Issues: (i) Whether the assessment initiated under section 153A pursuant to requisition of cash seized during an election period was valid without compliance with Rule 112F; (ii) Whether the seized cash of Rs. 20 lakh was unexplained money liable to addition.

Issue (i): Whether the assessment initiated under section 153A pursuant to requisition of cash seized during an election period was valid without compliance with Rule 112F.

Analysis: Rule 112F and Circular No. 10/2012 require certification by the investigating officer, with approval of the Director General of Income Tax, where cash or assets are seized in connection with an ongoing election and no evidence or investigation is required for other assessment years. The required certificate was neither issued nor shown to have been communicated to the jurisdictional authorities. The requisition-based notices for six assessment years therefore contravened the prescribed procedure.

Conclusion: The assessment under section 153A was invalid and was quashed, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the seized cash of Rs. 20 lakh was unexplained money liable to addition.

Analysis: The cash was shown as part of cash withdrawn from the assessee's bank account and recorded cash balance. The books of account and cash book were not rejected, and withdrawals exceeding Rs. 88 lakh during the relevant financial year were undisputed. The source of the seized cash was thus established.

Conclusion: The seized cash was from explained sources and could not be added as unexplained money, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The assessment machinery could not be invoked without adhering to the election-period safeguards, and the cash explanation was independently accepted on merits.

Ratio Decidendi: Where an election-period search or requisition falls within Rule 112F, failure to obtain and communicate the prescribed investigating-officer certificate invalidates section 153A proceedings for the preceding assessment years.

Issues: Whether reassessment for assessment year 2018-19 was validly initiated where notice under section 148 was issued after expiry of three years from the end of the assessment year with approval of the Principal Commissioner rather than the authority specified under section 151(ii).

Analysis: For a notice issued after more than three years from the end of the relevant assessment year, section 151(ii), as applicable on the date of issuance, required approval of the Principal Chief Commissioner, Principal Director General, Chief Commissioner, or Director General. The approval in this case was obtained from the Principal Commissioner, who was not the specified authority. The proviso inserted into section 151 by the Finance Act, 2023, providing for exclusion of time allowed under section 148A(b), was not operative when the impugned notice was issued and could not be retrospectively applied. Section 292BC did not cure approval granted by an authority other than the statutorily specified authority.

Conclusion: The reassessment lacked valid jurisdiction and the assessment was quashed in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether reassessment for assessment year 2017-18 was valid where approval for the order under section 148A(d) and notice under section 148 was granted by the Principal Commissioner instead of the authority specified under section 151(ii). (ii) Whether penalties levied under sections 270A and 271AAC(1) could survive after the reassessment was quashed.

Issue (i): Whether reassessment for assessment year 2017-18 was valid where approval for the order under section 148A(d) and notice under section 148 was granted by the Principal Commissioner instead of the authority specified under section 151(ii).

Analysis: The reassessment notice and order under section 148A(d) were issued after more than three years from the end of the relevant assessment year. Although the extended period under the relaxation legislation permitted approval under section 151(i) only up to 30 June 2021, the order under section 148A(d) was passed thereafter with approval of the Principal Commissioner. For action after that period, section 151(ii) required approval from the higher specified authority. Such sanction is a precondition to assumption of reassessment jurisdiction.

Conclusion: The approval was by an incompetent authority; the order under section 148A(d), notice under section 148 and reassessment were void ab initio and were quashed, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether penalties levied under sections 270A and 271AAC(1) could survive after the reassessment was quashed.

Analysis: The penalty levies arose from the reassessment proceedings, which were held void.

Conclusion: The penalties could not survive and were deleted, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The invalid reassessment foundation extinguished both the assessment and the consequential penalty demands.

Ratio Decidendi: Where reassessment action beyond the prescribed three-year period is sanctioned by an authority other than that mandated under section 151(ii), the Assessing Officer lacks jurisdiction and the resulting reassessment proceedings are void.

Issues: Whether, for Assessment Year 2025-26, rebate under Section 87A was available against tax payable on short-term capital gains taxable under Section 111A, and whether its denial while processing the return without prior intimation was valid.

Analysis: Section 87A, applicable to an eligible assessee opting for the new tax regime, granted rebate by reference to total income and total tax payable, without excluding tax on income chargeable at the special rate under Section 111A. The exclusion of special-rate income from the rebate was introduced only from Assessment Year 2026-27 and could not be applied to the year in question. Further, the adjustment under Section 143(1) was made without prior notice or an opportunity of hearing, contrary to the prescribed procedure.

Conclusion: The assessee was entitled to rebate under Section 87A on the entire tax liability, including tax on short-term capital gains under Section 111A; the adjustment denying that rebate was invalid.

Issues: Whether delay in electronically furnishing Form 10B by a charitable trust for Assessment Year 2016-17 was liable to be condoned, enabling its claim for exemption under Section 11.

Analysis: The audit report and Form 10 had been obtained before filing the return, but were not electronically uploaded because of an inadvertent clerical omission amid the serious illness of the chartered accountant. The applicable CBDT circular directly covered Assessment Year 2016-17 and authorised condonation where the assessee was prevented by reasonable cause. The earlier decision concerning the same trust established that a technical uploading lapse in these circumstances constituted genuine hardship and could not be rejected through a pedantic approach.

Conclusion: The delay in filing Form 10B was required to be condoned, and the assessee was entitled to have its claim for exemption under Section 11 considered accordingly.

Issues: (i) Whether the reassessment notice for AY 2016-17 was barred by limitation under the first proviso to Section 149(1). (ii) Whether a 5% addition from the sale consideration of investments could be sustained as an estimated profit element.

Issue (i): Whether the reassessment notice for AY 2016-17 was barred by limitation under the first proviso to Section 149(1).

Analysis: For an assessment year beginning on or before 1 April 2021, the first proviso preserves the pre-Finance Act, 2021 limitation regime. The notice issued on 9 October 2023 for AY 2016-17 was beyond six years from the end of the relevant assessment year.

Conclusion: The reassessment notice and the consequential reassessment were time-barred and void. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether a 5% addition from the sale consideration of investments could be sustained as an estimated profit element.

Analysis: The investments had been acquired in earlier years, recorded in the books and accepted in prior assessments. The sale transactions were supported by documentary evidence and banking-channel receipts. No incriminating material, reliable cash trail, adverse statement or other evidence linked the assessee with alleged accommodation entries. Once the source investments were accepted and the sale transactions stood substantiated, an estimated addition based merely on presumptions lacked a substantive evidentiary basis.

Conclusion: The 5% addition was unsustainable and was deleted. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The reassessment founded on the belated notice cannot survive, and no estimated income can be retained from the substantiated sale of investments.

Ratio Decidendi: A reassessment notice issued beyond the preserved statutory limitation is invalid, and an addition from sale proceeds of accepted investments cannot rest on conjecture without material disproving the documented transaction.

Issues: Whether penalty for cash repayment of money received from a spouse was sustainable where the transaction was a fully explained family transaction undertaken for the benefit of the family.

Analysis: The cash loan received from the spouse was fully explained, no addition was made in assessment in respect of the relevant cash deposits, and the repayment was stated to be for the benefit of the whole family. Applying the principle governing non-commercial transactions between spouses, the transaction was treated as a genuine family arrangement rather than a transaction warranting penalty.

Conclusion: The penalty under Section 271E for repayment of Rs. 4,00,000 in cash was not justified and was directed to be deleted.

Issues: (i) Whether a claimant whose flat was allotted in adjustment of an unpaid invoice for advertisement services qualifies as a financial creditor holding a financial debt; (ii) Whether delay in filing the claim after approval of the resolution plan by the Committee of Creditors warranted interference.

Issue (i): Whether a claimant whose flat was allotted in adjustment of an unpaid invoice for advertisement services qualifies as a financial creditor holding a financial debt.

Analysis: Financial debt requires a disbursement against consideration for the time value of money. Although amounts raised from real-estate allottees are deemed to have the commercial effect of borrowing, that deeming treatment applies where an amount has been raised from the allottee. The allotment here compensated an outstanding invoice for advertisement services, without any disbursement by the claimant to the corporate debtor.

Conclusion: The claimant is not a financial creditor and its claim is not a financial debt. This issue is against the appellant.

Issue (ii): Whether delay in filing the claim after approval of the resolution plan by the Committee of Creditors warranted interference.

Analysis: The claim was filed approximately 676 days after the prescribed last date, after the Committee of Creditors had approved the resolution plan. The claimant, being a commercial entity whose claim arose from services rather than a monetary disbursement for a residential allotment, could not be equated with homebuyers for relaxation in claim collation.

Conclusion: Refusal to condone the delay calls for no interference. This issue is against the appellant.

Final Conclusion: A service provider receiving a flat in settlement of service dues cannot invoke the status and protections of a real-estate financial creditor without a qualifying disbursement.

Ratio Decidendi: An allotment made in settlement of unpaid service consideration, absent disbursement by the allottee against consideration for time value of money, does not create a financial debt or confer financial-creditor status.

Issues: Whether the writ petition challenging the GST demand order could be entertained despite the available statutory appellate remedy.

Analysis: The petitioner had not availed the appeal mechanism. The statutory remedy under Section 107 was efficacious, and all challenges to the demand order could be raised before the appellate authority. The contentions on merits were therefore left open for that authority.

Conclusion: The writ petition was not entertained; the petitioner was relegated to the statutory appellate remedy.

Issues: Whether the money-laundering complaint against the petitioner should be quashed for want of material establishing his involvement with proceeds of crime.

Analysis: Section 3 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 covers direct or indirect involvement, knowing assistance, or participation in processes connected with proceeds of crime, including their concealment, possession, acquisition, use, or projection as untainted property. The complaint and supporting material specifically attributed to the petitioner the receipt of loan funds ostensibly for construction materials and their immediate re-transfer, substantially in full, to the personal accounts of the principal accused. These transactions prima facie indicated knowing participation in routing, concealing, and disbursing the tainted funds. The earlier quashing in favour of the bank manager was distinguishable because no comparable material showed that the manager had assisted in handling or laundering the proceeds of crime.

Conclusion: The material prima facie disclosed the petitioner's involvement in the offence of money laundering; quashing was not warranted and the issue was decided against the petitioner.

Issues: Whether the writ petition challenging the order confirming recovery of ineligible input tax credit was maintainable in view of the statutory appellate remedy.

Analysis: The impugned order was passed under Section 74 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, following proceedings concerning availment of input tax credit on invoices issued by non-existent firms. The Court found that the petitioner had an alternative efficacious remedy of appeal under Section 107 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017. The proceedings and allegations were also materially connected with those in an earlier petition arising from the same show-cause notice, which had been withdrawn to pursue the appellate remedy.

Conclusion: The writ petition was not maintainable for direct consideration and was rejected in view of the alternative statutory appellate remedy.

Issues: Whether foreign tax credit could be denied solely because Form No. 67 was filed after the prescribed due date.

Analysis: Section 90 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and Article 24 of the India-United Kingdom Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement provide relief against double taxation of income taxed in both jurisdictions. Rule 128(8) of the Income-tax Rules, 1962 requires supporting foreign-tax documents, while Rule 128(9) prescribes the time for furnishing Form No. 67. The delayed form contained the required details, and the foreign income and tax paid in the United Kingdom had been disclosed. Rule 128(9) does not prescribe denial of foreign tax credit for delayed filing; its requirement is directory and cannot defeat treaty-based double-taxation relief.

Conclusion: Foreign tax credit is allowable despite belated filing of Form No. 67; the finding granting the credit is sustained in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether disallowance relating to exempt-income investments was sustainable under section 14A read with Rule 8D; (ii) Whether the Sikkim unit was eligible for deduction under section 80-IE; (iii) Whether amortisation of intangibles could be disallowed in computing book profit under section 115JB; and (iv) Whether the amount transferred to the Debenture Redemption Reserve was deductible in computing book profit under section 115JB.

Issue (i): Whether disallowance relating to exempt-income investments was sustainable under section 14A read with Rule 8D.

Analysis: The investments in tax-free bonds were held for a limited period without substantial buying or selling activity. The assessee possessed sufficient own funds for the investments, and the approach adopted by the appellate authority followed the consistent position accepted in the assessee's preceding assessment years. No changed facts or legal position justified departure from that consistent view.

Conclusion: The appellate treatment of the disallowance under section 14A read with Rule 8D was sustained, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the Sikkim unit was eligible for deduction under section 80-IE.

Analysis: Eligibility of the Sikkim unit had been sustained in the assessee's own earlier years, including findings that the Revenue had not established use of old machinery beyond the permissible threshold or reconstruction of an existing business. The Revenue identified neither distinguishing facts nor any change in law or binding reversal of the earlier decisions.

Conclusion: The deduction under section 80-IE for the Sikkim unit was allowable, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether amortisation of intangibles could be disallowed in computing book profit under section 115JB.

Analysis: The appellate relief followed the consistent decisions in the assessee's earlier years concerning the treatment of amortisation of intangibles for minimum alternate tax computation. No material was produced warranting a different conclusion.

Conclusion: The amortisation of intangibles was not disallowable for computation of book profit under section 115JB, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iv): Whether the amount transferred to the Debenture Redemption Reserve was deductible in computing book profit under section 115JB.

Analysis: The reserve was created under section 71(4) of the Companies Act, 2013 for redemption of debentures and had been appropriated from the relevant year's profits through the Profit and Loss Account. A liability to redeem debentures is known and existing; consequently, the amount earmarked for it is a provision for an ascertained liability rather than a reserve. Further, an appellate authority may entertain a legally sustainable claim even where it was not made in the original return, and a substantive claim cannot be denied solely because of the presentation constraints of the return utility.

Conclusion: The Debenture Redemption Reserve represented an ascertained liability and was deductible in recomputing book profit under section 115JB, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The assessee retained the claimed tax treatment for exempt-income expenditure, the Sikkim-unit deduction, intangible amortisation under minimum alternate tax computation, and the Debenture Redemption Reserve adjustment.

Ratio Decidendi: An amount set aside for redemption of debentures pursuant to a statutory obligation is a provision for an ascertained existing liability, not a reserve, and a legally allowable claim may be granted in appellate proceedings despite its omission from the original return.

Issues: Whether the assessment order was erroneous and prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue so as to justify revision under Section 263 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The Assessing Officer had specifically called for details concerning payments to related parties, expenses towards services exempt from GST, supplier information, tax deductions, financial statements, returns, invoices and supporting records. The assessee furnished the requested details during the assessment and revision proceedings, and the Assessing Officer accepted the returned income. The record therefore disclosed inquiry and application of mind, even if the Principal Commissioner considered the inquiry inadequate or desired further verification. Revision under Section 263 requires the assessment order to be both erroneous and prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue. The provision does not permit revision merely because the Commissioner prefers additional inquiry, a different manner of inquiry, or another possible view, without identifying a specific error and resulting prejudice.

Conclusion: The assessment order was not shown to be erroneous and prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue. The revisionary order under Section 263 was quashed.

Issues: (i) Whether penalty proceedings under Section 271D for alleged violation of Section 269SS could validly be initiated by the Joint Commissioner without satisfaction recorded by the Assessing Officer during the assessment proceedings; (ii) whether the penalty proceedings and consequential penalty order were barred by limitation.

Issue (i): Validity of initiation of penalty proceedings under Section 271D without satisfaction recorded by the Assessing Officer.

Analysis: Recording of satisfaction by the Assessing Officer during the pendency of assessment proceedings is a condition precedent for initiation of penalty proceedings under Section 271D. The assessment order recorded satisfaction only for proceedings under Section 271DA concerning Section 269ST. Those proceedings were subsequently dropped, and the Joint Commissioner independently initiated proceedings under Section 271D concerning Section 269SS. In the absence of satisfaction by the Assessing Officer for the alleged Section 269SS violation, the Joint Commissioner lacked jurisdiction to initiate the penalty proceedings.

Conclusion: The penalty proceedings initiated under Section 271D were without jurisdiction and the penalty was liable to be deleted.

Issue (ii): Whether the penalty proceedings were barred by limitation.

Analysis: The relevant satisfaction was recorded in the assessment order dated 20 January 2023. Applying the limitation framework under Section 275(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, as reflected in the applicable CBDT Circular, the limitation period expired on 31 July 2023. The subsequent dropping of proceedings under Section 271DA and fresh initiation under Section 271D could not extend or revive the limitation period.

Conclusion: The penalty proceedings and consequential penalty order were barred by limitation.

Final Conclusion: The statutory penalties imposed on both assessees under Section 271D were quashed on account of absence of jurisdictional satisfaction and limitation, with the same conclusions applying to both connected appeals.

Ratio Decidendi: Penalty under Section 271D cannot be validly imposed unless the Assessing Officer records satisfaction during the assessment proceedings regarding violation of Section 269SS, and proceedings initiated beyond the limitation prescribed under Section 275(1)(c) are unsustainable.

Issues: (i) Whether disallowances under Section 43B for unpaid bonus provisions could be sustained where the amount was offered to tax in the succeeding year; (ii) whether provisions made against standard assets were deductible; (iii) whether a provision for income tax already added back in the computation could be disallowed again; (iv) whether brought-forward unabsorbed depreciation was available for set-off after recomputation of the preceding year; and (v) whether ex-gratia payments were allowable as business expenditure.

Issue (i): Validity of disallowance of bonus provisions under Section 43B and prevention of double taxation.

Analysis: A bonus provision charged to the profit and loss account is subject to disallowance under Section 43B in the year in which it is claimed if the statutory payment condition is not met. However, where the same amount has subsequently been offered to tax, retaining both adjustments would result in double taxation. Verification was therefore directed to determine whether the amount was offered in the succeeding assessment year.

Conclusion: The disallowance for the relevant year was sustained, subject to reduction from the assessee's income if the amount had been offered to tax in the succeeding year.

Issue (ii): Deductibility of provisions made against standard assets under Section 36(1)(viia) and Section 36(1)(vii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: Following the applicable Special Bench ruling, the provisions made against standard assets were held eligible for deduction under the statutory framework governing provisions for bad and doubtful debts.

Conclusion: The disallowances relating to provisions against standard assets were deleted.

Issue (iii): Whether a provision for income tax already added back in the computation of income could be disallowed again.

Analysis: The computation of income showed that the provision for income tax debited to the profit and loss account had already been added back. A further disallowance by the Assessing Officer would constitute a duplicate adjustment.

Conclusion: The disallowance of the provision for income tax was deleted.

Issue (iv): Whether brought-forward unabsorbed depreciation could be carried forward and set off after recomputation of the preceding assessment year.

Analysis: The Tribunal directed recomputation of the preceding year's total income after giving effect to the relief granted. Any loss or unabsorbed depreciation remaining thereafter was held eligible for carry forward and set-off against the income of the following assessment year.

Conclusion: The claim for carry forward and set-off of unabsorbed depreciation was allowed for statistical purposes, subject to recomputation.

Issue (v): Whether ex-gratia payments to employees could be disallowed under Section 37(1) on the ground that the liability related to an earlier year.

Analysis: Ex-gratia payments made pursuant to the bank's employee incentive policy were treated as salary or incentive payments rather than statutory bonus. The payments were allowable business expenditure in the year of payment and could not be disallowed under Section 37(1) merely because the liability had accumulated over earlier years.

Conclusion: The disallowance of the ex-gratia payment was deleted.

Final Conclusion: Relief was granted on the disallowances relating to standard-asset provisions, the already-added-back income-tax provision, ex-gratia payments, and the consequential depreciation claim, while the bonus-provision adjustment remained subject to verification to prevent duplicate taxation.

Ratio Decidendi: An amount disallowed under the applicable statutory provision cannot be taxed again when it has been offered to tax in a succeeding year; provisions against standard assets may qualify for deduction under the applicable bad-debt provision, and ex-gratia employee incentives are allowable business expenditure when incurred in the year of payment.

Issues: Whether penalty proceedings under Section 271(1)(c) were invalid because the notice under Section 274 failed to specify the applicable charge by striking off the inapplicable limb.

Analysis: A penalty notice under Section 274 must clearly identify whether the alleged default is concealment of particulars of income or furnishing of inaccurate particulars of income. A notice retaining both alternatives without striking off the inapplicable charge is vague and violates the requirement of a specific opportunity to respond, offending principles of natural justice. The defect is substantive and invalidates the penalty proceedings at their inception.

Conclusion: The notice under Section 274 was invalid and the consequential penalty proceedings under Section 271(1)(c) were quashed. The penalty was deleted.

Ratio Decidendi: A penalty proceeding under Section 271(1)(c) cannot be sustained where the notice under Section 274 fails to specify the precise charge against the assessee.

Issues: Whether foreign tax credit can be denied solely because Form 67 was filed after the return of income but before processing of the return.

Analysis: Filing Form 67 is a directory procedural requirement and not a mandatory condition that extinguishes the substantive right to claim foreign tax credit. Since Form 67 was filed before the return was processed under Section 143(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, denial of credit solely on the ground of delayed filing was unsustainable. The tax treaty provisions governing foreign tax credit prevail to the extent they are more beneficial than the general statutory and procedural provisions.

Conclusion: Foreign tax credit cannot be denied solely for delayed filing of Form 67. The Assessing Officer was directed to verify the claim and grant the credit in accordance with law.

Ratio Decidendi: Form 67 is directory and not mandatory, and delayed filing before processing of the return does not defeat the substantive claim for foreign tax credit.

Issues: Whether rejection of the assessee society's application for registration or renewal under sections 12AB and 12AA of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was legally sustainable.

Analysis: For registration under section 12AB, the competent authority must examine the charitable objects and the genuineness of the activities. Activities such as technical education, research, seminars, conferences and dissemination of knowledge relating to a specialised industry may advance an object of general public utility merely because the direct participants belong to a defined professional or industrial group. A narrow requirement of formal schooling cannot be imposed at the registration stage, and generation of surplus by itself does not establish that the institution is non-charitable or disentitle it from registration. The earlier coordinate Bench decision concerning the assessee had found the objects and activities capable of constituting charitable purposes and had directed grant of registration.

Conclusion: The rejection of the application under sections 12AB and 12AA was legally unsustainable and was set aside. The matter was remanded to the Commissioner of Income Tax (Exemption) for a fresh decision in accordance with law after providing a fair opportunity of hearing.

Issues: (i) Whether capital expenditure incurred on scientific research after 31 March 1967 qualified for a 100% deduction; (ii) whether the challenge to adjustments made while processing the return was maintainable in an appeal against the scrutiny assessment order.

Issue (i): Whether capital expenditure incurred on scientific research after 31 March 1967 qualified for a 100% deduction.

Analysis: Section 35(1)(iv) permits deduction for capital expenditure on scientific research related to the assessee's business, subject to section 35(2). Section 35(2)(i) applies where the expenditure was incurred before 1 April 1967 and permits deduction in instalments. Section 35(2)(ia) specifically provides that where such expenditure was incurred after 31 March 1967, the whole capital expenditure incurred in the relevant previous year is deductible. The expenditure in question was therefore not restricted to one-fifth deduction.

Conclusion: The assessee was entitled to 100% deduction of the capital expenditure of Rs. 88,54,987 under section 35(1)(iv) read with section 35(2)(ia) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Issue (ii): Whether the challenge to adjustments made while processing the return was maintainable in an appeal against the scrutiny assessment order.

Analysis: The impugned appeal was against the order passed under section 143(3), whereas the disputed adjustments arose from the separate intimation under section 143(1)(a). The scrutiny assessment order neither discussed nor modified those adjustments. A separate appellate remedy was available against the intimation, and the issue did not arise from the assessment order under appeal.

Conclusion: The challenge to the adjustments made under section 143(1)(a) was not maintainable in the appeal against the order under section 143(3).

Final Conclusion: The restriction of the scientific-research deduction was removed, while the challenge concerning the separate processing adjustments was not entertained in the present appeal.

Ratio Decidendi: Capital expenditure on scientific research incurred after 31 March 1967 is fully deductible under section 35(2)(ia), and an adjustment arising from a separate section 143(1)(a) intimation cannot be challenged in an appeal directed against a section 143(3) assessment order.