Commencement of limitation period starts on communication of the substantive examination order; subsequent procedural refusals do not reset it.

Clarifies that the limitation period for an appeal against an order directing public examination of directors begins when the substantive Section 196 order is made and communicated to the parties; subsequent procedural refusals or orders do not constitute fresh orders that restart limitation. Because the substantive, appealable order was communicated by 1930, later refusals by the District Judge did not alter the commencement date, and the appeal is therefore time-barred, resulting in dismissal in favour of the respondent.

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Issues: Whether the appeal against the order for public examination of directors under Section 196 of the Indian Companies Act is barred by limitation and when the period of limitation commenced.

Analysis: The order under Section 196 directing the public examination of the directors was made in December 1929 and communicated to the appellants before the end of 1930. An appeal lay against that order. Subsequent procedural orders refusing later applications did not themselves constitute fresh orders under Section 196 that would reset the period of limitation. The District Judge's later refusal of the appellants' application did not alter the date from which limitation ran because the substantive order attracting appealability had already been passed and communicated.

Conclusion: The appeal was barred by limitation and is dismissed; decision is therefore in favour of the Respondent.

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