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Issues: Whether, in a prosecution under section 454(5) and section 454(5A) of the Companies Act, 1956, the burden of proving that the accused made the default without reasonable excuse lies on the prosecution or on the accused.
Analysis: The statutory scheme required persons concerned with the company to submit a statement of affairs within the prescribed time, with provision for extension by the official liquidator or the court. The penal clause in section 454(5) did not create liability for mere default alone; absence of reasonable excuse formed part of the offence itself. In the absence of any statutory presumption or express shift of burden, the ordinary criminal rule applied that the prosecution must prove every ingredient of the offence. Section 106 of the Evidence Act could not be used to transfer the legal burden to the accused, though once the prosecution established the relevant facts within its knowledge, an evidentiary burden could shift to the accused to explain circumstances showing reasonable excuse.
Conclusion: The burden lay initially on the prosecution to prove that the accused, without reasonable excuse, made the default.
Ratio Decidendi: Where a penal provision makes absence of reasonable excuse an ingredient of the offence and does not create a statutory presumption or express reverse burden, the prosecution must prove that ingredient in the first instance, though the evidentiary burden may shift according to the facts proved.