Limitation under the Insolvency Code runs from pronouncement of the order, and delay beyond the statutory ceiling cannot be condoned.

Limitation for an appeal under Section 61(2) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code runs from pronouncement of the impugned order, not from the later date of upload or asserted actual knowledge. The Tribunal treated pronouncement in open court as sufficient to start time running, found constructive knowledge on the admitted facts, and rejected reliance on later upload dates. It also reiterated that the appellate forum lacks jurisdiction to condone delay beyond the statutory ceiling of 30 days plus a further 15 days. Appeals filed after that outer limit are time-barred and cannot be entertained.

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Issues: (i) Whether limitation for filing an appeal under Section 61 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 commenced from the date of pronouncement of the impugned order or from the later date when the order was uploaded or otherwise came to the appellants' knowledge; (ii) Whether the appeals were filed within the statutory period of 30 days, extendable by a further 15 days.

Issue (i): Whether limitation for filing an appeal under Section 61 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 commenced from the date of pronouncement of the impugned order or from the later date when the order was uploaded or otherwise came to the appellants' knowledge.

Analysis: The limitation period under Section 61(2) begins from pronouncement of the order. The Tribunal found on the admitted chronology and pleadings that the impugned order was pronounced in open court on 07.10.2025, with the appellants present or otherwise aware of the proceedings. The subsequent upload of the order did not defer commencement of limitation. The Tribunal held that the decisions relied on by the appellants did not assist them on the facts, and that constructive knowledge followed from pronouncement in open court. The request to shift the start date to the upload date or the date of actual knowledge was rejected.

Conclusion: Limitation commenced on 07.10.2025, the date of pronouncement, and not on the date of upload or later knowledge.

Issue (ii): Whether the appeals were filed within the statutory period of 30 days, extendable by a further 15 days.

Analysis: Counting from 07.10.2025, the 30-day period expired on 06.11.2025 and the additional condonable 15-day period expired on 21.11.2025. The appeals were filed on 29.11.2025 and 11.12.2025 respectively, which was beyond the outer statutory limit. The Tribunal reiterated that it had no jurisdiction to condone delay beyond 45 days under Section 61(2) of the Code. Since the delay exceeded the statutory ceiling, the applications for condonation could not be allowed.

Conclusion: The appeals were time-barred beyond the condonable limit and the delay could not be condoned.

Final Conclusion: The Tribunal declined to enlarge the statutory limitation period, treated pronouncement as the trigger for limitation, and dismissed the delay condonation applications, with the connected appeals consequently failing.

Ratio Decidendi: Under Section 61(2) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, limitation for an appeal runs from pronouncement of the order and the appellate tribunal has no jurisdiction to condone delay beyond the statutory 30 days plus 15 days.

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