TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2012 (7) TMI 1030
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....s simple imprisonment and to pay compensation of Rs. 5 lakhs to the complainant under Section 357(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure Code (for short, "the Code"), in default, to undergo two months simple imprisonment. In appeal, the IIIrd Additional Fast Track District & Sessions Judge, Chennai confirmed the conviction and sentence. In revision, the High Court confirmed the order of conviction and sentence of three months simple imprisonment and to pay compensation of Rs. 5 lakhs, however, the High Court was of opinion that no separate sentence could be awarded in default of payment of compensation when substantive sentence of imprisonment is independently awarded. The High Court, therefore, set aside the sentence in default of payment of compensation. Being aggrieved by the said order of conviction and sentence, the accused has approached this court by way of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.2299 of 2012. The complainant has filed Special Leave Petition No.3327 of 2012 being aggrieved by the order of the High Court to the extent it sets aside the order of sentence in default of payment of compensation. 4. The brief facts are as under: The case of the complainant is that on 10/....
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....cused in default of payment of compensation when substantive sentence of imprisonment was awarded. In support of his submissions counsel relied on Suganthi Suresh Kumar v. Jagdeeshan 2002(2) SCC 420, and K.A. Abbas HSA v. Sahu Joseph and Another 2010 (6) SCC 230. Counsel submitted that the impugned order of the High Court be set aside only to that extent. 8. So far as the merits of the case are concerned, we have no hesitation in recording that the High Court was perfectly justified in confirming the conviction and sentence. Ex-P1 is the promissory note in the sum of Rs. 5 lakhs executed by the accused and his wife in favour of the complainant. The accused has not led any evidence to prove that the promissory note (Ex- P1) is a got up document. In his reply, he has nowhere taken such a stand. The cheque (Ex-P2) is also on record. According to the accused, he had borrowed only Rs. 3 lakhs from the complainant and a blank cheque was offered as security to the complainant. It is suggested in the notice that the said cheque was misused by the complainant. This story has to be rejected in view of the promissory note (Ex-P1). The accused has relied on xerox copy of some pages from a dia....
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....ssory note (Ex-P1), the cheque (Ex-P2), reply dated 24/5/2002 sent by the accused to the complainant (Ex-P8) and the Income-tax Returns to which a reference is made by the High Court lead us to concur with the High Court that the conviction and sentence awarded to the accused is perfectly justified and no interference is called for with the same. 10. That takes us to the legal question whether the court can award a sentence in default of payment of compensation. Under Section 357 of the Code the Court can pass order to pay compensation. Sub-Section (1) of Section 357 of the Code empowers the court to award compensation to the victim of offence out of the sentence of fine imposed on the accused. Section 357(3) is relevant. It reads thus: "357. Order to pay compensation. - (1) xxx xxx xxx (2) xxx xxx xxx (3) When a Court imposes a sentence, of which fine does not form a part, the Court may, when passing judgment, order the accused person to pay, by way of compensation, such amount as may be specified in the order to the person who has suffered any loss or injury by reason of the act for which the accused person has been so sentenced." Thus, if a fine is not a part of the or....
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....under Section 357(3) of the Code. 13. Undoubtedly, there is no specific provision in the Code which enables the court to sentence a person who commits breach of the order of payment of compensation. Section 421of the Code provides for the action which the court can take for the recovery of the fine where the accused has been sentenced to pay a fine. Proviso thereto states how to deal with a situation where default sentence is prescribed. Section 421 reads thus: "421. Warrant for levy of fine.-(1) When an offender has been sentenced to pay a fine, the court passing the sentence may take action for the recovery of the fine in either or both of the following ways, that is to say, it may- (a) issue a warrant for the levy of the amount by attachment and sale of any movable property belonging to the offender; (b) issue a warrant to the Collector of the district, authorising him to realise the amount as arrears of land revenue from the movable or immovable property, or both, of the defaulter: Provided that, if the sentence directs that in default of payment of the fine, the offender shall be imprisoned, and if such offender has undergone the whole of such imprisonment in default,....
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....ther with or without imprisonment, and in every case of an offence punishable with imprisonment or fine, or with fine only, in which the offender is sentenced to a fine, it shall be competent to the court which sentences such offender to direct by the sentence that, in default of payment of the fine, the offender shall suffer imprisonment for a certain term, which imprisonment shall be in excess of any other imprisonment to which he may have been sentenced or to which he may be liable under a commutation of a sentence." 16. The above provisions were examined by this Court in Vijayan v. Sadanandan K. & Anr. (2009) 6 SCC 652. After quoting them, this Court rejected the submission that where there is default in payment of compensation ordered by the court, recourse can only be had to Section 421 of the Code because there is no provision enabling the court to award a default sentence. This Court observed that if such a view is taken, the very object of sub-section (3) of Section 357 would be frustrated and the relief contemplated therein would be rendered somewhat illusory. 17. We respectfully concur with this view. In K. Bhaskaran v. Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan (1997) 7 SCC 510 while co....