Section 633 relief conditions may be extended by fresh judicial order where justice requires and delay is explained

Section 633 of the Companies Act, 1956 was construed as allowing the Court to vary or extend the time fixed as a condition for relief from corporate default. Rule 7 of the Companies (Court) Rules, 1959 was not treated as enlarging the rule-making power under section 643, but the Court accepted that a fresh judicial order could extend compliance time where justice required it. Applying that approach, the delay was treated as adequately explained and the default as subsequently cured, and further time was granted for compliance.

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Issues: Whether the High Court had power, under section 633 of the Companies Act, 1956 and the Companies (Court) Rules, 1959, to extend the time earlier fixed for complying with the statutory default, and whether the petitioners were entitled to such extension.

Analysis: The relief previously granted under section 633 was conditioned on compliance within the time fixed by the Court. The Court held that rule 7 of the Companies (Court) Rules, 1959 could not enlarge the Supreme Court's rule-making power under section 643 of the Companies Act, 1956 so as to authorise extension of time fixed under section 633. However, section 633 itself was construed as conferring power on the Court to make further or fresh orders concerning the conditions imposed for relief. The Court also treated the analogy of the civil procedure rule permitting a court to alter time once fixed as supporting the view that time fixed by the Court could be extended where justice required it. On the facts, the delay was found sufficiently explained and the default had since been made good.

Conclusion: The Court held that it had power to extend the time and granted the petitioners a further three months from 6 January 1967 to comply with the statutory requirement.

Ratio Decidendi: Section 633 empowers the Court to vary or extend time fixed as a condition for relief from corporate default, and such time may be enlarged by a fresh judicial order where justice so requires.

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