Dear All,
Sharing my views on second question first from post at Sr. No. 112 (i.e. Whether SC was correct in remanding the matter back to HC under undisputed facts noted in Para 2 of the order, instead of directly allowing ITC to the said tax-payer?)"
(IF OBJECTIVELY SEEN, this post will give many of you a some of 'reasons' (not all reason) about 'why I am so confident to what-ever I said in my posts here from Sr. No. 67 to my post at Sr. No. 110' and how I have interpreted said Safari Retreat Ruling).
Para 31 & 32 of judgement of Safari Retreat reported as 2024 (10) TMI 286-SC is worth noting:
" 31. Now, we analyse clauses (c) and (d) of Section 17(5). Clause (c) applies when works contract services are supplied for constructing immovable property. The definition of “works contract” under Section 2(119) is extensive. It reads thus:
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Thus, in the case of works contract services supplied for the construction of immovable property, the benefit of ITC is not available. However, there are exceptions to clause (c). First is when goods or services, or both, are received by a taxable person for the construction of “plant and machinery”, as defined in the explanation to Section 17. The second exception is where the works contract service supplied for the construction of immovable property is an input service for further supply of the works contract.
32. Clause (d) of Section 17(5) is different from clause (c) in various aspects. Clause (d) seeks to exclude from the purview of sub-section (1) of Sections 16 and 18, goods or services or both received by a taxable person to construct an immovable property on his own account. There are two exceptions in clause (d) to the exclusion from ITC provided in the first part of Clause (d). The first exception is where goods or services or both are received by a taxable person to construct an immovable property consisting of a “plant or machinery”. The second exception is where goods and services or both are received by a taxable person for the construction of an immovable property made not on his own account. Construction is said to be on a taxable person’s “own account” when (i) it is made for his personal use and not for service or (ii) it is to be used by the person constructing as a setting in which business is carried out. However, construction cannot said to be on a taxable person’s “own account” if it is intended to be sold or given on lease or license.'
As can be seen, the Apex Court explained various differences between clause (c) & clause (d) which is reproduced above. As per SC, one of exception to Section 17(5)(d) is where goods and services or both are received by a taxable person for the construction of an immovable property made not on his own account.
Undisputed position from Para 2 of said ruling is as follows: "In Civil Appeal Nos. 2948 and 2949 of 2023, the first respondent is engaged in the construction of a shopping mall for the purpose of letting out premises in the malls to different tenants. Vast quantities of material, inputs and services are required for the construction of the malls in the form of cement, sand, steel, aluminium, wires, plywood, paint, lifts, escalators, air-conditioning plants, electrical equipment, transformers, building automation systems etc., and also consultancy services, architectural services, legal and other professional services, engineering services and other services including the services of a special team of international designers specialised in the construction of Malls. These goods and services used in the construction of the mall are taxable under the CGST Act. It is the case of the first respondent that it has accumulated input credit of GST amounting to more than Rs. 34 crores by the purchase/supply of goods and services consumed and used in the construction of the shopping mall. At the same time, the first respondent's letting out of units in the shopping mall attracts CGST based on the rent received by the first respondent since it amounts to the supply of service under the CGST Act. Therefore, the first respondent was desirous of availing the Input Tax Credit (ITC) accumulated against the rental income received by it upon letting out the mall premises. According to the first respondent, when it approached the concerned authorities, it was advised to deposit GST on rent without deducting ITC because of the exception carved out by Section 17(5)(d)"
As per Para 32, the Apex Court clearly held that 'construction cannot said to be on a taxable person’s “own account” if it is intended to be sold or given on lease or license'.
Thus, in given facts, it is clear that M/s Safari Retreat was NOT constructing shopping-mall on its “own account” as per reasoning given by the court in Para 32.
One of the principles governing the interpretation of the taxation statutes, as Para 25(h) of said ruling, is 'there is nothing unjust in the taxpayer escaping if the letter of the law fails to catch him on account of the legislature’s failure to express itself clearly'.
It also held constitutional validity of clauses (c) and (d) of Section 17(5) and in Para 64, further held that its plain interpretation does not lead to any ambiguity, the question of reading down the provisions does not arise
Hence, it is clear to me that ITC cannot be denied to said tax-payer u/s 17(5)(d) in given facts & circumstances IRRESPECTIVE of fulfilment of 'functionality test'. In other words, whether said 'shopping mall' is a 'plant' or 'building' is an "irrelevant question" in given fact & circumstances of the M/s Safari Retreat.
Hence, in my humble view, the Apex Court seems to be erred (why the word 'seems' is explained afterwards) in remanding the matter back to the High Court under undisputed facts noted in Para 2 of the order. There was no need to carry out 'functionality test' under admitted facts. It should instead have directly allowed ITC to the said tax-payer in view of exception to Section 17(5)(d).
One possible reason behind remanding back the matter could be that Court wanted to be sure about the 'facts' involved (i.e. actually intention behind construction was to lease or ‘own use’). But, the Apex Court has not specifically so. But, other than Para 2 (which can be just submission by the parties involved or history in brief) which is not 'findings' by Apex court per se, it is worth noting that there is NO finding given in entire judgement about actual intention behind construction of subject shopping mall.
Only way, as far as I can see, to justify such order about remanding back (& not treating it as 'error' by Apex Court) is to understand reason behind seeking ‘functionality test’ laid down by the Apex Court in the following way:
- Once, the tax-payer proves that that actually intention behind construction was to only for leasing / renting / licencing & not “own use’ by demonstrating the same with supporting evidences, this proof by-itself fulfils ‘functionality test’ and need NOT go into such other aspects of ‘functionality test’ at all, in my humble view. And blockage of ITC u/s 17(5)(d) will not apply.
- Only when said shopping-mall is constructed by the tax-payer for his ‘own use’ (i.e. using that mall for selling various goods) & NOT with intention to ‘renting / leasing / Sale’, one need to carry out 'functionality test' to find whether shopping mall is 'plant' or 'building' for reasons explained above for the purpose of Section 17(5)(d).
These are ex facie views of mine and the same should not be construed as professional advice / suggestion or recommendation.