Limitation under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code runs from pronouncement, and delay beyond the condonable period cannot be extended.

Limitation for an appeal under Section 61 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code begins on pronouncement of the order when it is made in the presence of counsel, because constructive knowledge is imputed to the aggrieved party. The party must act diligently, seek a certified copy promptly, and rely on Section 12 of the Limitation Act only for excluding the time requisite for obtaining it. Decisions under the Land Acquisition Act were distinguished on their different statutory context. Where the appeal is filed beyond the further 15-day period permitted by Section 61, delay cannot be condoned.

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Issues: Whether limitation for filing an appeal under Section 61 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 commences from the date of pronouncement of the order and whether delay beyond the statutory condonable period can be condoned where the appeal is filed after that period.

Analysis: The limitation scheme under Section 61 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 was read in light of the statutory requirement of prompt challenge and the settled principle that, when an order is pronounced in the presence of counsel, constructive knowledge of the order is imputed to the aggrieved party. The Court distinguished authorities under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and held that those decisions turned on their own statutory context, where knowledge of the award was expressly material. Relying on the governing interpretation of Section 61 in the IBC, the Court held that the clock for limitation begins when the order is pronounced, not when the party later claims to have learned the contents of the order. It further held that the party seeking to appeal must act diligently and apply for a certified copy so that the time requisite for obtaining it may be excluded under Section 12 of the Limitation Act, 1963. In the absence of a timely and sufficient basis to bring the appeal within the statutory window, the Tribunal has no power to condone delay beyond the further 15 days permitted by Section 61.

Conclusion: Limitation under Section 61 begins from the date of pronouncement of the order, and the delay in both appeals was beyond the Tribunal's condonable limit, so the delay applications were rightly rejected.

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