Charitable trust registration requires a specified-violation notice; settled cash deposits and related-party payments did not justify cancellation or ...
External development charges trigger TDS under section 194C, while disputed administrative payments require factual verification and fresh adjudicatio...
Section 270AA penalty immunity requires identified statutory defaults and a hearing before rejection; reassessment disclosure may constitute under-rep...
Section 80JJAA employee-cost deduction allowed for deployed staff but barred against transfer-pricing income enhancement, with pricing issues remanded...
Transfer-pricing methodology protects commercially genuine associated-enterprise payments, while pre-2016 secondary adjustments and related notional i...
Negative liens over operating assets can constitute international transactions requiring arm's-length pricing reflecting restricted borrowing and expa...
Cross-examination rights in Customs Broker revocation inquiries require witness examination; procedural denial may be cured through fresh adjudication...
The court held that the Division Bench erred in not considering Section 58(f) of the Act. Despite the respondent's claim of threat and coercion in executing the Agreement, the burden was on him to prove it since he admitted to signing it. The First Impugned Order suffered from legal errors and could not withstand scrutiny. Regarding the delay, the appellant's plea of engaging counsel only for the delay condonation was rightly rejected as 'fantastic' by the Division Bench. The First Impugned Order was set aside, effectively nullifying the Second Impugned Order, though it was not faulted. However, costs of Rs.1,20,000 were imposed on the appellant for wasting judicial time, to be utilized for juvenile welfare, advocate-clerks' welfare, and legal aid as directed. The appeal was allowed.
The court held that the Division Bench erred in not considering Section 58(f) of the Act. Despite the respondent's claim of threat and coercion in executing the Agreement, the burden was on him to prove it since he admitted to signing it. The First Impugned Order suffered from legal errors and could not withstand scrutiny. Regarding the delay, the appellant's plea of engaging counsel only for the delay condonation was rightly rejected as 'fantastic' by the Division Bench. The First Impugned Order was set aside, effectively nullifying the Second Impugned Order, though it was not faulted. However, costs of Rs.1,20,000 were imposed on the appellant for wasting judicial time, to be utilized for juvenile welfare, advocate-clerks' welfare, and legal aid as directed. The appeal was allowed.
Note: It is a system-generated summary and is for quick reference only.