Private prosecution under section 141A was not excluded; the Registrar could competently prefer the complaint.

Section 141A of the Indian Companies Act, 1913 was construed as an enabling provision read with the investigation scheme in sections 138 to 141. The Court held that, although the Central Government could refer a reported offence to the Advocate-General or Public Prosecutor for prosecution, the section did not expressly exclude complaints by other persons. Because the statute contained no words barring private prosecution, and unlike other provisions did not confine criminal cognizance to named authorities, the Registrar of Joint Stock Companies was competent to prefer the complaint. The objection to maintainability therefore failed.

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Issues: Whether the Registrar of Joint Stock Companies was competent to prefer the complaint under section 141A of the Indian Companies Act, 1913.

Analysis: Section 141A was read with the investigation scheme in sections 138 to 141 of the Indian Companies Act, 1913. The provision required the Central Government, on a report of offence, to refer the matter to the Advocate-General or the Public Prosecutor for possible prosecution, but its language did not expressly exclude complaints by other persons. The absence of words barring private prosecutions, and the contrast with provisions that expressly restrict criminal cognizance, supported the view that the section was enabling and not exclusive. The Court declined to accept the narrower interpretation that only the authorities named in section 141A could initiate proceedings.

Conclusion: The Registrar was competent to prefer the complaint, and the objection to the maintainability of the prosecution failed.

Ratio Decidendi: A statutory procedure requiring governmental reference to specified prosecuting authorities does not, express exclusion, bar private prosecution or confine the right to institute proceedings exclusively to those authorities.

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