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Application of gross profit rate for determination of taxable income - rejection of book results - telescoping of additions - addition on account of discrepancy in cash book - addition on account of unaccounted cash payments
Application of gross profit rate for determination of taxable income - rejection of book results - Tribunal's reduction of the gross profit rate from 9.54% (as applied by the Assessing Officer) to 8.50% and confirmation of rejection of book results. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal noted survey discrepancies, admission by an employee, and findings of Special Auditors regarding difficulties in the books; it observed a historical pattern where increased sales correlated with falling gross profit rate. On that factual basis the Tribunal substituted the AO's gross profit rate and applied 8.50% while rejecting the book results. Although the Tribunal's reasoning is not elaborately detailed, the court found the conclusion to be fact based, supported by material on record and unassailed by any pointed infirmity; hence no interference was warranted. [Paras 4]
Tribunal's adjustment of the gross profit rate to 8.50% and rejection of book results upheld.
Addition on account of discrepancy in cash book - rejection of book results - Deletion of the addition made by the AO on account of a cash book discrepancy of Rs.3,74,687/-. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal found the cash book showed a negative balance and therefore no substantive addition should have been made. Having rejected the book results and applied a gross profit rate to compute the book result, the Tribunal held that separate disallowances (brokerage, travelling, HRA) formed part of the book results and required no further separate additions. The High Court accepted that the Tribunal's conclusion flowed from the material and reasoning recorded and saw no reason to interfere. [Paras 5]
Tribunal's deletion of the addition on account of the cash book discrepancy upheld.
Addition on account of unaccounted cash payments - telescoping of additions - Deletion of the separate addition of Rs.80,000/- made by the AO for unaccounted cash payments. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal held that once an addition is made on account of higher gross profit (i.e., undisclosed income), any undisclosed payment outside the books should be telescoped against that addition and no separate addition was required. The High Court found this approach justified on the available material and that the Tribunal properly set aside the AO's separate disallowance. [Paras 6, 7]
Tribunal's deletion of the separate addition for unaccounted cash payments upheld.
Application of gross profit rate for determination of taxable income - Whether the Tax Appeal raised any substantial question of law warranting interference with the Tribunal's order. - HELD THAT: - The High Court examined the Tribunal's factual findings and reasoning on the above issues and found no legal infirmity, perversity, or lack of cogent reasons that would justify interference. The appeal did not raise any question of law, much less a substantial one, and the Tribunal's factual determinations and consequent orders were sustained. [Paras 8]
Tax Appeal dismissed for lack of any substantial question of law; Tribunal's order affirmed.
Final Conclusion: The High Court found the Tribunal's fact based reduction of the gross profit rate, and its deletions of the additions for the cash book discrepancy and unaccounted cash payment (by telescoping against the higher gross profit addition) to be justified; no substantial question of law arose and the Tax Appeal is dismissed.
Issues: Whether the payment made to a foreign testing laboratory for type testing of circuit breakers, carried out through sophisticated machines without substantial human intervention, constituted fees for technical services under section 9(1)(vii) read with Explanation 2 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
Analysis: The expression "fees for technical services" in Explanation 2 covers consideration for managerial, technical or consultancy services. Applying the rule of noscitur a sociis, the word "technical" takes colour from the associated words "managerial" and "consultancy", both of which ordinarily involve a human element. A service rendered merely by operating sophisticated machines or providing a standard facility, without meaningful human interface, does not by itself amount to technical services. On the facts, the testing laboratory conducted destructive type tests through automated equipment and issued reports and certificates, and the authorities did not establish that the service was provided by human technical skill rather than by machine-based standard testing.
Conclusion: The payment was not in the nature of fees for technical services and was not chargeable under section 9(1)(vii) read with Explanation 2. The assessee was not required to deduct tax at source on the remittance.
Fees for technical services - noscitur a sociis - human intervention / human element - taxability under section 9(1)(vii) read with Explanation 2 - deduction of tax at source under section 195(2)
Fees for technical services - human intervention / human element - noscitur a sociis - taxability under section 9(1)(vii) read with Explanation 2 - deduction of tax at source under section 195(2) - Whether payment made to Pehla Testing Laboratory for type tests on circuit breakers falls within the meaning of "fees for technical services" in Explanation 2 to section 9(1)(vii) and thereby attracts tax withholding under section 195(2). - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal examined Explanation 2 which defines "fees for technical services" as consideration for rendering managerial, technical or consultancy services. Applying the rule of noscitur a sociis, the word "technical" must be read in the context of "managerial" and "consultancy", expressions which necessarily involve a human element. The factual finding recorded by the authorities - accepted as undisputed - is that the type tests at Pehla are standard laboratory procedures carried out automatically by sophisticated machines with minimal human intervention; the tests are destructive, the machines perform the testing and a certificate is thereafter issued. The Tribunal held that where a facility or service is provided by automatic operation of machines (a standard facility) and is not the product of continuous human skill or endeavour, such provision does not constitute rendering of "managerial, technical or consultancy services" contemplated by Explanation 2. Reliance on precedents emphasising that mere use or provision of technology or equipment does not convert supply of a standard facility into "technical services" was treated as applicable. The Tribunal rejected the Revenue's contention that incidental human acts such as observation, report preparation or certification convert the activity into FTS, noting that occasional or supervisory human involvement is not equivalent to the continuous human interface envisaged by Explanation 2. On this basis the Tribunal concluded that the payments to Pehla do not constitute fees for technical services and are not taxable under section 9(1)(vii) for the purpose of TDS under section 195(2). [Paras 12, 14, 15, 18]
Payment to Pehla Testing Laboratory is not "fees for technical services" within Explanation 2 to section 9(1)(vii); consequently there was no requirement to deduct tax at source under section 195(2).
Final Conclusion: Appeal allowed: payment for automated laboratory type tests performed by Pehla does not fall within "fees for technical services" under Explanation 2 to section 9(1)(vii), and therefore no TDS was required; other grounds became academic.
Valuation of immovable property for income-tax assessment - reliability and evidentiary value of departmental Inspector's report - use of circle rates as benchmark for valuation - cross-examination of departmental witness and right to confront
Reliability and evidentiary value of departmental Inspector's report - cross-examination of departmental witness and right to confront - The Inspector's report prepared on the basis of verbal local enquiries made in 2006 did not constitute reliable or admissible material to determine the sale rates for transactions in the financial year ending 31.03.2003. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal in the first round had directed supply of the Inspector's report and allowed cross-examination. On cross-examination the Inspector stated that his inquiries were verbal, involved only 2-3 persons, were made on 02.03.2006, contained no documentary corroboration and did not establish rates prevailing in the financial year 2002-03. The High Court agreed that these aspects substantially diminished any evidentiary value of the report, which amounted to an opinion unbacked by contemporaneous or documentary material. Consequently, the assessing officer and the department could not rely on the Inspector's post-facto, limited verbal enquiries to supplant the assessed sale consideration for AY 2003-04. [Paras 4, 5]
Inspector's report held not to be reliable evidence for valuing the plots for AY 2003-04; Tribunal and CIT(A) justified in not placing reliance on it.
Valuation of immovable property for income-tax assessment - use of circle rates as benchmark for valuation - In the absence of reliable departmental evidence, the Tribunal correctly adopted the circle rates (or values derived therefrom) as the appropriate benchmark to determine the correct value of the two plots sold in the financial year ending 31.03.2003. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal found that for the Radhey Shyam Park plot the circle rate was Rs.1,338 per sq. yd. and the apparent sale consideration was Rs.1,441 per sq. yd., and in absence of contrary cogent evidence the circle rate represented the correct value. For the Rajinder Nagar Industrial Area the circle rate was Rs.2,508 per sq. yd.; the declared sale consideration of Rs.1,000 per sq. yd. was thus below circle rate and the Tribunal accepted the CIT(A)'s adoption of Rs.2,500 per sq. yd. as the appropriate rate. The High Court upheld the Tribunal's reliance on circle rates where the Inspector's report was unreliable, endorsing the recalculation of values on that basis. [Paras 3, 5]
Tribunal's adoption of circle rates (and the CIT(A)'s adjusted rates) for valuation of the two plots for AY 2003-04 upheld.
Valuation of immovable property for income-tax assessment - The appeal by the revenue did not raise any substantial question of law warranting interference with the Tribunal's order. - HELD THAT: - Having examined the Tribunal's and CIT(A)'s reasoning, particularly the inadequacy of the Inspector's report and the availability of circle rates as objective benchmarks, the High Court concluded there was no substantial question of law arising from the revenue's challenge. The Court therefore declined to interfere with the Tribunal's factual and evaluative conclusions. [Paras 6]
Revenue's appeal dismissed for lack of any substantial question of law.
Final Conclusion: The High Court upheld the Tribunal's approach: the Inspector's belated and verbal enquiries lacked evidentiary value for AY 2003-04 and could not supplant circle rates; accordingly the Tribunal's adoption of circle rates (and the CIT(A)'s adjusted rates) for valuing the two plots is sustained and the revenue's appeal is dismissed.
Credit for tax deducted at source where tax is deducted on gross receipts but income offered is net - matching concept in recognition of job-wise income and vendor costs - prescription that TDS credit is to be allowed in the year in which the income on which tax was deducted is offered to tax - disallowance under section 40A(2)(b) for excessive or unreasonable payments to related parties - fair market value test for payments to sister/holding concerns for services and allocations - allowability of royalty for use of proprietary material where parallel agreement indicates prevailing rate
Credit for tax deducted at source where tax is deducted on gross receipts but income offered is net - matching concept in recognition of job-wise income and vendor costs - prescription that TDS credit is to be allowed in the year in which the income on which tax was deducted is offered to tax - Whether the Assessing Officer and CIT(A) were justified in restricting TDS credit to the portion of receipts credited to profit and loss account instead of allowing full TDS credit where tax was deducted on gross payments - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal noted and followed its earlier decision in the assessee's own case for AY 2003-04, which held that where tax was deducted on gross payments made by the assessee and the assessee offered the resulting net income to tax in the relevant year, the entire TDS deducted related to the assessee's income and must be allowed as credit. The courts below had restricted credit by applying a proportionate basis because the assessee credited only net amounts in the P&L; the Tribunal rejected that approach as contrary to the mandate that deduction made and paid to the Government is to be treated as payment of tax on behalf of the person from whose income deduction was made, and that credit must be allowed in the year the income is offered to tax. Consequently the order of the CIT(A) confining credit to amounts reflected in the P&L was set aside and full credit allowed in accordance with the Tribunal's precedent. [Paras 8]
Set aside the CIT(A) order and allow full TDS credit as per the Tribunal's precedent.
Disallowance under section 40A(2)(b) for excessive or unreasonable payments to related parties - fair market value test for payments to sister/holding concerns for services and allocations - Whether the adhoc disallowance (reduced by CIT(A) to 20%) of common facility charges paid to the holding company was sustainable - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal applied its earlier coordinate-bench decision in the assessee's own case for AY 2005-06 and other coordinate-bench authority, observing that the Assessing Officer made no effort to determine the fair market value of the services and proceeded by an adhoc percentage disallowance based on total expenditure. The Tribunal reiterated that section 40A(2)(b) disallowance requires a finding that payment is excessive or unreasonable vis-a -vis fair market value, and that inter-group allocations made on a commercial basis (here on turnover) do not automatically warrant disallowance absent such findings or evidence of tax-avoidance motive. Following the coordinate-bench precedent, the Tribunal upheld the assessee's grievance and disallowed the adhoc reduction. [Paras 12]
Following coordinate-bench precedent, the grievance of the assessee is allowed and the adhoc disallowance is not sustained.
Disallowance under section 40A(2)(b) for excessive or unreasonable payments to related parties - allowability of royalty for use of proprietary material where parallel agreement indicates prevailing rate - fair market value test for payments to sister/holding concerns for services and allocations - Whether the adhoc disallowance of a portion of royalty paid to the holding company (reduced by CIT(A) to 20%) for use of proprietary materials was justified - HELD THAT: - Relying on the Tribunal's decision in the assessee's own case for AY 2005-06, the Tribunal examined the agreement which capped royalty at 5% of billings and noted existence of a parallel arrangement between the parent company and the ultimate proprietor of the proprietary material, indicating the reasonableness of the rate. The Assessing Officer did not determine fair market value nor demonstrate that the 5% rate was excessive; disallowance under section 40A(2)(b) requires such a foundation. In absence of categorical findings or evidence that payments were excessive or entered into for tax avoidance, the adhoc percentage disallowance was unwarranted. The coordinate-bench reasoning was followed to delete the disallowance. [Paras 17]
Following coordinate-bench precedent, the disallowance of royalty is deleted and the assessee's ground is allowed.
Final Conclusion: The Tribunal allowed the appeal in full for AY 2006-07: (i) TDS credit is to be allowed in accordance with the Tribunal's earlier precedent rather than being restricted to amounts credited to P&L; (ii) the adhoc disallowance of common facility charges under section 40A(2)(b) was not sustained; and (iii) the adhoc disallowance of royalty paid for use of proprietary material was deleted.
Waiver of interest under Section 220(2A) - conditions for waiver under Section 220(2A) - discretionary power of the Commissioner in granting waiver - judicial review under Article 226 - instalment facility for payment of tax dues
Waiver of interest under Section 220(2A) - conditions for waiver under Section 220(2A) - discretionary power of the Commissioner - judicial review under Article 226 - Validity of Ext.P8 order granting 50% waiver of interest and refusal of full waiver - HELD THAT: - The Court examined whether the Commissioner erred in granting only a 50% reduction of interest under Section 220(2A) despite the petitioner alleging satisfaction of the three statutory conditions. The statutory test requires satisfaction of all three conditions before relief can be granted. The Commissioner found that the petitioner cooperated and faced liquidity problems but also possessed immovable properties and rental income; on that basis the Commissioner exercised discretion to reduce, but not fully waive, the interest. The High Court held that this exercise of discretion, based on the material noticed by the Commissioner, was not perverse and did not warrant interference under Article 226. [Paras 4, 5]
Ext.P8 upheld; no interference with the Commissioner's discretionary order reducing interest by 50%.
Instalment facility for payment of tax dues - Grant of instalment facility for payment of the reduced interest demand - HELD THAT: - Although Ext.P8 was upheld, the Court considered the petitioner's request for payment assistance and, on submissions, directed that the interest liability be payable in five equal monthly instalments with the first instalment due on or before 15.2.2012 and subsequent instalments on or before the 15th of each succeeding month. The order also recorded that failure to pay any instalment would permit the Bank to take recovery action in accordance with law. [Paras 6]
Payment permitted in five equal monthly instalments with specified due dates; default to attract recovery action.
Final Conclusion: The Court refused to set aside the Commissioner's order reducing interest by 50% under Section 220(2A), finding no perversity in the exercise of discretion, and granted the petitioner a five month instalment facility to pay the reduced interest amount.
Power of waiver of interest under Section 220(2A) of the Income Tax Act - conditions for waiver under Section 220(2A): genuine hardship; default not attributable to assessee; assessee's cooperation in recovery proceedings - non-co-operation in recovery proceedings as ground for refusal of waiver - finality of administrative discretion in exercise of statutory waiver power - incompetency of recurring applications after considered administrative rejection
Conditions for waiver under Section 220(2A): genuine hardship; default not attributable to assessee; assessee's cooperation in recovery proceedings - non-co-operation in recovery proceedings as ground for refusal of waiver - Whether the petitioner satisfied the statutory conditions for waiver of interest under Section 220(2A) and was entitled to exercise of the waiver power. - HELD THAT: - The Court recorded that Section 220(2A) permits waiver of interest only upon satisfaction of three conditions: genuine hardship in payment, default or delay not attributable to the assessee, and the assessee's cooperation in recovery proceedings. The authorities had considered the petitioner's earlier applications and found non-co-operation evidenced by default in payment. Subsequent change in circumstances (payment having later been made) did not cure the earlier finding of non-co-operation such as to mandate exercise of the waiver power. The Commissioner and the Chief Commissioner had independently rejected the waiver applications on the basis that one of the statutory conditions (co-operation/default) was not satisfied, and the Court declined to interfere with that exercise of discretion.
Petitioner's claim for waiver under Section 220(2A) was rejected as the statutory conditions, in particular cooperation/default, were not satisfied and the administrative refusal was not interfered with.
Incompetency of recurring applications after considered administrative rejection - finality of administrative discretion in exercise of statutory waiver power - Whether repeated or successive applications for the same statutory relief could be entertained after a competent authority had considered and rejected an earlier application. - HELD THAT: - The Court held that the power under Section 220(2A) is discretionary and, once exercised by the competent authority resulting in a considered rejection, there was no scope for recurring applications seeking the same relief on the same cause. The applications which followed the initial considered rejection were held to be incompetent, and the Court observed that it was not appropriate to permit repeated invocation of the same statutory power on every change in circumstances where the competent authority had already negatived one of the statutory conditions.
Subsequent applications for the same waiver after a competent authority's considered rejection were held incompetent and were not to be entertained.
Final Conclusion: Writ petition dismissed. The authorities validly refused waiver of interest under Section 220(2A) because the statutory conditions were not satisfied and repeated applications after considered administrative rejections were incompetent; the Court declined to interfere with the discretionary decisions.
Deduction for agency commission on export sales - character of export receipts as net amount after adjustment of foreign buyer's commission - DEPB claim in relation to actual convertible foreign exchange received - cessation or remission of liability and applicability of Section 41(1) - effect of limitation on extinguishment of debt - onus of proof on revenue to establish cessation of liability
Deduction for agency commission on export sales - character of export receipts as net amount after adjustment of foreign buyer's commission - DEPB claim in relation to actual convertible foreign exchange received - Deletion of addition of Rs.58,08,755 claimed as deduction of agency commission - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal found that the assessee received only the net invoice amount after adjustment of the foreign buyer's commission and there was no dispute about the commission being payable; the invoices reflected the commission/discount and the actual convertible foreign exchange realized was the net amount. The Tribunal therefore held that the assessee was entitled to the deduction despite claiming DEPB on gross invoice value, because the DEPB permission from RBI does not alter the fact of actual receipts. The High Court agreed that the revenue failed to establish that the assessee received any payment in excess of the invoiced (net) amounts and found no substantial question of law arising, endorsing the Tribunal's deletion of the addition. [Paras 3, 4]
Addition of Rs.58,08,755 deleted; no question of law arises.
Cessation or remission of liability and applicability of Section 41(1) - effect of limitation on extinguishment of debt - onus of proof on revenue to establish cessation of liability - Deletion of addition of Rs.2,14,195 made under the doctrine of deemed income on cessation of liability (invoking Section 41(1)) - HELD THAT: - The Assessing Officer invoked the provision treating the liability as having ceased because confirmations from creditors were not furnished. The Tribunal observed, and the High Court agreed, that the assessee continued to show the amount as outstanding in the balance-sheet and there was no material to show that the liability had actually ceased or that creditors had remitted the debt. Reliance on the principle that limitation alone does not extinguish the debt (and does not confer benefit on the debtor) was examined; the Court distinguished precedents where monies had been treated as the assessee's own by conduct and lapse of time. In the facts of this case the revenue failed to bring positive material to show cessation or remission of liability, and therefore the onus lay on the revenue which it did not discharge. [Paras 5, 6, 7]
Addition of Rs.2,14,195 deleted; invocation of Section 41(1) was not justified on the material before the authorities.
Final Conclusion: Revenue's appeal dismissed: the Tribunal correctly deleted the additions relating to agency commission and to alleged cessation of liability; revenue failed to establish receipt of gross export proceeds or cessation/remission of the creditor liability and did not discharge the onus to justify additions.
Reopening under Section 147 - failure to disclose facts necessary for assessment - exclusion of DEPB credit entitlement in computing export deduction - eligibility for deduction under Section 80-IA - allowability of expenditure under Section 37 - disallowance under Section 14A - application of Rule 8D of the Income-tax Rules - self-disallowance as estoppel against contesting expenditure
Reopening under Section 147 - failure to disclose facts necessary for assessment - Validity of reassessment proceedings initiated after completion of assessment under Section 143(3). - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal applied its earlier decision in I.T.A. Nos. 1374 to 1377/Mds/2010 and I.T.A. Nos. 1676 to 1679/Mds/2010 and held that reassessment was valid because the assessee had failed to disclose fully and truly the facts necessary for assessment in respect of its claims (notably deduction under Section 80-IA and expenditure for MRF Pace Foundation). The earlier reasoning was adopted as determinative for the present appeals. [Paras 5]
Reopening held valid; ground against the Revenue rejected and the assessee's challenge dismissed.
Exclusion of DEPB credit entitlement in computing export deduction - interpretation of export benefits for deduction - Whether DEPB credit entitlement should be included while computing deduction under Section 80-HHC/related export deduction. - HELD THAT: - Relying on the Tribunal's earlier order, the appeal was dismissed as the decision in Topman Exports v. ITO was held to be in favour of the Revenue and the assessee's ground could not be sustained. The Tribunal therefore affirmed exclusion of DEPB credit entitlement as decided previously. [Paras 6]
Assessee's ground disallowed; exclusion of DEPB credit upheld.
Eligibility for deduction under Section 80-IA - interpretation of Eleventh Schedule Item 27 - Whether products such as crown corks and similar fittings qualify for deduction under Section 80-IA. - HELD THAT: - On construction of the Eleventh Schedule, the Tribunal held (following its earlier order) that crown corks and other fittings of cork, rubber, polyethylene or any other material fell within Item 27 of the Eleventh Schedule and therefore the activities/products did not qualify for deduction under Section 80-IA. The prior reasoning was applied to dismiss the assessee's claim. [Paras 7]
Claim for deduction under Section 80-IA refused; ground dismissed.
Allowability of expenditure under Section 37 - business nexus of promotional expenditure - Whether expenditure incurred for MRF Pace Foundation (training individuals in cricket) is allowable as business expenditure under Section 37. - HELD THAT: - Adopting the Tribunal's earlier finding, expenditure incurred in promoting MRF Pace Foundation for training individuals in the game of cricket was held not to constitute the assessee's business activity and therefore could not be allowed as a business deduction under Section 37. The same conclusion was applied across the relevant assessment years before the Tribunal. [Paras 8, 12]
Expenditure disallowed; claim under Section 37 rejected.
Disallowance under Section 14A - application of Rule 8D of the Income-tax Rules - self-disallowance as estoppel against contesting expenditure - Whether disallowance under Section 14A in respect of exempt dividend income for AY 2008-09 should be determined by applying Rule 8D and whether the assessee can contend that no expenditure was incurred when it made a self-disallowance. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal noted that Rule 8D is applicable from assessment year 2008-09 and that while some authorities (cited precedent) hold that one cannot presume expenditure was always incurred in relation to exempt income, the assessee had itself made a disallowance. In view of these factors and the applicability of Rule 8D for the year in question, the Tribunal considered that the matter required fresh consideration by the Assessing Officer and therefore set aside the orders below and remitted the issue for reconsideration in accordance with law. [Paras 15]
Issue remitted to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication under Rule 8D/Section 14A; ground allowed for statistical purpose.
Final Conclusion: Appeals for assessment years 2003-04 and 2005-06 dismissed; appeal for assessment year 2008-09 partly allowed for statistical purposes and remitted to the Assessing Officer solely for fresh consideration of the Section 14A/Rule 8D disallowance issue.
Penalty under Section 271(1)(c) - application of Section 50C - substitution of consideration for computation of capital gains - concealment of income - furnishing inaccurate particulars - guideline value adopted by Registration/Stamping authority not conclusive proof of market value
Application of Section 50C - substitution of consideration for computation of capital gains - penalty under Section 271(1)(c) - Levy of penalty under Section 271(1)(c) on account of substitution of sale consideration under Section 50C - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal held that substitution of the sale consideration by the Assessing Officer in terms of Section 50C is for the limited purpose of computing capital gains and does not alter the actual consideration received by the assessee. Clause (2) of Section 50C permits the assessee to contend before the AO that the value adopted by the stamp valuation authority exceeds the fair market value; absence of such exercise (to avoid litigation) does not ipso facto imply furnishing of inaccurate particulars. Therefore, an addition made by applying the value adopted by the registering/stamp authorities does not automatically sustain a penalty under Section 271(1)(c). The Tribunal agreed with the CIT(A) that not every assessment addition attracts penalty and that the guideline value adopted by the Registration Department is not conclusive proof of market price, so as to establish concealment or inaccuracy warranting penalty. [Paras 5]
Penalty under Section 271(1)(c) could not be sustained merely because Assessing Officer substituted consideration under Section 50C; penalty deleted.
Concealment of income - furnishing inaccurate particulars - Whether non-supply of copies of registered sale deeds by the assessee amounted to concealment of income or furnishing of inaccurate particulars - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal found that mere non-furnishing of sale deed copies by the assessee does not necessarily constitute non-cooperation or indicate an intention to conceal income. Sellers may not possess copies of registered deeds unless provided by buyers, and the Assessing Officer in the present case obtained necessary documents from the registering authority. In the absence of evidence that amounts other than those declared by the assessee were actually received, the conduct could not be characterised as contumacious or as deliberate concealment warranting penalty under Section 271(1)(c). The CIT(A)'s conclusion that there was no concealment or inaccurate furnishing of particulars was upheld. [Paras 5]
Non-furnishing of sale deed copies did not by itself establish concealment or inaccurate particulars; penalty under Section 271(1)(c) not attracted.
Final Conclusion: The Tribunal dismissed the Revenue's appeal and upheld the CIT(A)'s order deleting the penalty under Section 271(1)(c), holding that substitution of value under Section 50C and non-production of registered deed copies did not, on the facts, establish concealment or furnishing of inaccurate particulars.
Commissioner's revision under section 263 - double claim of depreciation / depreciation disallowance - benefit under section 10B - splitting of depreciation - limitation for revision computed from income escaping assessment - deductibility of interest as revenue expenditure in relation to ESOP perquisites
Commissioner's revision under section 263 - double claim of depreciation / depreciation disallowance - benefit under section 10B - splitting of depreciation - Validity of the Commissioner's revision under section 263 in respect of the assessing officer's giving of depreciation twice and failure to split depreciation while computing benefit under section 10B (assessment year 2002-03). - HELD THAT: - The Commissioner was entitled under section 263 to examine an order passed by a subordinate assessing authority and to revise an order found to be erroneous and prejudicial to the Revenue. On giving effect to the Tribunal's directions the assessing officer adopted net profit which already reflected depreciation as per the Companies Act and then again allowed depreciation under the Income-tax Act, resulting in a double allowance. Further, the assessing officer did not split depreciation while computing the section 10B benefit, resulting in excess benefit. These errors rendered the assessment order both erroneous and prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue and justified revision under section 263. [Paras 6, 7, 8]
Revision under section 263 upheld; assessing officer's order for AY 2002-03 held erroneous and prejudicial and the Commissioner's revision order sustained.
Limitation for revision computed from income escaping assessment - Commissioner's revision under section 263 - Whether the Commissioner's revision for assessment year 2003-04 was time barred or within limitation. - HELD THAT: - The assessing officer issued a notice under section 148 and completed an income escaping assessment under section 147 read with section 143(3); that subsequent assessment merges and supersedes the earlier regular assessment. The Commissioner is entitled to examine the records of the income escaping assessment order and to pass a revision under section 263 with reference to issues arising from that order. Consequently, the period of limitation for exercise of revisionary power is to be computed from the date of the income escaping assessment order, and the Commissioner's revision for AY 2003-04 was within time. [Paras 10]
Limitation objection rejected; revision for AY 2003-04 held to be within the period of limitation.
Deductibility of interest as revenue expenditure in relation to ESOP perquisites - Commissioner's revision under section 263 - Treatment of interest paid by the assessee on loans taken by employees for allotment of ESOP shares and whether such interest is deductible as revenue expenditure (assessment year 2003-04) - remanded for fresh consideration. - HELD THAT: - The Commissioner considered whether the interest incurred (repayment of loans advanced to employees who later declined ESOP subscription) was incurred for the assessee's business and thus deductible under section 36(1). The Tribunal recognised the assessee's contentions that the interest was a revenue expenditure in managing employee relations and that ESOPs constitute perquisites, but observed that the factual and documentary particulars necessary to adjudicate these contentions had not been examined by the Commissioner. Rather than deciding the matter on merits, the Commissioner set aside the assessment for the assessing officer to re determine the issue after affording the assessee an opportunity of being heard. The Tribunal preserved the assessee's right to raise all contentions before the assessing officer and accordingly upheld the revision while directing fresh adjudication by the AO. [Paras 11, 12, 13]
Matter remitted to the assessing officer for fresh determination after hearing the assessee; the question of deductibility of the interest remains to be adjudicated on facts and evidence.
Final Conclusion: Appeals dismissed. Revision under section 263 upheld for AY 2002-03 (depreciation disallowance and section 10B splitting) and for AY 2003-04 (revision held within limitation); question of deductibility of interest relating to ESOP loans remanded to the assessing officer for fresh consideration after hearing the assessee.
Exemption under section 80P(2)(a)(i) - engaged in carrying on the business of banking or providing credit facilities to its members - deduction under section 80P(2)(a)(iii) - marketing of the agricultural produce of members
Exemption under section 80P(2)(a)(i) - engaged in carrying on the business of banking or providing credit facilities to its members - Entitlement of the assessee-cooperative to exemption under section 80P(2)(a)(i) in respect of interest received from members - HELD THAT: - The Supreme Court held that, for a cooperative society to claim exemption under section 80P(2)(a)(i), it must prove that it is engaged in carrying on the business of banking or in providing credit facilities to its members; this requires examination of the memorandum of association, articles of association, returns of income and the status of business indicated therein. The Tribunal found that these inquiries were not undertaken by the Assessing Officer or the CIT(A). In conformity with the Supreme Court's directions, the Tribunal remitted the issue to the Assessing Officer for de novo enquiry and directed the AO to call for requisite information, examine the memorandum/articles/returns and give the assessee an opportunity of being heard before adjudicating the claim. [Paras 6, 7]
Issue remitted to the file of the Assessing Officer for fresh consideration in accordance with the Supreme Court's directions; matter restored to AO to make necessary enquiries and adjudicate afresh.
Deduction under section 80P(2)(a)(iii) - marketing of the agricultural produce of members - Claim for deduction under section 80P(2)(a)(iii) in respect of income earned on diversion/marketing of members' sugarcane - HELD THAT: - With respect to the deduction under section 80P(2)(a)(iii), the Revenue conceded that a Special Leave Petition on a similar issue had been dismissed by the Supreme Court. Following that precedent and concession, the Tribunal held that the appeal regarding the benefit under section 80P(2)(a)(iii) must be dismissed. [Paras 6, 8]
Appeal dismissed insofar as it relates to the benefit of section 80P(2)(a)(iii).
Final Conclusion: For assessment years 1994-95 and 1995-96, the Tribunal remitted the question of exemption under section 80P(2)(a)(i) to the Assessing Officer for fresh enquiry in conformity with the Supreme Court's directions, and dismissed the challenge to the disallowance of deduction under section 80P(2)(a)(iii).
Addition on account of low gross profit - rejection of books of account - application of average gross profit - concurrent findings of fact by adjudicating authorities - appellate interference in findings of fact - absence of substantial question of law
Addition on account of low gross profit - application of average gross profit - concurrent findings of fact by adjudicating authorities - Reduction of the addition made by the Assessing Officer on account of low gross profit to 60% and related factual findings. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal examined the drastic fall in gross profit compared to earlier years and accepted the assessee's explanation regarding increased production cost and marginally higher sale prices, while noting that verification of purchases, sales and consumption was not practicable. The Assessing Officer had rejected the books and applied an average gross profit rate to compute an addition. The Tribunal, relying on similar orders in respect of group concerns and considering price fluctuations in raw material and the post-survey decline in gross profit, sustained only 60% of the addition. The High Court found the matter to be essentially factual, observed that both lower authorities reached concurrent conclusions with cogent reasons, and held that there was no substantial question of law warranting interference.
Tribunal's reduction of the addition to 60% is upheld; no interference with concurrent factual findings.
Final Conclusion: The Tax Appeal is dismissed: the High Court declines to interfere with the Tribunal's factual conclusion reducing the addition to 60%, holding there is no substantial question of law.
Pre-deposit of duty - fraudulent DEPB scrips - bonafide purchaser - waiver of interest and penalty during pendency - pre-deposit of penalty - application of precedent
Pre-deposit of duty - fraudulent DEPB scrips - bonafide purchaser - waiver of interest and penalty during pendency - application of precedent - Whether the appellants who imported against fraudulent DEPB scrips but claim to be bonafide purchasers are required to make pre-deposit of duty and whether interest and penalties may be waived during pendency of appeals. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal found on the record that the imports were effected against fraudulent DEPB scrips and therefore duty is required to be paid at the interim stage. The appellants claimed bonafide purchaser status and produced evidence of having lodged police complaints and FIRs against the broker, but the Bench applied its earlier decision in K.I International & Ors. Vs. Commissioner of Customs as governing precedent that importers in such cases must pre-deposit duty along with applicable interest. Following that precedent, the Tribunal directed the appellants (M/s. Glory Impex, M/s. K.T.V. Oil Mills Ltd., M/s. Crystal Traders and M/s. Jupiter Trading Corporation) to pre-deposit the amount of duty confirmed less any amount already paid within a specified period; upon such compliance interest and penalties shall remain waived during the pendency of the appeals.
Appellants ordered to pre-deposit confirmed duty (less amounts already paid) within 12 weeks; on compliance interest and penalties waived during pendency of appeals.
Pre-deposit of penalty - fraudulent DEPB scrips - Whether the broker V. Sankaran, held to have actively perpetrated the fraud, should be directed to make a pre-deposit of the penalty confirmed against him and whether any part of the penalty may be waived during pendency. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal concluded that V. Sankaran actively perpetrated the fraud in obtaining and supplying fake DEPB scrips. In view of his active role, the Bench ordered a different interim treatment: V. Sankaran was directed to pre-deposit 50% of the penalty amounts confirmed against him within the same specified period. Upon such compliance, the balance of the penalty was ordered to be waived during the pendency of the appeal.
V. Sankaran ordered to pre-deposit 50% of confirmed penalties within 12 weeks; balance of penalty waived during pendency of appeal.
Final Conclusion: The Tribunal directed the four importer-appellants to pre-deposit the confirmed duty (less amounts already paid) within 12 weeks, with interest and penalties waived during the appeal on such compliance; the broker V. Sankaran was directed to pre-deposit 50% of the confirmed penalty within 12 weeks, with the balance waived during the pendency of his appeal.
Winding up under section 433(e) of the Companies Act - admitted debt and liability of the respondent - dishonour of post dated cheques and non payment of admitted debt - reopening/restoration of company petition on failure of settlement - appointment of Official Liquidator and directions for initial deposits
Winding up under section 433(e) of the Companies Act - admitted debt and liability of the respondent - dishonour of post dated cheques and non payment of admitted debt - Allowing the company petition for winding up of the respondent company on the ground of inability or failure to pay an admitted debt. - HELD THAT: - The Court found that the respondent had admitted the debt by filing a memo and by participating in a joint memo which recorded a settlement by post dated cheques and partial payment promises. The cheques issued in furtherance of the settlement were dishonoured and criminal proceedings under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act were filed. A statutory notice had been served and the petition, which had been restored after the settlement failed, was before the Court. In view of the respondent's admission of liability, the failure of the settlement evidenced by dishonour of cheques, and persistent non payment despite repeated demands, the Court concluded that the petitioner had made out a case for winding up under the statutory provision relied upon and that the petition should be allowed. [Paras 3, 5, 6, 8, 9]
The company petition is allowed and the respondent company is ordered to be wound up.
Appointment of Official Liquidator and directions for initial deposits - Appointment of the Official Liquidator and directions as to procedural steps and initial expenses following the winding up order. - HELD THAT: - On allowing the petition, the Court appointed the Official Liquidator to take charge of winding up proceedings. The petitioner was directed to communicate the winding up order to the Registrar of Companies within a specified period and to deposit a specified sum with the Official Liquidator to meet initial expenses to initiate the winding up proceedings. These directions were issued as ancillary and necessary steps to give effect to the winding up order. [Paras 9]
Official Liquidator appointed; petitioner to inform Registrar of Companies and to deposit the initial sum with the Official Liquidator within the time fixed.
Reopening/restoration of company petition on failure of settlement - Rejection of the respondent's counsel's memo of retirement and restoration of the petition for adjudication following failure of the settlement. - HELD THAT: - The Court observed that the petition had earlier been disposed of on the basis of the joint memo recording settlement; following dishonour of the cheques the petitioner successfully applied for restoration and the petition was restored. When the matter was taken up, the respondent's counsel sought to file a memo for retirement; given the circumstances and the pendency of the matter after restoration, the Court refused to accept the counsel's memo of retirement. The petition was therefore heard in the absence of the respondent and decided on merits. [Paras 6, 7, 8]
Memo for retirement by the respondent's counsel rejected; petition restored and heard in the absence of the respondent.
Final Conclusion: The company petition under section 433(e) was allowed as the respondent had admitted the debt and the agreed settlement failed due to dishonour of cheques; the respondent company is ordered to be wound up, the Official Liquidator is appointed, and the petitioner directed to notify the Registrar of Companies and to deposit the initial amount required for commencement of winding up.
Attachment and restraint of assets for enforcement of refund directions - Joint and several liability of directors and promoter for refund of investor monies - Non compliance with court directions as a basis for execution remedies including freezing and sale - Verification of refund claims by production of supporting documents - Appropriation to Government where subscribers are untraceable
Non compliance with court directions as a basis for execution remedies including freezing and sale - Verification of refund claims by production of supporting documents - SIRECL's failure to furnish documents and otherwise comply with the Supreme Court directions justified treating its refund claims as not established and authorised SEBI to proceed with enforcement measures. - HELD THAT: - The Court records that SIRECL did not submit the documents required by the Supreme Court order within the stipulated period and subsequently delivered materials in a disordered and unacceptable form, preventing SEBI from verifying genuineness of subscribers and refunds. Under the Supreme Court's directions, if documents produced are not genuine or acceptable, SEBI was entitled to proceed as if no refunds had been made. In consequence of these findings of non compliance and unacceptability of documents, SEBI was empowered to take coercive measures provided in the Supreme Court orders for recovery of amounts refundable to investors. [Paras 4, 5, 9]
SEBI correctly proceeded on the basis that SIRECL's refund claims were not established due to failure to comply with documentary directions, permitting enforcement measures.
Attachment and restraint of assets for enforcement of refund directions - SEBI was authorised to attach and restrain specified immovable and movable assets, bank and demat accounts and investments of SIRECL to secure repayment as directed by the Supreme Court. - HELD THAT: - Relying on the Supreme Court's orders which permitted SEBI to take recourse to legal remedies including attachment and sale of properties and freezing of bank accounts, the adjudicating officer issued an order attaching the assets and interests enumerated in Table 'A' (serials 1-11) and directed restraints on operation of accounts, demat accounts and disposition of assets. The order also directed transfer of monies in bank/demat accounts to a designated SEBI refund account and required SIRECL to furnish additional particulars within fixed timeframes to facilitate sale and recovery steps. The attachment and directions were made effective immediately and sale proceedings were to follow after collection of full particulars. [Paras 14, 15]
Attachment of the specified assets and restraints on SIRECL's accounts and properties were ordered to enforce the refund directions.
Joint and several liability of directors and promoter for refund of investor monies - Non compliance with court directions as a basis for execution remedies including freezing and sale - The promoter (Mr. Subrata Roy Sahara) and named directors were held jointly and severally liable for refund and their bank accounts and properties were ordered frozen and attached for recovery. - HELD THAT: - The SEBI order of 23.06.2011, affirmed by the SAT and the Supreme Court, had made the promoter and the directors jointly and severally liable to refund monies collected through the RHPs with interest. Given the affirmance and the subsequent non compliance by the companies, the adjudicating officer directed freezing of all bank and demat accounts of Mr. Subrata Roy Sahara and the named directors, and attachment of all their movable and immovable properties, together with a requirement to furnish particulars of such assets within 21 days and a restraint on alienation pending compliance. [Paras 16]
Freezing and attachment of bank accounts and properties of the promoter and named directors was directed to secure recovery against their joint and several liability.
Verification of refund claims by production of supporting documents - Appropriation to Government where subscribers are untraceable - The procedural mechanism for verifying refund claims and the consequence for untraceable subscribers under the Supreme Court directions were affirmed and to be implemented by SEBI. - HELD THAT: - The Supreme Court had directed that Saharas furnish documents to establish refunds, that SEBI verify genuineness with expert assistance, afford Saharas opportunity to establish doubtful claims, and that sums from subscribers whose whereabouts could not be ascertained be appropriated to the Government of India. The adjudicating officer recorded that SEBI would implement these procedures, including engaging experts and investigators at Saharas' expense, and proceed with appropriation where subscribers could not be traced after verification efforts. [Paras 3, 4, 5]
SEBI was to verify refund claims using the prescribed procedure and, where subscribers are untraceable after verification, amounts would be appropriated to the Government as directed.
Attachment and restraint of assets for enforcement of refund directions - Specific ancillary directions were issued for preservation and realisation of assets and for SIRECL to furnish further details and realise certain investments for deposit with SEBI. - HELD THAT: - Beyond attachment, the order directed SIRECL to furnish details of other investments within 21 days, refrain from operating bank/demat accounts or redeeming mutual funds, not to transfer shares held, to recover amounts from partnership firm investments and loans/advances and deposit specified cash and bank balances with SEBI. The order also directed deposit of share certificates representing the Aamby Valley shares and prohibited disposal of certain listed mutual fund units, thereby creating an operational framework to preserve assets pending recovery. [Paras 14]
Directed preservation steps and disclosure/realisation obligations were imposed on SIRECL to facilitate enforcement of the refund directions.
Final Conclusion: SEBI's order attaches and restrains identified assets, bank/demat accounts and investments of Sahara India Real Estate Corporation Ltd., freezes accounts and directs attachment of properties of the promoter and specified directors, and implements the Supreme Court's verification and recovery scheme because SIRECL and others failed to comply with documentary and payment directions, thereby authorising seizure, transfer to a SEBI refund account and further enforcement including sale or appropriation where subscribers are untraceable.
Refund of service tax on exported goods - interest on delayed refunds - application of provisions of Section 11BB to service tax refunds under Section 83 of the Finance Act, 1994 - interpretation of Notification No. 41/2007 ST concerning relevant date and limitation for refund - calculation of interest from expiry of three months after filing of the refund claim
Interest on delayed refunds - application of provisions of Section 11BB to service tax refunds under Section 83 of the Finance Act, 1994 - interpretation of Notification No. 41/2007 ST concerning relevant date and limitation for refund - calculation of interest from expiry of three months after filing of the refund claim - Entitlement to interest for belatedly sanctioned refunds of service tax paid on exported goods and the period for calculation of such interest. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal found no dispute as to the appellant's entitlement to the refunded amounts. Relying on the bench's earlier decision in Nirma Limited, the Tribunal held that the authorities erred in denying interest where refunds were belatedly sanctioned. The reasoning notes that Section 83 of the Finance Act incorporates the provisions of Section 11BB of the Central Excise Act for service tax matters, and that Notification No. 41/2007 ST must be read in light of the statutory scheme governing refunds and limitation. Consequently, interest is payable where refunds are not paid within the prescribed period; the period for computing interest runs from the expiry of three months after filing the refund claim until the date of actual refund. The Tribunal directed the lower authorities to compute and grant the interest accordingly and allowed the appeals with consequential relief.
Appeals allowed; appellants entitled to interest on belatedly sanctioned refunds, to be calculated from after three months of filing the refund claim until payment, and the amount to be determined by the lower authorities.
Final Conclusion: The Tribunal allowed the appeals and directed that interest be paid on the refunds which were sanctioned belatedly, the interest to be calculated from the expiry of three months after filing the refund claims up to the date of actual refund, with consequential relief.
Issues: Whether storage and warehousing of old files, records, discharged cheques, vouchers, deeds and books of account amounts to taxable storage and warehousing of "goods" under the Finance Act, 1994.
Analysis: The definition of storage and warehousing service under the Finance Act, 1994 applies to storage and warehousing of goods. The expression "goods" is linked to the meaning in section 2(7) of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930. On that definition and the settled understanding of goods, saleability and marketability are essential attributes. Old records, files and similar documents maintained for clients are not marketable or saleable commodities. The reasoning in the cited Supreme Court decision on the meaning of goods was held applicable, even though it arose in a different statutory context, because the same concept of goods was involved.
Conclusion: Storage and warehousing of old records and similar documents is not taxable as storage and warehousing of goods, and the service tax demand was unsustainable.
Final Conclusion: The assessee's activity fell outside the taxable category invoked by the department, so the assessee succeeded and the revenue's challenge failed.
Ratio Decidendi: For purposes of taxing storage and warehousing services, "goods" must be saleable and marketable; unsaleable records and documents are not goods within the relevant service-tax entry.
Storage and warehousing services - definition of goods under the Sale of Goods Act, 1930 - marketability / saleability as an essential criterion for goods - taxability of services linked to storage of goods
Storage and warehousing services - definition of goods under the Sale of Goods Act, 1930 - marketability / saleability as an essential criterion for goods - Whether records such as discharged cheques, vouchers, agreements and books of account constitute 'goods' and whether storage of such records is taxable as storage and warehousing services under the Finance Act, 1994. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal held that the Finance Act's reference to "goods" must be read with the meaning assigned in Section 2(7) of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930, which contemplates saleable/moveable property capable of coming into the market. The Court accepted the principle that marketability or saleability is an essential criterion for an item to qualify as 'goods' under the Sale of Goods Act. Applying the ratio of R.D. Saxena v. Balram Prasad Sharma, the Tribunal found that bank and corporate records, discharged cheques, vouchers, agreements and similar files are not saleable or marketable items and therefore do not fall within the statutory definition of 'goods'. Since the services rendered by the appellant related to storage and retrieval of such non-saleable records, those activities do not amount to "storage and warehousing of goods" and hence are not taxable under the storage and warehousing service category as defined in the Finance Act, 1994. [Paras 7, 8]
Storage and retrieval of old files and records do not constitute storage and warehousing of 'goods' and are not liable to service tax under the storage and warehousing service definition.
Final Conclusion: The appeal by the assessee is allowed and the revenue's demand for service tax in respect of storage and retrieval of client records is set aside; the revenue's appeal is dismissed.
Extended period of limitation under proviso to Section 73(1) - Levy of Service Tax on storage and warehousing - auction proceeds of abandoned cargo - Service provider-service recipient relationship - Application of Board clarification on cargo handling to storage and warehousing
Extended period of limitation under proviso to Section 73(1) - Invocation of extended period based on omission from ST-3 when 'auction income' was shown in books of account - HELD THAT: - The extended period was invoked solely because the 'auction income' was not declared in the ST-3 returns. The Show Cause Notice did not allege any wilful suppression or concealment with intent to evade tax. The auction income had been fully disclosed in the appellant's regular books of account (public documents) and the audit itself drew the information from the balance sheet. Applying the principle in CCE v. H.M.M. Ltd. as relied upon by the appellant, mere nondisclosure in ST-3 without suppression in books is insufficient to attract the proviso to Section 73(1). Consequently the extended period cannot be invoked and the demand is time-barred except insofar as it survives for one year prior to issuance of the SCN. [Paras 5]
Extended period under the proviso to Section 73(1) cannot be invoked; demand survives only from 1-4-2007 onwards.
Levy of Service Tax on storage and warehousing - auction proceeds of abandoned cargo - Service provider-service recipient relationship - Application of Board clarification on cargo handling to storage and warehousing - Whether the appellant's 'auction income' is liable to Service tax as consideration for storage and warehousing service - HELD THAT: - The appellant, as custodian, conducted auctions of abandoned cargo and retained auction proceeds after statutory payments. The Board's earlier clarification on auctioned abandoned cargo in the context of 'cargo handling service' stated that no service is rendered to any person in such auctions and tax is not leviable; the Court found that though the storage and warehousing levy was introduced later, the rationale of the clarification applies by inference. Moreover, transfer of title at auction characterises the transaction as a sale and not as rendering of storage/warehousing service to any identifiable recipient; successful bidders paid sales tax, and no importer ever came forward to claim goods or proceeds. In absence of a service provider-service receiver relationship and where the proceeds represent sale consideration adjusted for statutory dues, the auction income cannot be treated as consideration for storage and warehousing service. [Paras 6]
No Service tax is payable on the auction income; the auction proceeds are not consideration for storage and warehousing service.
Final Conclusion: The appeal is allowed: the extended period under the proviso to Section 73(1) is not invokable (demand survives only from 1-4-2007 onwards), and the auction income of abandoned cargo is not taxable as consideration for storage and warehousing service; the impugned order is set aside.
Issues: (i) whether the extended period of limitation under section 73(1) of the Finance Act, 1994 could be invoked; (ii) whether the service rendered to the foreign principal was classifiable as Business Support Service or Ship Management Service; (iii) whether the service was an export of service and therefore not liable to service tax; and (iv) whether exemption under Notification No. 4/2004-S.T. was available for services rendered to SEZ units.
Issue (i): whether the extended period of limitation under section 73(1) of the Finance Act, 1994 could be invoked.
Analysis: The appellant was a registered service provider filing returns regularly and was subjected to periodic audit. On those facts, the Department was held to be aware of the nature of the activity, and there was no suppression of facts with intent to evade tax. The ingredients necessary for invoking the extended period were therefore absent, and only the normal period could survive.
Conclusion: The extended period of limitation was not invocable, and the demand survived only for the period within limitation.
Issue (ii): whether the service rendered to the foreign principal was classifiable as Business Support Service or Ship Management Service.
Analysis: The dominant and essential service was found to be the supply of seafarers or crew. The presence of the principal's representative in India was treated as merely incidental. Applying the rule of specific description over general description under section 65A, and noting the specific inclusion of providing crews within ship management service, the service was held to fall under ship management service and not Business Support Service.
Conclusion: The service was correctly classifiable as Ship Management Service.
Issue (iii): whether the service was an export of service and therefore not liable to service tax.
Analysis: Once the service was identified as supply of seafarers to a foreign receiver, the location of the service receiver was outside India. Payment was received in convertible foreign exchange. The conditions of the Export of Service Rules, 2005 were therefore satisfied.
Conclusion: The service constituted export of service and was not liable to service tax.
Issue (iv): whether exemption under Notification No. 4/2004-S.T. was available for services rendered to SEZ units.
Analysis: Services consumed within SEZ were treated as eligible for exemption. The SEZ was treated as a duty-free enclave, and section 51 of the Special Economic Zones Act, 2005 was relied upon for its overriding effect. Since the services were ultimately consumed by SEZ units, the exemption was held applicable.
Conclusion: The appellant was entitled to exemption under Notification No. 4/2004-S.T. for services rendered to the SEZ units.
Final Conclusion: The demand did not survive on the substantive grounds decided, and the appeal was allowed with the impugned order set aside.
Ratio Decidendi: Where the essential nature of a service fits a specific taxable category, that specific classification prevails over a broader residual category; service rendered to a foreign recipient and paid for in convertible foreign exchange qualifies as export of service, and services consumed within an SEZ are eligible for the applicable exemption.
Ship Management Service - Business Support Service - Export of Service - Extended period / proviso to Section 73(1) - limitation - Exemption under Notification No. 4/2004-S.T. for services consumed within SEZ - Classification rule preferring most specific description (Section 65A)
Extended period / proviso to Section 73(1) - limitation - Whether the demand is time-barred and the extended period under proviso to Section 73(1) is invocable - HELD THAT: - The adjudicator found that the appellant was a registered Steamer Agent filing returns regularly and audited periodically, and there was no suppression with intent to evade tax. Consequently the proviso to invoke the extended period could not be applied. As a result only the portion of the demand within one year of the relevant date survives, namely the period w.e.f. 1-4-2007. [Paras 5]
The extended period is not invocable; demand survives only from 1-4-2007.
Ship Management Service - Business Support Service - Classification rule preferring most specific description (Section 65A) - Whether the services rendered to M/s. Eagle Ship Management Pvt. Ltd. are classifiable as Ship Management Service or as Business Support Service - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal applied the statutory rule that a sub clause giving the most specific description must be preferred. Since providing crews (seafarers) is specifically included within the definition of Ship Management Service, and the primary and essential nature of the appellant's agreement was to supply seafarers, the activity is classifiable under Ship Management Service rather than the more general Business Support Service. The presence of the principal's representatives in India was held to be ancillary to the primary service of supplying crews; if infrastructure facilities were separately billed, those amounts could be taxed under BSS, but the core service is ship management. [Paras 5]
The service is rightly classifiable under Ship Management Service.
Export of Service - Whether the services supplied to the foreign principal amount to Export of Service and thereby attract exemption - HELD THAT: - Having held that the appellant provided seafarers to a foreign service receiver, the Tribunal applied the Export of Service Rules and noted that payment was received in convertible foreign exchange. The conditions of Rule 4 read with Rule 3 were therefore satisfied, and the services qualified as exported services, rendering them not liable to service tax for the surviving demand period. [Paras 5]
The services are exported and not liable to Service tax for the surviving period.
Exemption under Notification No. 4/2004-S.T. for services consumed within SEZ - Whether Steamer Agent services provided to SEZ units qualify for exemption under Notification No. 4/2004-S.T. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal observed that SEZs are duty free enclaves deemed foreign territory and that services which commence outside but are utilised within SEZ units are to be treated as consumed within the SEZ. The Lower Authority had not disputed utilisation by the SEZ units. In view of the SEZ Act's overriding effect and the purpose of SEZ concessions, the appellant's Steamer Agent services consumed by SEZ units fall within the scope of Notification No. 4/2004 S.T. and are eligible for exemption. [Paras 5]
The appellant is eligible for exemption under Notification No. 4/2004 S.T. for services provided to the identified SEZ units.
Penalty - Whether penalty should be imposed - HELD THAT: - Since the demand does not survive on merits for the surviving period (being either exported or exempt in respect of SEZ consumption), the question of imposing penalty does not arise. [Paras 6]
No penalty is to be imposed.
Final Conclusion: The appeal is allowed: the extended period under Section 73(1) is not invocable so demand survives only from 1-4-2007; the services are classifiable as Ship Management Service; those services to the foreign principal qualify as Export of Service (payment in foreign exchange) and are not liable to service tax for the surviving period; services consumed by specified SEZ units are exempt under Notification No. 4/2004 S.T.; accordingly no penalty is imposed and the impugned order is set aside.
Availability of Cenvat credit on Education Cess and S.& H. Education Cess - non-obstante clause in Rule 3(7)(a) of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 - precedential application of Tribunal decision
Availability of Cenvat credit on Education Cess and S.& H. Education Cess - non-obstante clause in Rule 3(7)(a) of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 - precedential application of Tribunal decision - Whether the Cenvat credit of Education Cess and S.& H. Education Cess paid on the aggregate of customs duties was wrongly availed by the assessee or was allowable in view of the non-obstante clause of Rule 3(7)(a) and the Tribunal's decision in EMCURE Pharmaceuticals Ltd. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal examined the invoices showing CVD and the education cesses charged by the 100% EOU and the claim of the DTA assessee to Cenvat credit of those cesses. The adjudicating authorities had found that credit of Education Cess and S.& H. Education Cess on the aggregate of customs duty was not permissible under Rule 3. The Commissioner (Appeals) allowed the assessee's claim relying on this Tribunal's earlier decision in EMCURE Pharmaceuticals Ltd., which held that the non-obstante clause in Rule 3(7)(a) applies in respect of Basic Excise Duty paid under Section 3 of the Act and therefore permitted the credit. The Revenue failed to distinguish that precedent or provide reasons why EMCURE would not apply. In the absence of any amendment to the Rule or distinguishing facts, the Tribunal respectfully followed EMCURE and concluded that the credit was allowable.
Appeal rejected; order of Commissioner (A) upholding availment of the Cenvat credit is confirmed and Revenue's appeal is devoid of merit.
Final Conclusion: The Tribunal, following its decision in EMCURE Pharmaceuticals Ltd., held that the Cenvat credit of Education Cess and S.& H. Education Cess as claimed by the assessee was allowable; the Revenue's appeal is dismissed and the cross-objection is disposed of.
Issues: (i) Whether the appellant had a prima facie case on the demand of education cess on DTA clearances of 100% EOU goods; (ii) whether copper alloy coin blanks were classifiable under Heading 7409 or as articles of copper under Heading 7419; (iii) whether the DTA clearances of one product of a 100% EOU could be made up to 90% of the FOB value of its exports where the unit manufactured more than one similar product.
Issue (i): Whether the appellant had a prima facie case on the demand of education cess on DTA clearances of 100% EOU goods.
Analysis: The demand turned on whether education cess could be charged again on the aggregate of customs duties used as the measure of excise duty for DTA clearances. The issue had already been referred to a Larger Bench in another matter, which showed that the point was debatable and not finally settled at that stage.
Conclusion: The appellant had an arguable case on this issue.
Issue (ii): Whether copper alloy coin blanks were classifiable under Heading 7409 or as articles of copper under Heading 7419.
Analysis: The coin blanks were manufactured by punching copper alloy sheets and were used by the mint for making coins. They had not acquired the shape or character of finished articles of copper. The reasoning that Section Note 6 to Section XVI supported classification under Heading 7419 was found inapplicable to goods falling under Section XV and Chapter 74. Chapter Note 1(g) to Chapter 74 supported classification of such perforated or worked flat products under Heading 7409.
Conclusion: The appellant had a prima facie case that the coin blanks were classifiable under Heading 7409 and not under Heading 7419.
Issue (iii): Whether the DTA clearances of one product of a 100% EOU could be made up to 90% of the FOB value of its exports where the unit manufactured more than one similar product.
Analysis: The exported items were treated as similar products and both fell under the same tariff heading. Since the total DTA clearances remained within the overall entitlement under the Foreign Trade Policy, the clearances of any one such product could be made up to 90% of the FOB value of its exports.
Conclusion: The department's objection on this point was not accepted and the appellant had a prima facie case.
Final Conclusion: The appellant established a prima facie case on all three disputes, so pre-deposit was waived and recovery stayed pending disposal of the appeal.
Ratio Decidendi: Where the disputed demands involve debatable questions of duty computation, tariff classification, and export entitlement, and the appellant shows a strong prima facie case, pre-deposit may be waived and recovery stayed pending the appeal.
Levy of education cess on excise duty computed under proviso to Section 3(1) - Classification of coin blanks under Heading 7409 versus as "articles of copper" under Heading 7419 - Application of Chapter Note 1(g) for "flat surface products" and its relevance to coin blanks - Inapplicability of Section Note 6 to Section XVI to goods falling under Section XV - DTA entitlement allocation for a 100% EOU manufacturing similar products under para 6.8(a) of the Foreign Trade Policy - Prima facie case and stay of recovery with waiver of pre-deposit
Levy of education cess on excise duty computed under proviso to Section 3(1) - Whether education cess is chargeable again on the aggregate customs duties which form the excise liability for DTA clearances under the proviso to Section 3(1). - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal noted that the question whether education cess is to be levied again on the aggregate of duties of customs (which constitute the excise liability under the proviso to Section 3(1)) has been referred to a Larger Bench in Kumar Arch Tech Pvt. Ltd. Accordingly, the Tribunal treated the matter as presenting an arguable case in favour of the appellant for the purpose of interim relief. The Tribunal did not finally decide the legal question on merits but recognised that the issue is the subject of reference and therefore prima facie support exists for the appellant's contention. [Paras 6]
The appellant has an arguable prima facie case on the cess issue; interim relief warranted but the substantive question remains for the Larger Bench or final adjudication.
Classification of coin blanks under Heading 7409 versus as "articles of copper" under Heading 7419 - Application of Chapter Note 1(g) for "flat surface products" and its relevance to coin blanks - Inapplicability of Section Note 6 to Section XVI to goods falling under Section XV - Whether the coin blanks of copper alloys are correctly classifiable under Heading 7409 (flat surface products/plates, sheets, strips, foils) and not as "articles of copper" under Heading 7419. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal examined the manufacturing process (punching of copper alloy sheets to produce coin blanks) and the use of coin blanks by the mint to make coins, concluding that the blanks have not attained the shape or character of finished "articles." It held that Section Note 6 to Section XVI (which relates to machinery in Sections 84 and 85) is not appropriately applied to goods falling under Section XV, and that Chapter Note 1(g) to Chapter 74 supports classification as flat surface products under Heading 7409. The Tribunal also noted that US Customs rulings, while not determinative, have parallel force because India follows the HSN-based system. On this prima facie assessment, the appellant's plea on classification was accepted for interim purposes. [Paras 7]
Prima facie view that coin blanks are classifiable under Heading 7409 and not under Heading 7419; appellant has a strong prima facie case on classification.
DTA entitlement allocation for a 100% EOU manufacturing similar products under para 6.8(a) of the Foreign Trade Policy - Whether, where a 100% EOU manufactures two or more similar products for export, the unit may allocate DTA quota so that DTA clearance of one product can be up to 90% of that product's FOB exports provided the overall DTA entitlement (50% of total FOB) is not exceeded. - HELD THAT: - Applying para 6.8(a) of the Foreign Trade Policy, the Tribunal found that where exported items are similar (here, coin blanks and copper-zinc-nickel strips both falling under Heading 7409), the unit may make DTA clearances of any one product up to 90% of that product's FOB value so long as total DTA clearances remain within the unit's overall entitlement of 50% of total FOB value. On the prima facie facts, the Tribunal observed that the appellant's DTA sales of coin blanks fall within this permissible allocation and therefore the departmental objection to the mode of allocation did not prima facie sustain. [Paras 8]
Prima facie view that the appellant's DTA allocation conforms to para 6.8(a) and the department's objection to excess DTA clearance is not sustainable on the facts presented.
Final Conclusion: The Tribunal found prima facie merit in the appellant's contentions on classification and DTA entitlement and an arguable case on the education cess point (the latter being referred to a Larger Bench); accordingly, pre-deposit of duty, interest and penalty was waived for the purpose of admission and recovery stayed pending disposal of the appeal; stay application allowed.
Issues: Whether bio-compost cleared by the sugar manufacturer was liable to central excise duty, and whether Modvat credit could be denied or reversed on the ground that common inputs were used in relation to dutiable and exempted or non-excisable by-products.
Analysis: The respondents' manufacturing activity gave rise to press mud and spent wash as by-products, which were mixed to make bio-compost. The Tribunal noted that the issue was already settled by its earlier decision that bio-compost cleared by a sugar manufacturer is not liable to duty. It also accepted the application of Rule 57D, under which Modvat credit cannot be denied merely because part of the input is contained in waste, refuse, or by-products that are exempt from duty, chargeable to nil rate, or otherwise not specified under Rule 57A. On that basis, the clearance of the by-products without payment of duty did not justify denial of credit.
Conclusion: The demand of duty was not sustainable and the Modvat credit was correctly availed. The appeal was therefore dismissed in favour of the assessee.
Ratio Decidendi: Where waste, refuse, or by-products arise in the course of manufacture, Modvat credit cannot be denied merely because such by-products are exempt, nil-rated, or non-excisable, and bio-compost cleared by a sugar manufacturer is not liable to central excise duty.
Modvat credit - by-products and waste in manufacture - excisability of bio-compost - application of Rule 57D regarding credit reversal for by-products - clearance of by-products without payment of duty
Modvat credit - by-products and waste in manufacture - application of Rule 57D regarding credit reversal for by-products - excisability of bio-compost - Validity of demand for duty on bio-compost and correctness of denial/reversal of Modvat credit on inputs used in manufacture of dutiable and exempted goods. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal upheld the Commissioner (Appeals) finding that press mud and spent wash are bye-products arising in the manufacture of ethyl alcohol and sugar and, when mixed and converted into bio-compost, are non-excisable. The Commissioner (Appeals) applied the principle in Rule 57D that Modvat credit cannot be denied merely because part of an input is contained in waste, refuse or bye-product which is exempt or chargeable to nil rate, and observed that such bye-products could be cleared without payment of duty and used in manufacture of compost without reversing the credit. The Tribunal found the matter settled by its earlier decision in Manakpur Chini Mills v. CCE and, applying that precedent, found no infirmity in the view that the bio-compost is not liable to duty and that the Modvat credit availed was correctly retained. [Paras 5, 6]
Demand for duty set aside; Modvat credit held to have been correctly availed and no recovery warranted; appeal dismissed.
Final Conclusion: The Tribunal dismissed the Revenue's appeal, upholding the Commissioner (Appeals) that bio-compost produced from press mud and spent wash is not liable to duty and that Modvat credit need not be reversed under Rule 57D.
Suo motu availment of credit - intimation to department - limitation for initiating proceedings - pre-deposit waiver and stay of recovery
Suo motu availment of credit - intimation to department - limitation for initiating proceedings - pre-deposit waiver and stay of recovery - Whether waiver of pre-deposit and stay of recovery should be granted where the department issued notice about suo motu availment of credit after a lapse of about 31/2 years despite being informed of the availment the next day. - HELD THAT: - The appellant availed suo motu credit on 27.2.2008 and intimated the jurisdictional Superintendent on 28.2.2008. The department issued a notice only on 17.6.2011, about 31/2 years after the intimation. On this prima facie material the Tribunal found that the appellant has a strong case on the ground of limitation for initiation of proceedings. In view of that prima facie conclusion, the Tribunal exercised its discretion to grant relief pending appeal by waiving the requirement of pre-deposit of the dues adjudged and by staying recovery during the pendency of the appeal. The order reflects a protective interim determination based on delay between the intimation and the departmental action rather than a final adjudication on merits of the tax demand. [Paras 5]
Waiver of pre-deposit granted and recovery stayed during pendency of appeal on prima facie ground of limitation arising from delay in issuance of notice despite prior intimation.
Final Conclusion: The Tribunal granted waiver of pre-deposit and stayed recovery of the adjudged dues during the appeal, holding that on the materials placed before it a prima facie case based on limitation exists because the department issued notice only after about 31/2 years despite being intimated the day after the suo motu credit was availed.
Issues: Whether pre-deposit and recovery could be stayed where the appellant had already paid duty on the final product in excess of the credit sought to be denied.
Analysis: The appellant claimed to be a merchant exporter and asserted that the imported raw material was supplied for manufacture by a supporting manufacturer under the relevant CENVAT scheme and import notification. The decisive consideration was that the duty already paid on the final product exceeded the amount of credit under dispute. The Tribunal relied on the principle that once duty on the final product has been accepted, credit cannot be denied in such circumstances.
Conclusion: Pre-deposit was waived and recovery was stayed in favour of the appellant.
Waiver of pre-deposit - stay of recovery during pendency of appeal - CENVAT credit - denial for lack of manufacturing facility - merchant exporter with supporting manufacturer - import under Notification 53/2003-Cus. with specified supporting manufacturer - acceptance of duty on final product precludes subsequent denial of credit
Waiver of pre-deposit - CENVAT credit - denial for lack of manufacturing facility - merchant exporter with supporting manufacturer - acceptance of duty on final product precludes subsequent denial of credit - stay of recovery during pendency of appeal - Application for waiver of pre-deposit and grant of stay of recovery of confirmed duty demand arising from denial of CENVAT credit. - HELD THAT: - The Tribunal found that the appellant, a merchant exporter, had imported raw material under the scheme permitting import by a merchant exporter with a specified supporting manufacturer and had disclosed the supporting manufacturer's name. The appellant paid duty on the final goods (utilising credit and PLA) and the duty paid exceeded the quantum of credit now sought to be denied. Relying on the principle, as applied by the Bombay High Court in CCE, Pune-III v. Ajinkya Enterprises, that once duty on the final product has been accepted by the Revenue the corresponding credit cannot be denied, the Tribunal concluded that the demand based on denial of credit could not justify withholding waiver of pre-deposit. For these reasons the Tribunal exercised its power to waive the requirement of pre-deposit and to stay recovery of the confirmed dues during the pendency of the appeal. [Paras 5]
Pre-deposit requirement waived and recovery of the demand stayed during pendency of the appeal.
Final Conclusion: The stay petition is allowed: pre-deposit of the confirmed duty is waived and recovery is stayed while the appeal is pending, since the duty on the final product was paid by the appellant and exceeds the credit sought to be denied, and therefore the credit could not be denied in the circumstances.
Issues: Whether the assessment order was liable to be interfered with on the ground of violation of the principles of natural justice for alleged non-grant of personal hearing.
Analysis: The assessment proceedings were initiated by notice under Section 25(1) of the Kerala Value Added Tax Act, 2003. The record in the assessment order recorded that the dealer was given an opportunity of personal hearing, that the authorised representative appeared, and that the reply was heard. There was no specific averment that these statements were incorrect. In these circumstances, the factual basis for alleging denial of hearing was not established, and the plea of breach of natural justice failed.
Conclusion: The challenge based on violation of natural justice was rejected and interference with the assessment order was declined.
Final Conclusion: The writ petition did not succeed, and the petitioner was left to pursue the statutory remedies available against the assessment order.
Ratio Decidendi: A challenge to an assessment order on the ground of denial of natural justice cannot succeed where the order records that a personal hearing was afforded and the contrary factual assertion is not specifically disputed.
Violation of principles of natural justice - denial of personal hearing - Assessment amended under Section 25(1) of the KVAT Act - Opportunity of hearing to authorized representative - Availability of alternative statutory remedies
Violation of principles of natural justice - denial of personal hearing - Opportunity of hearing to authorized representative - Assessment amended under Section 25(1) of the KVAT Act - Availability of alternative statutory remedies - Whether Ext.P3 assessment order was passed in violation of principles of natural justice by not affording the petitioner a personal hearing, and whether interference by writ is warranted. - HELD THAT: - The assessment notice (Ext.P1) and the petitioner's reply (Ext.P2) preceded the assessment order (Ext.P3). Ext.P3 itself records that an opportunity of personal hearing was fixed and that the assessee availed the hearing through an authorised representative who was heard on 5.11.2012, after the filing of the reply dated 01.11.2012. The writ petition contains no averment disputing the factual statements recorded in Ext.P3 regarding the personal hearing. In the absence of any challenge to those recorded facts, the petitioner's contention that the order was passed without affording a hearing is belied by the assessment order. Consequently, there is no basis for interference with Ext.P3 on grounds of breach of natural justice. The Court accordingly refrains from exercising writ jurisdiction on the merits and leaves the petitioner free to pursue the available statutory remedies against Ext.P3.
Petition dismissed on merits; no interference with Ext.P3 assessment order for AY 2011-2012, petitioner permitted to pursue statutory remedies.
Final Conclusion: Writ petition dismissed: the assessment order records that a personal hearing was afforded to the authorised representative after the reply was filed, the petitioner did not controvert those facts, and therefore no interference on natural justice grounds is warranted; petitioner may pursue statutory remedies against Ext.P3.
Issues: Whether the delay of 58 days in filing the revision applications against the recovery certificates deserved condonation.
Analysis: The Petitioners showed that their director was unwell and had undergone a stress test, which supported the explanation for the delay. The fact that further treatment was not shown in the report did not by itself discredit the explanation. The authority below erred in insisting on a rigid explanation for every day's delay, whereas the governing approach is to prefer adjudication on merits over rejection on technical grounds when sufficient cause is shown.
Conclusion: The delay of 58 days ought to have been condoned.
Final Conclusion: The impugned orders rejecting condonation were set aside, the revision applications were directed to be registered, and the matters were to proceed on merits.
Ratio Decidendi: In considering condonation of delay, a pragmatic and justice-oriented approach must be adopted, and where sufficient cause is shown, a party should not be shut out from merits by a rigid insistence on explaining every day's delay.
Condonation of delay - revision under Section 154 of the Maharashtra Cooperative Societies Act - explanation for each day's delay - prosecution of remedy on merits - revisional authority to hear on merits - costs as condition for relief
Condonation of delay - explanation for each day's delay - prosecution of remedy on merits - Whether the delay of 58 days in filing the Revision Applications ought to be condoned. - HELD THAT: - The Court accepted the Petitioners' explanation that the Director, who was responsible for prosecuting the matter, was unwell and underwent a stress test, and held that this fact justified condonation of the 58 days' delay. The Court found that the revisional authority proceeded on the erroneous assumption that every day's delay must be specifically explained and that such a rigid requirement was not sustainable where sufficient cause has otherwise been shown. The Court emphasized the well settled principle that parties should be permitted to have their claims adjudicated on merits rather than defeated on technical grounds of delay. [Paras 8]
Delay of 58 days in filing the Revision Applications is condoned.
Revision under Section 154 of the Maharashtra Cooperative Societies Act - revisional authority to hear on merits - costs as condition for relief - What further directions should be given after condoning the delay. - HELD THAT: - The Court quashed and set aside the impugned orders rejecting condonation and directed that the Revision Applications be numbered and heard on merits by the revisional authority. This continuation of proceedings was made subject to procedural conditions: the Petitioners must deposit the balance amount required to make the 50% deposit current within four weeks, and must pay costs to the Respondent society. The Court mandated payment of costs to compensate the society and conditioned the benefit of this order on compliance; non compliance would permit the society to proceed in accordance with law. [Paras 8]
Revision Applications to be numbered and heard on merits after the Petitioners deposit the balance to make 50% as of date within four weeks and pay costs to the Respondent society; failure to comply will forfeit the benefits granted.
Final Conclusion: The writ petitions are allowed: the orders rejecting condonation of delay are quashed and set aside; the 58 day delay is condoned; the Revision Applications are to be numbered and heard on merits subject to the Petitioners making the required deposit within four weeks and paying costs to the Respondent society within two weeks, non compliance with which will defeat the relief granted.
TaxTMI