Winding-up refusal is not a decree; appeal court-fee was correctly paid under the applicable provisions.

An order refusing winding up under section 433 of the Companies Act, 1956 is discretionary and does not determine a right in controversy so as to amount to a decree within section 2(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The fact that winding-up orders are appealable and may be enforced in the same manner as a decree does not convert such an order into a decree. The court-fee provisions applicable to appeals from decrees therefore do not govern an appeal against refusal of winding up, and the alternative valuation provisions relied on were inapplicable. The court-fee paid on the memorandum of appeal was held to be adequate.

---

---

Issues: Whether the order refusing winding up of a company is an order having the force of a decree for the purpose of court-fee on appeal, and whether the court-fee paid on the memorandum of appeal was adequate.

Analysis: An application for winding up under section 433 of the Companies Act, 1956 is addressed to the court's discretion and does not confer an absolute right to obtain a winding-up order. An order allowing or refusing winding up does not adjudicate a right in controversy in the manner of a decree within section 2(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The provision governing appeals from winding-up matters confirms that such orders are appealable as orders in winding-up proceedings, and the clause stating that an order may be enforced in the same manner as a decree does not make the order itself a decree. The alternative court-fee provisions relied upon were inapplicable to an appeal of this nature.

Conclusion: The order refusing winding up did not have the force of a decree, and the court-fee paid on the appeal was correct.

---