Jurisdiction to recall judicial confirmation required Local Government approval; confirmation order set aside pending statutory sanction.

A judicial confirmation of alterations to a Section 26 association's memorandum, given ex parte without prior Local Government sanction, was procedurally invalid because the statutory prerequisite of administrative approval must precede judicial confirmation; therefore the court may recall and set aside its earlier confirmation order. Authorities concerning vested private rights were held distinguishable where no vested rights arose from the impugned ex parte order. The prior order dated February 28, 1936, was recalled and the confirmation proceeding restored and adjourned for six months to enable the association to obtain the Local Government's approval.

---

---

Issues: (i) Whether the Court has jurisdiction to recall and set aside its earlier order confirming alterations in the memorandum of association of an association registered under Section 26 of the Companies Act where such confirmation required prior approval of the Local Government under Section 28; and whether the earlier order should be recalled and the confirmation application restored for compliance with Local Government approval.

Analysis: The Chamber of Commerce sought confirmation of proposed alterations to its memorandum and an ex parte order confirming the alterations was made and registered. It later became apparent that, under the statutory scheme applicable to associations registered under Section 26, prior approval of the Local Government is the proper prerequisite before judicial confirmation of alterations affecting the licence. The earlier order was therefore procedurally invalid because the Local Government's sanction had not been obtained before confirmation. Authorities relied upon by the Chamber addressing vested rights and limits on review were considered distinguishable where no vested private rights had accrued as a result of the impugned order. The circumstances involved an ex parte confirmation lacking the requisite administrative approval, and the proceedings could properly be restored to permit the statutory prerequisite (Local Government approval) to be sought and considered.

Conclusion: (i) The Court has jurisdiction to recall and set aside its earlier order confirming the alterations; the order dated February 28, 1936, is recalled, and the original confirmation application is restored and ordered to stand over for six months to enable the Chamber to obtain the Local Government's approval to the proposed alterations.

---