these insurance services was therefore admissible for the relevant period.

Service tax on credit-card services applies to the merchant discount rate as a unified charge comprising the acquiring-bank fee, interchange fee and platform fee. Where the acquiring bank has discharged service tax on the entire merchant discount rate, separately taxing the issuing bank's interchange fee would duplicate taxation without revenue loss. Consequently, no separate service-tax liability arises on interchange fee in those circumstances, and consequential demands, interest and penalties are unsustainable.

Transponder bandwidth capacity supplied by foreign satellite service providers constituted telecommunication service because it enabled satellite-based connectivity between points on earth. Under the Finance Act, 1994, telecommunication service was taxable only when supplied by a telegraph authority licensed under the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885; foreign providers did not meet that condition. Such services could not be reclassified as Business Support Service merely because they fell outside the telecommunication-service taxability clause. Bandwidth capacity did not amount to the infrastructural or commercial support covered by Business Support Service. Consequently, reverse-charge service tax was not payable as Business Support Service, and the proceedings were dropped.

Admission-facilitation services supplied to foreign universities on the provider's own account do not constitute intermediary services merely because the provider is described as an agent and receives commission. Intermediary status requires three parties, two distinct supplies, and facilitation of a separate main supply by another person; the services therefore qualify as exports. Commission from domestic educational institutions remains eligible for the small-service-provider exemption where it is below the aggregate-value threshold, and exported-service value is excluded from that threshold calculation. Consequently, no service tax is payable on either the foreign-university or qualifying domestic-institution commission.

Cleaning, sanitation and housekeeping contracts constitute cleaning services rather than manpower supply where the provider retains control and supervision over personnel and consideration is for the completed activity, not workforce deployment. The related service-tax demand, interest and penalties were therefore unsustainable. A mismatch between income-tax disclosures and ST-3 returns cannot, without corroborative evidence of taxable services and their value, establish service-tax liability; the demand based solely on that discrepancy was unsustainable. Admitted tax and interest on legal services remained payable, without penalty.

Output-based conversion and packaging of Third Schedule biscuits constituted manufacture, not manpower supply, because consideration depended on packed quantity and the process rendered goods marketable. The activity was consequently covered by the service-tax exclusion for processes amounting to manufacture. Reverse-charge demands for security, GTA and legal services did not arise where security services were provided by a tax-charging body corporate, freight entries included non-GTA expenses or settled audit liabilities, and legal-service invoices concerned consultants rather than advocates. Extended limitation and penalties were unavailable because the dispute was interpretational, based on audited statutory records, and lacked fraud, wilful misstatement or suppression intended to evade tax.

Service tax paid on a contractual advance is refundable without the limitation under Section 11B where the underlying project is terminated before services commence, no consideration is adjusted against performance, and the entire advance is recovered. In those circumstances, the payment does not retain the character of legally payable service tax but constitutes a deposit with the Revenue. The tax incidence must also remain with the assessee. Refund entitlement arises on termination of the contract and recovery of the advance, with consequential relief available.

Bail for an alleged money-laundering offence requires satisfaction of the statutory twin conditions: the prosecution must have an opportunity to oppose bail, and the court must have reasonable grounds to believe the accused is not guilty and unlikely to commit an offence while on bail. Allegations of substantial misappropriation and an investigation statement indicated an alleged connection with proceeds of crime. As the twin conditions were not satisfied, bail was refused.

Money laundering liability under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act requires cogent material establishing culpable intent and knowing involvement with proceeds of crime. Uncorroborated co-accused statements alleging peripheral facilitation, without documentary or electronic evidence, a money trail, recovery, attachment, control of funds, participation in the predicate offence, or personal benefit, do not establish the required mens rea. Mere suspicion or an expectation that evidence may emerge at trial cannot sustain prosecution. Proceedings were quashed because the material did not disclose a sustainable money-laundering case against the petitioners.

Bail for money-laundering offences requires recorded satisfaction of the mandatory twin conditions under Section 45 of the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002: reasonable grounds to believe that the accused is not guilty and is unlikely to commit an offence while on bail. Parity with anticipatory bail granted for non-PMLA offences is inapplicable, and cooperation with investigation alone cannot meet these statutory requirements. Bail granted without applying and recording satisfaction of the twin conditions is unsustainable and liable to be cancelled.

Complaint concerning alleged money laundering was to be taken up by the competent department, which undertook to act in accordance with law and communicate developments to the petitioner. No stipulated time limit was prescribed for completing the process, although responsible action was expected. No determination was made on the underlying money-laundering allegations, and the writ petition was disposed of.

Anticipatory bail in a money-laundering investigation may be refused where investigation material prima facie links the applicant to illegal call-centre operations, alleged proceeds of crime, their layering, and unexplained financial credits. At the pre-arrest bail stage, the relevant inquiry is whether serious allegations and a prima facie case exist, rather than a meticulous assessment of evidence or conclusive acceptance of financial explanations. Repeated non-compliance with summons, incomplete participation, non-appearance despite judicial directions, and being declared a proclaimed person indicate lack of cooperation. The need for effective investigation and custodial interrogation can outweigh pre-arrest protection.

PMLA action requires a subsisting scheduled offence and identifiable proceeds of crime. An ECIR is an internal administrative record rather than an FIR or criminal prosecution, while search, seizure, freezing and preservation measures remain administrative until a prosecution complaint reaches the Special Court. Article 226 review may extend to the jurisdictional basis of those measures where the challenge concerns foundational legality, not merely property-related action within the Adjudicating Authority's remit. Closure of the predicate FIR through acceptance of a cancellation report and dismissal of a protest petition removes the basis for continuing PMLA action unless the predicate investigation is lawfully revived. An ECIR addendum may include another FIR, but must satisfy legality, procedural fairness and a sufficient same-transaction nexus; it cannot arbitrarily substitute an unrelated predicate offence.

PMLA proceedings involved dismissal of a Special Leave Petition challenging a High Court order, with no interference granted. The petitioner received four weeks to surrender; on surrender within that period, the Trial Court must consider the bail application independently on its merits and in accordance with law. Pending applications stood disposed of.

Homebuyers who invoke arbitration for refund of sale consideration, accept and present refund cheques, and pursue dishonour proceedings abandon their status as continuing allottees for insolvency purposes. Although amounts raised from real-estate allottees ordinarily have the commercial effect of borrowing, financial-creditor status requires a subsisting financial debt and liability owed by the corporate debtor. A refund claim pursued through these steps does not retain the character of a debt owed to a continuing allottee. The principle barring differential treatment of decree-holder allottees does not apply where the claim results from the homebuyer's election to seek refund. Such homebuyers cannot be recognised as financial creditors in that capacity.

Corporate insolvency recovery may proceed alongside depositor-protection proceedings under the Tamil Nadu Protection of Interests of Depositors (in Financial Establishments) Act, 1997. The Economic Offences Wing may continue statutory action to protect and redress depositor claims and investigate related offences despite the insolvency process. A liquidator, having assumed the company's management functions, may obtain a complete set of seized investigation materials and pursue recovery of receivables through the available statutory forum. Providing those materials supports recovery without interrupting investigation, while amounts traceable to alleged offences remain subject to lawful action by the Economic Offences Wing.

Regulation 31A validly imposes a regulatory fee as an insolvency resolution process cost for resolution plans approved under Section 31 on or after 1 October 2022. The Board's express power to levy fees for carrying out the Code's purposes, together with its regulation-making power over process costs, supports inclusion of the fee within the residuary category of insolvency resolution process costs. The levy remains a regulatory fee, rather than a tax, where it has a broad nexus with regulatory functions; direct payer-specific quid pro quo is unnecessary. The fee is not excessive, arbitrary, retrospective, colourable, or based on excessive delegation where statutory guidance and legislative oversight apply.

Orders of the National Company Law Tribunal must ordinarily be challenged through the statutory appellate remedy before the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal. Writ jurisdiction should not be invoked against an NCLT order where no sufficient reason exists to bypass that alternative remedy. High Courts should therefore decline to entertain such writ applications, leaving aggrieved parties to pursue the appropriate remedy before the competent forum in accordance with law.