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2018 (4) TMI 3
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....: Mr. Kapil Sibal,Sr.Adv., Mr. Arunabh Chowdhary,Adv., Mr. Sidharth Dave,Adv., Mr. Sarvesh Singh Baghel,Adv., Mr. Aditya Pujari,Adv., Ms. Kalyani Lal,Adv., Mr. Bhanoo Sood,Adv., Mr. Aamir Khan,Adv., Ms. Tatini Basu, AOR, Mr. Raghav Tankha,Adv., Mr. Sarvesh Singh Baghel, AOR, Mr. Md. Shahid Anwar, AOR, Mr. Zulfiqar Ali Khan,Adv., Mr. Mohd. Farhan Khan,Adv., Mr. Aamir Naseem,Adv., Mr. Syed Rehan,Adv., Mr. Triveni Poteker,Adv., Mr. Aditya Ranjan,Adv., Ms. Indu Malhotra,Sr.Adv., Mr. H.S. Bhullar,Adv., Ms. Iti Sharma,Adv., Mr. Ashwani Kumar, AOR, Ms. Shivali Chaudhary,Adv., Mr. Jay Kr. Bhardwaj,Adv., Dr. Sushil Kr. Gupta,Adv., Mr. Ajit Kumar Gupta,Adv., Ms. Mridula Ray Bharadwaj, AOR, Mr. Anupam Lal Das, AOR, Mr. Rishi Malhotra, AOR, Mr. Gopal Jha, AOR, Mr. Sibo Sankar Mishra, AOR, Mr. Mohit D. Ram, AOR, Mr. Yoginder Handoo, AOR, Mr. Harish Pandey, AOR, Mr. Nikhil Jain, AOR, Mr. Vijay K. Jain, AOR, Mr. Kamal Mohan Gupta, AOR And Mr. Santosh Kumar - I, AOR For the Respondent(s) : Ms. Pinky Anand,ASG, Ms. Binu Tamta,Adv., Ms. Kiran Bhardwaj,Adv., Mr. S.S. Shamshery,Adv., Mr. V.V. Pattabhi Ram,Adv., Ms. Rukmani Bobde,Adv., Mr. Hemant Arya,Adv., Mr. Sumit T.,Adv., Mr. Mukesh Kumar Marori....
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....espondent-CBI before the Special Judge, CBI, New Delhi on 28th November, 2002. The appellants filed an application for discharge with the Special Judge, CBI. On 1st February, 2007, the Special Judge, CBI directed framing of the charges after considering the material before the Court. It was held that there was a prima facie case against the appellant and the other accused. The appellants filed Criminal Revision No. 321 of 2007 before the Delhi High Court against the order framing charge. The Revision Petition was converted into Writ Petition (Criminal)No.352 of 2010. 5. Learned Single Judge referred the following question of law for consideration by the Division Bench: "Whether an order on charge framed by a Special Judge under the provisions of Prevention of Corruption Act, being an interlocutory order, and when no revision against the order or a petition under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. lies, can be assailed under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, whether or not the offences committed include the offences under Indian Penal Code apart from offences under Prevention of Corruption Act?" 6. The learned Single Judge referred to the conflicting views taken in....
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....ction 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, cannot be used when exercise of such powers would be in derogation of an express bar contained in a statutory enactment, other than the Code of Criminal Procedure. The inherent powers of the High Court have not been limited by any other provisions contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, as is evident from the use of the words ?Nothing in this Code? in Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, but, the powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure cannot be exercised when exercise of such powers would be against the legislative mandate contained in some other statutory enactment such as Section 19(3)(c) of Prevention of Corruption Act." "29. The fact that the procedural aspect as regards the hearing of the parties has been incorporated in Section 22 does not really throw light on whether an order on charge would be an interlocutory order for the purposes of Section 19(3)(c) PCA. A collective reading of the two provisions indicates that in the context of order on charge an order discharging the accused may be an order that would be subject-matter of a revision petition at the instance perhaps of the prosecut....
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....not proceed. 26. The decisions on a petition assailing charge requires going through the voluminous evidence collected by the CBI, analyzing the evidence against each accused and then coming to conclusion whether the accused was liable to be charged or not. This exercise is done by Special Judge invariably vide a detailed speaking order. Each order on charge of the Special Judge, under Prevention of Corruption cases, normally runs into 40 to 50 pages where evidence is discussed in detail and thereafter the order for framing of charge is made. If this Court entertains petitions under Article 227 of the Constitution to re-appreciate the evidence collected by CBI to see if charge was liable to be framed or, in fact, the Court would be doing so contrary to the legislative intent. No court can appreciate arguments advanced in a case on charge without going through the entire record. The issues of jurisdiction and perversity are raised in such petitions only to get the petition admitted. The issue of jurisdiction is rarely involved. The perversity of an order can be argued in respect of any well written judgment because perversity is such a term which has a vast meaning and an o....
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....ure or under Article 227 of the Constitution of India cannot be exercised as a "cloak of an appeal in disguise" or to re-appreciate evidence. The aforesaid proceedings should be used sparingly with great care, caution, circumspection and only to prevent grave miscarriage of justice." 12. It was held that order framing charge was an interlocutory order and no Revision Petition under Section 401 read with Section 397(2) Cr.P.C. would lie to the High Court against such order. Reliance was mainly placed on V.C. Shukla versus State through CBI (1980) Suppl. SCC 92. Therein, Section 11A of the Special Courts Act, 1979 was interpreted by a Bench of four Judges of this Court. The Bench applied the test in S. Kuppuswami Rao versus the King (1947) 2 SCR 685. Reliance was also placed on Satya Narayan Sharma versus State of Rajasthan (2001) 8 SCC 607, wherein Section 19 (3)(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 was the subject matter of consideration. 13. It was, however, held that a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. will lie to the High Court even when there is a bar under Section 397 or some other provisions of the Cr.P.C. However, inherent power could be exercised onl....
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....iction against an interlocutory order under sub-Section 2 of Section 397 Cr.P.C. At the same time, inherent power of the High Court is not limited or affected by any other provision. It could not mean that limitation on exercise of revisional power is to be set at naught. Inherent power could be used for securing ends of justice or to check abuse of the process of the Court. This power has to be exercised very sparingly against a proceeding initiated illegally or vexatiously or without jurisdiction. The label of the petition is immaterial. This Court modified the view taken in Amarnath versus State of Haryana (1977) 4 SCC 137 and also deviated from the test for interlocutory order laid down in S. Kuppuswami Rao (supra). We may quote the following observations in this regard: "6. The point which falls for determination in this appeal is squarely covered by a decision of this Court, to which one of us (Untwalia, J.) was a party in Amar Nath v. State of Haryana. But on a careful consideration of the matter and on hearing learned Counsel for the parties in this appeal we thought it advisable to enunciate and reiterate the view taken by two learned Judges of this Court in Amar ....
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....brings about a situation which is an abuse of the process of the Court or for the purpose of securing the ends of justice interference by the High Court is absolutely necessary, then nothing contained in section 397(2) can limit or affect the exercise of the inherent power by the High Court. But such cases would be few and far between. The High Court must exercise the inherent power very sparingly. One such case would be the desirability of the quashing of, a criminal proceeding initiated illegally, vexatiously or as being without jurisdiction. Take for example a case where a prosecution is launched under the Prevention of Corruption Act without a sanction. then the trial of the accused will be without jurisdiction and even after his acquittal a second trial after proper sanction will not be barred on the doctrine of Autrefois Acquit. Even assuming, although we shall presently show that it is not so, that in such a case an order of the Court taking cognizance or issuing processes is an interlocutory order. does it stand to reason to say that inherent power of the High Court cannot be exercised for stopping the criminal proceeding as early as possible, instead of harassing ....
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....1968) 2 SCR 685 = AIR 1968 SC 733, it was held that the test adopted therein that if reversal of impugned order results in conclusion of proceedings, such order may not be interlocutory but final order. It was observed : "15. .......In the majority decision four tests were culled out from some English decisions. They are found enumerated at p. 688. One of the tests is "if the order in question is reversed would the action have to go on?" Applying that test to the facts of the instant case it would be noticed that if the plea of the appellant succeeds and the order of the Sessions Judge is reversed, the criminal proceeding as initiated and instituted against him cannot go on. If, however, he loses on the merits of the preliminary point the proceeding will go on. Applying the test of Kuppuswami case such an order will not be a final order. But applying the fourth test noted at p. 688 in Mohan Lal case it would be a final order. The real point of distinction, however, is to be found at p. 693 in the judgment of Shelat, J. The passage runs thus: "As observed in Ramesh v. Gendalal Motilal Patni[(1966) 3 SCR 198 : AIR 1966 SC 1445] the finality of that order was not to ....
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....ividual grievance. Therefore, the power under Article 227 may be unfettered but its exercise is subject to high degree of judicial discipline pointed out above." 20. It was observed that power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. could be exercised only in rarest of rare cases and not otherwise. 38. The Criminal Procedure Code is undoubtedly a complete code in itself. As has already been discussed by us, the discretionary jurisdiction under Section 397(2) CrPC is to be exercised only in respect of final orders and intermediate orders. The power under Section 482 CrPC is to be exercised only in respect of interlocutory orders to give effect to an order passed under the Criminal Procedure Code or to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to serve the ends of justice. As indicated above, this power has to be exercised only in the rarest of rare cases and not otherwise. If that is the position, and we are of the view that it is so, resort to Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution would be permissible perhaps only in the most extraordinary case. To invoke the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court when the Criminal Procedure Code restricts it in the interest of....
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....s to say any ground other than a ground relatable to the error, omission or irregularity in the sanction resulting in a failure of justice. 65. A conjoint reading of clause (b) and clause (c) of Section 19(3) of the PC Act makes it is clear that a stay of proceedings could be granted only and only if there is an error, omission or irregularity in the sanction granted for a prosecution and that error, omission or irregularity has resulted in a failure of justice. There is no other situation that is contemplated for the grant of a stay of proceedings under the PC Act on any other ground whatsoever, even if there is a failure of justice. Clause (c) additionally mandates a prohibition on the exercise of revision jurisdiction in respect of any interlocutory order passed in any trial such as those that we have already referred to. In our opinion, the provisions of clauses (b) and (c) of Section 19(3) of the PC Act read together are quite clear and do not admit of any ambiguity or the need for any further interpretation." 23. We may also refer to the observations of the Constitution Bench in Ratilal Bhanji Mithani versus Asstt. Collector of Customs, Bombay and Anr. [1....
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....eady noted, the bench of seven Judges in Kartar Singh (supra) held that even constitutional power of the High Court under Article 226 which was very wide ought to be used with circumspection in accordance with judicial consideration and well established principles. The power should be exercised sparingly in rare and extreme circumstances. 28. It is well accepted that delay in a criminal trial, particularly in the PC Act cases, has deleterious effect on the administration of justice in which the society has a vital interest. Delay in trials affects the faith in Rule of Law and efficacy of the legal system. It affects social welfare and development. Even in civil or tax cases it has been laid down that power to grant stay has to be exercised with restraint. Mere prima facie case is not enough. Party seeking stay must be put to terms and stay should not be incentive to delay. The order granting stay must show application of mind. The power to grant stay is coupled with accountability (Siliguri Municipality vs. Amalendu Das (1984) 2 SCC 436 para 4; Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Chandan Nagar, West Bengal vs. Dunlop India Ltd. and Ors. (1985) 1 SCC 260 para 5; Union Territor....
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....ons, the test of prima facie case is to be applied. The court has to find out whether the materials offered by the prosecution to be adduced as evidence are sufficient for the court to proceed against the accused further. (Vide State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy[(1977) 2 SCC 699], All India Bank Officers' Confederation v. Union of India[(1989) 4 SCC 90] Stree Atyachar Virodhi Parishad v. Dilip Nathumal Chordia [(1989) 1 SCC 715] State of M.P. v. Krishna Chandra Saksena [(1996) 11 SCC 439] and State of M.P. v. Mohanlal Soni [(2000) 6 SCC 338] 101. In Dilawar Balu Kurane v. State of Maharashtra [(2002) 2 SCC 135] this Court while dealing with the provisions of Sections 227 and 228 CrPC, placed a very heavy reliance on the earlier judgment of this Court in Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal [(1979) 3 SCC 4] and held that while considering the question of framing the charges, the court may weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out and whether the materials placed before the court disclose grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained. In such an eventuality, ....
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....al is thus, hampered. Thus, even while reiterating the view that there is no bar to jurisdiction of the High Court to consider a challenge against an order of framing charge in exceptional situation for correcting a patent error of lack of jurisdiction, exercise of such jurisdiction has to be limited to rarest of rare cases. Even if a challenge to order framing charge is entertained, decision of such a petition should not be delayed. Though no mandatory time limit can be fixed, normally it should not exceed two-three months. If stay is granted, it should not normally be unconditional or of indefinite duration. Appropriate conditions may be imposed so that the party in whose favour stay is granted is accountable if court finally finds no merit in the matter and the other side suffers loss and injustice. To give effect to the legislative policy and the mandate of Article 21 for speedy justice in criminal cases, if stay is granted, matter should be taken on day-to-day basis and concluded within two-three months. Where the matter remains pending for longer period, the order of stay will stand vacated on expiry of six months, unless extension is granted by a speaking order showing ex....
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.... 56. It is true that this Court has no power of superintendence over the High Court as the High Court has over District Courts under Article 227 of the Constitution. Like this Court, the High Court is equally a superior court of record with plenary jurisdiction. Under our Constitution the High Court is not a court subordinate to this Court. This Court, however, enjoys appellate powers over the High Court as also some other incidental powers. But as the last court and in exercise of this Court's power to do complete justice which includes within it the power to improve the administration of justice in public interest, this Court gives the aforesaid guidelines for sustaining common man's faith in the rule of law and the justice delivery system, both being inextricably linked." 35. In view of above, situation of proceedings remaining pending for long on account of stay needs to be remedied. Remedy is required not only for corruption cases but for all civil and criminal cases where on account of stay, civil and criminal proceedings are held up. At times, proceedings are adjourned sine die on account of stay. Even after stay is vacated, intimation is not received and proceedin....
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....se after six months from today unless extended by a speaking order on above parameters. Same course may also be adopted by civil and criminal appellate/revisional courts under the jurisdiction of the High Courts. The trial courts may, on expiry of above period, resume the proceedings without waiting for any other intimation unless express order extending stay is produced. 37. The High Courts may also issue instructions to this effect and monitor the same so that civil or criminal proceedings do not remain pending for unduly period at the trial stage. 38. The question referred stands answered. The matter along with other connected matters, may now be listed before an appropriate Bench as first matter, subject to overnight part-heard, on Wednesday, the 18th April, 2018. A copy of this order be sent to all the High Courts for necessary action. JUDGMENT R.F. Nariman, J. (Concurring) 1. The cancer of corruption has, as we all know, eaten into the vital organs of the State. Cancer is a dreaded disease which, if not nipped in the bud in time, causes death. In British India, the Penal Code dealt with the cancer of corruption by public servants in Chapter IX ther....
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....Penal Code. Consequently, it is proposed to delete those sections with the necessary saving provision. 5. The notes on clauses explain in detail the provisions of the Bill." (Emphasis Supplied) 2. Section 2(c) defines "public servant". The definition is extremely wide and includes within its ken even arbitrators or other persons to whom any cause or matter has been referred for decision or report by a court of justice or by a competent public authority - (See Section 2(c)(vi)). Also included are office bearers of registered co-operative societies engaged in agriculture, industry, trade or banking, who receive financial aid from the Government - (See Section 2(c)(ix)). Office bearers or employees of educational, scientific, social, cultural or other institutions in whatever manner established, receiving financial assistance from the Government or local or other public authorities are also included (see Section 2(c)(xii)). The two explanations to Section 2(c) are also revealing - whereas Explanation 1 states that in order to be a public servant, one need not be appointed by Government, Explanation 2 refers to a de facto, as opposed to a de jure, public s....
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....of the proceedings- (a) without giving the other party an opportunity of showing cause why the record should not be called for; or (b) if it is satisfied that an examination of the record of the proceedings may be made from the certified copies." Under Section 27, powers of appeal and revision, conferred by the Code of Criminal Procedure, are to be exercised "subject to the provisions of this Act". Section 27 reads as follows: "27. Appeal and revision.- Subject to the provisions of this Act, the High Court may exercise, so far as they may be applicable, all the powers of appeal and revision conferred by the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, on a High court as if the Court of the special Judge were a Court of Session trying 12 cases within the local limits of the High Court." 4. The bone of contention in these appeals is the true interpretation of Section 19(3)(c) of the Act, and whether superior constitutional courts, namely, the High Courts in this country, are bound to follow Section 19(3)(c) in petitions filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. An allied question is whether the inherent powers of High Courts are ava....
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....nce of, or any error, omission or irregularity in, such sanction has occasioned or resulted in a failure of justice the Court shall have regard to the fact whether the objection could and should have been raised at any earlier stage in the proceedings. Explanation. - For the purposes of this section, - (a) error includes competency of the authority to grant sanction; (b) a sanction required for prosecution includes reference to any requirement that the prosecution shall be at the instance of a specified authority or with the sanction of a specified person or any requirement of a similar nature." 5. On a reference made to a 2-Judge Bench in the Delhi High Court, the learned Chief Justice framed, what he described as, "three facets which emanate for consideration", as follows: "(a) Whether an order framing charge under the 1988 Act would be treated as an interlocutory order thereby barring the exercise of revisional power of this Court? (b) Whether the language employed in Section 19 of the 1988 Act which bars the revision would also bar the exercise of power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. for all purposes? (c) Whether the order frami....
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....any other ground. The contention on behalf of the Appellants before us is that the expression "on any other ground" is referable only to grounds which relate to sanction and not generally to all proceedings under the Act. Whereas learned counsel for the Respondents argues that these are grounds referable to the proceedings under this Act and there is no warrant to add words not found in sub-section (c), namely, that these grounds should be relatable to sanction only. 8. We are of the view that the Respondents are correct in this submission for the following reasons: (i) Section 19(3)(b) subsumes all grounds which are relatable to sanction granted. This is clear from the word "any" making it clear that whatever be the error, omission or irregularity in sanction granted, all grounds relatable thereto are covered. (ii) This is further made clear by Explanation (a), which defines an "error" as including competency of the authority to grant sanction. (iii) The words "in the sanction granted by the authority" contained in sub-clause (b) are conspicuous by their absence in sub-clause(c), showing thereby that it is the proceedings under the Act that are referr....
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....r and record the evidence of any witness, subject to the right of the accused to recall the witness for cross-examination. This again can be done so that there is no delay in either the enquiry or trial proceedings under the Act. Insofar as sub-clause (d) is concerned, this Court in Girish Kumar Suneja v. C.B.I., (2017) 14 SCC 809 at 847 has held: "By adding the proviso to Section 397(1) CrPC, Parliament has made it clear that it would be appropriate not to call for the records of the case before the Special Judge even when the High Court exercises its revision jurisdiction. The reason for this quite clearly is that once the records are called for, the Special Judge cannot proceed with the trial. With a view to ensure that the accused who has invoked the revision jurisdiction of the High Court is not prejudiced and at the same time the trial is not indirectly stayed or otherwise impeded, Parliament has made it clear that the examination of the record of the Special Judge may also be made on the basis of certified copies of the record. Quite clearly, the intention of Parliament is that there should not be any impediment in the trial of a case under the PC Act.") (v....
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....dragadkar, C.J. held: "Besides, in the case of a superior Court of Record, it is for the court to consider whether any matter falls within its jurisdiction or not. Unlike a Court of limited jurisdiction, the superior Court is entitled to determine for itself questions about its own jurisdiction. "Prima facie", says Halsbury, "no matter is deemed to be beyond the jurisdiction of a superior court unless it is expressly shown to be so, while nothing is within the jurisdiction of an inferior court unless it is expressly shown on the face of the proceedings that the particular matter is within the cognizance of the particular court" [Halsbury's Law of England, Vol. 9, p. 349]." 10. Also, in Ratilal Bhanji Mithani v. Assistant Collector of Customs, 1967 SCR (3) 926 at 930-931, this Court had occasion to deal with the inherent power of the High Court under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, which is equivalent to Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. It was held that the said Section did not confer any power, but only declared that nothing in the Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the existing inherent powers of the High Court. The C....
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....607 at paragraphs 14 and 15 does not, therefore, lay down the correct position in law. Equally, in paragraph 17 of the said judgment, despite the clarification that proceedings can be "adapted" in appropriate cases, the Court went on to hold that there is a blanket ban of stay of trials and that, therefore, Section 482, even as adapted, cannot be used for the aforesaid purpose. This again is contrary to the position in law as laid down hereinabove. This case, therefore, stands overruled. 12. At this juncture it is important to consider the 3-Judge bench decision in Madhu Limaye (supra). A 3-Judge bench of this Court decided that a Section 482 petition under the Code of Criminal Procedure would be maintainable against a Sessions Judge order framing a charge against the appellant under Section 500 of the Penal Code, despite the prohibition contained in Section 397(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. This was held on two grounds. First, that even if Section 397(1) was out of the way because of the prohibition contained in Section 397(2), the inherent power of the Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure would be available. This was held after referring t....
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....then, if the order assailed is purely of an interlocutory character which could be corrected in exercise of the revisional power of the High Court under the 1898 Code, the High Court will refuse to exercise its inherent power. But in case the impugned order clearly brings about a situation which is an abuse of the process of the Court or for the purpose of securing the ends of justice interference by the High Court is absolutely necessary, then nothing contained in Section 397(2) can limit or affect the exercise of the inherent power by the High Court. But such cases would be few and far between. The High Court must exercise the inherent power very sparingly. One such case would be the desirability of the quashing of a criminal proceeding initiated illegally, vexatiously or as being without jurisdiction. Take for example a case where a prosecution is launched under the Prevention of Corruption Act without a sanction, then the trial of the accused will be without jurisdiction and even after his acquittal a second trial, after proper sanction will not be barred on the doctrine of autrefois acquit. Even assuming, although we shall presently show that it is not so, that in such a case ....
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.... decided the rights of the parties. According to the test laid down in Kuppuswami's case the order impugned was undoubtedly an interlocutory order. Taking into consideration, therefore, the natural meaning of interlocutory order and applying the non obstante clause, the position is that the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure are expressly excluded by the non obstante clause and therefore s. 397(2) of the Code cannot be called into aid in order to hold that the order impugned is not an interlocutory order. As the decisions of this Court in the cases of Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra and Amar Nath & v. State of Haryana were given with respect to the provisions of the Code, particularly s. 397(2), they were correctly decided and would have no application to the interpretation of s. 11(1) of the Act, which expressly excludes the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure by virtue of the non obstante clause." In Poonam Chand Jain and another v. Fazru, (2004) 13 SCC 269 at 276-279, this Court was at pains to point out that the judgment in V.C. Shukla (supra) was rendered in the background of the special statute applicable (See paragraph 13). 15. It is th....
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....his Court held in paragraphs 25, 29, 30 and 32 as follows: "25. This view was reaffirmed in Madhu Limaye when the following principles were approved in relation to Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. in the context of Section 397(2) thereof. The principles are: "(1) That the power is not to be resorted to if there is a specific provision in the Code for the redress of the grievance of the aggrieved party; (2) That it should be exercised very sparingly to prevent abuse of process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice; (3) That it should not be exercised as against the express bar of law engrafted in any other provision of the Code." Therefore, it is quite clear that the prohibition in Section 397 of the Cr.P.C. will govern Section 482 thereof. We endorse this view. xxx xxx xxx 29. This leads us to another facet of the submission made by learned counsel that even the avenue of proceeding under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. is barred as far as the appellants are concerned. As held in Amar Nath and with which conclusion we agree, if an interlocutory order is not revisable due to the prohibition contained in Section 39....
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....e the hearing of the petition filed, but merely because the court is not in a position to grant an early hearing would not be a ground to stay the trial even temporarily. With respect, we do not agree with the proposition that for the purposes of a stay of proceedings recourse could be had to Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. Our discussion above makes this quite clear." (at pages 832-834) However, thereafter, this Court stated the law thus in paragraph 38: "38. The Criminal Procedure Code is undoubtedly a complete code in itself. As has already been discussed by us, the discretionary jurisdiction under Section 397(2) of the Cr.P.C. is to be exercised only in respect of final orders and intermediate orders. The power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. is to be exercised only in respect of interlocutory orders to give effect to an order passed under the Cr.P.C. or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to serve the ends of justice. As indicated above, this power has to be exercised only in the rarest of rare cases and not otherwise. If that is the position, and we are of the view that it is so, resort to Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution w....