TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2013 (2) TMI 661
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....rein, on March 11, 2010. Thereafter, proposal was sent to the Finance Department on April 5, 2010 for challenging the said judgment of the honourable Tribunal. Sanction was received from the Finance Department on April 28, 2010 and received by the concerned branch on May 7, 2010 and accordingly, the applicant had sent the papers for filing a tax appeal challenging the impugned order to the office of the learned Government Pleader on May 19, 2010, which was received by the learned Government Pleader Office on May 21, 2010. The applicant submits that the said papers which were sent to the office of the learned Government Pleader on May 19, 2010 were lost is a fact, which was revealed when the applicant-Department inquired about filing of the captioned tax appeal. The applicantDepartment thereafter gave another set of papers for filing the captioned tax appeal, challenging the judgment of the honourable Tribunal dated May 7, 2009 passed in the above-mentioned second appeal. The applicant submits that as there was heavy drafting work load in the office of the learned Government Pleader and less Assistant Government Pleader and stenographers to do the drafting work, the captioned tax a....
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....t the joints'. Due recognition of these limitations on Governmental functioning-of course, within a reasonable limit-is necessary if the judicial approach is not rendered unrealistic. It would, perhaps, be unfair and unrealistic to put Government and private parties on the same footing in all respects in such matters. Implicit in the very nature of Governmental functioning is procedural delay incidental to the decision making process . . ." Reliance is also placed on the decision of the apex court rendered in case of N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy reported in AIR 1998 SC 3222. It is held therein by the apex court that the rules of limitation are not to jeopardize the right and interest of the parties. Court is to ensure of course that no dilatory tactics are adopted and if the large amount of tax revenue is at stake, the court should be slow in dismissing such plea of condonation of delay. Judgment rendered in case of State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani reported in [1996] 3 SCC 132 is pressed into service, wherein, the apex court has reiterated liberal approach in condoning the delay. In short, the submission that has been emphasized is to the effect that in absence of any....
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....a judgment has been repeatedly disapproved by this court in a number of cases. Whilst considering applications for condonation of delay under section 5 of the Limitation Act, the courts do not enjoy unlimited and unbridled discretionary powers. All discretionary powers, especially judicial powers, have to be exercised within reasonable bounds, known to the law. The discretion has to be exercised in a systematic manner informed by reason. Whims or fancies; prejudices or predilections cannot and should not form the basis of exercising discretionary powers." The apex court in a decision, rendered in case of Balwant Singh (Dead) v. Jagdish Singh reported in 2010 AIR SCW 4848 has given the test for a sufficient cause and what is to be seen is as to whether the party by the exercise of due care and attention could have avoided the delay. It reiterated that sufficient powers and discretion is available with the courts for applying this law in a meaningful manner but sufficient cause would mean presence of legal and adequate reasons. It would be profitable to reproduce the relevant observations of the apex court in this case: "14. In the case of Union of India v. Tata Yodogawa Ltd. [198....
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....f the Limitation Act) in such a manner and so liberally, irrespective of the period of delay, it would amount to practically rendering all these provisions redundant and inoperative. Such approach or interpretation would hardly be permissible in law. Liberal construction of the expression 'sufficient cause' is intended to advance substantial justice which itself presupposes no negligence or inaction on the part of the applicant, to whom want of bona fide is imputable. There can be instances where the court should condone the delay; equally there would be cases where the court must exercise its discretion against the applicant for want of any of these ingredients or where it does not reflect "sufficient cause" as understood in law. (Advanced Law Lexicon, P. Ramanatha Aiyar, Second Edition, 1997). The expression 'sufficient cause' implies the presence of legal and adequate reasons. The word 'sufficient' means adequate enough, as much as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. It embraces no more than that which provides a plenitude which, when done, suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the light of existing circumstances and when viewed from....