In the context of an appeal u/s 37(1)(c) of the Arbitration Act,...
Appellate Court's remand power u/s 37(1)(c) to be used sparingly. Narrow scope of interference u/s 34 & 37. Multiple grounds waste time & increase pendency.
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Cases where this provision is explicitly mentioned in the judgment/order text; may not be exhaustive. To view the complete list of cases mentioning this section, Click here.
Provisions expressly mentioned in the judgment/order text.
In the context of an appeal u/s 37(1)(c) of the Arbitration Act, the Court held that while the Appellate Court has the power to remand the matter to the Section 34 Court, this power should be exercised sparingly and only in exceptional circumstances where remand is unavoidable. Routinely passing remand orders would defeat the object of the Arbitration Act by causing delay and increased costs. The scope of interference u/s 34 is narrow, and the jurisdiction u/s 37 is even narrower. The Court cautioned against raising multiple grounds not covered by Section 34, as it wastes the Court's time and contributes to pendency. The appeal was partly allowed, and the matter was listed for further hearing.
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