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<h1>Telephone tapping and privacy rights: interception without statutory preconditions or mandatory safeguards was held illegal and unusable.</h1> Telephone tapping was held to intrude on the right to privacy under Article 21 unless authorised by a valid procedure established by law. The Madras HC ... Scope of the right to privacy and the power of the Law Enforcement Agencies to resort to covert surveillance by tapping the mobile phones to obtain information regarding the commission of an alleged crime - Public emergency and public safety - Mandatory review under Rule 419-A - Use of unlawfully intercepted material Right to privacy - Telephone interception - Article 21 - HELD THAT: - The Court held that after the development of constitutional doctrine culminating in K.S. Puttaswamy [2017 (8) TMI 938 - SUPREME COURT], the right to privacy stands as an intrinsic part of life and personal liberty under Article 21. Applying People's Union for Civil Liberties [1996 (12) TMI 400 - SUPREME COURT], it held that a telephone conversation in the privacy of one's home or office is a protected facet of privacy, and interception of such conversation is an infringement of Article 21 unless it is backed by law and carried out strictly within the limits of that law. [Paras 32, 33, 34] Telephone tapping was held to be constitutionally permissible only within the strict confines of law; otherwise it violates Article 21. Public emergency and public safety - Jurisdiction under Section 5(2) - Application of mind - The interception order did not satisfy the jurisdictional conditions for exercise of power under Section 5(2) of the Telegraph Act. - HELD THAT:- The Court held that under Section 5(2), as interpreted in Hukam Chand Shyam Lal [1975 (12) TMI 168 - SUPREME COURT] and People's Union for Civil Liberties [1996 (12) TMI 400 - SUPREME COURT], interception can be ordered only on the occurrence of a public emergency or in the interest of public safety, and those conditions are sine qua non. Such conditions are not secretive situations and must be apparent to a reasonable person. On examining the impugned order, the Court found that it merely reproduced the statutory language without disclosing any factual basis or real application of mind. The case involved a covert operation for detecting an alleged bribery offence, which by its nature did not answer the statutory requirements of public emergency or public safety. The attempt in the counter affidavit to improve the order by invoking different grounds was impermissible. The Court also declined the request to widen Section 5(2) judicially to cover such cases, holding that the statutory limits on invasion of a fundamental right cannot be expanded by the Court. [Paras 59, 61, 63, 64, 67] The impugned interception order was held to be without jurisdiction and liable to be quashed for want of the statutory preconditions under Section 5(2). Mandatory review under Rule 419-A - Procedural safeguards - Destruction and non-use of intercepted material - Failure to place the intercepted material before the Review Committee vitiated the interception, and the material so obtained could not be used. - HELD THAT: - The Court held that the safeguards embodied in Rule 419-A, which incorporate the directions issued in People's Union for Civil Liberties, are mandatory. The admitted position was that the intercepted material was not placed before the Review Committee at all. Relying on the reasoning in Anuradha Bhasin [2020 (1) TMI 1387 - SUPREME COURT], the Court held that where a drastic power is required to be exercised in a prescribed manner, it must be so exercised or not at all. Since the review mechanism under Rule 419-A(17) is an integral check on compliance with Section 5(2), its non-observance was fatal. On the effect of such illegality, the Court stated that it was unnecessary to pronounce broadly on all questions of admissibility of unconstitutionally obtained evidence, because Rule 419-A itself contemplates setting aside of unlawful interception and destruction of intercepted material. Accordingly, the intercepted conversations obtained in violation of Section 5(2) and Rule 419-A(17) were directed not to be used for any purpose whatsoever, while clarifying that independent material collected subsequently would remain unaffected. [Paras 77, 86, 94, 95, 96] Non-compliance with Rule 419-A was held fatal, and the intercepted material collected pursuant to the unlawful order was directed not to be used for any purpose. Final Conclusion: The right to privacy is now an integral part of the right to life and personal liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of The Constitution of India. Telephone tapping constitutes a violation of the right to privacy unless justified by a procedure established by law. Section 5(2) of the Act authorizes interception of telephones on the occurrence of a public emergency or in the interests of public safety. Both these contingencies are not secretive conditions or situations. Either of the situations would be apparent to a reasonable person. As laid down in paragraph 28 of the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in People's Union for Civil Liberties [1996 (12) TMI 400 - SUPREME COURT], it is only when the above two situations exist that the Authority may pass an order directing interception of messages after recording its satisfaction that it is necessary or expedient so to do in the interest of (1) the sovereignty and integrity of India, (2) the security of the State, (3) friendly relations with foreign States, (4) public order or (5) for preventing incitement to the commission of an offence. In the instant case, the impugned order dated 12.8.2011 does not fall either within the rubric of 'public emergency' or 'in the interests of public safety' as explained by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of People's Union for Civil Liberties. The facts disclose that it was a covert operation/secretive situation for detection of crime, which would not be apparent to any reasonable person. As the law presently stands, a situation of this nature does not fall within the four corners of Section 5(2) of the Act as expounded by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of People's Union for Civil Liberties, which has been approved by the Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in K.S. Puttaswamy (Aadhaar-5]) [2018 (9) TMI 1733 - SUPREME COURT]. The respondents have also contravened Rule 419-A(17) of the Rules by failing to place the intercepted material before the Review Committee within the stipulated time to examine as to whether the interception was made in compliance with Section 5(2) of the Act. As a consequence of (iii) and (iv) above, the impugned order dated 12.8.2011 must necessarily be set aside as unconstitutional and one without jurisdiction. Besides violating Article 21, it is also ultra vires Section 5(2) of the Act besides being in violation of the mandatory provisions of Rule 419-A of the Rules. It follows that the intercepted conversations collected pursuant to the impugned order dated 12.8.2011 in violation of Section 5(2) of the Act and Rule 419-A(17) of the Rules shall not be used for any purposes whatsoever. It is, however, made clear that the above direction shall have no bearing on the other material that have been collected by the CBI subsequent to and independent of the intercepted call records, which shall be considered by the Trial Court on its own merits without being influenced by any of the observations made in this order. In the result, the writ petition is allowed. Issues: (i) Whether telephone tapping infringes the right to privacy protected under Article 21 of the Constitution of India unless justified by law; (ii) whether the interception order satisfied the jurisdictional preconditions under Section 5(2) of the Telegraph Act, 1885; (iii) whether the mandatory safeguards under Rule 419-A of the Telegraph Rules, 1951 were complied with; (iv) whether material collected pursuant to unlawful interception can be used for any purpose.Issue (i): Whether telephone tapping infringes the right to privacy protected under Article 21 of the Constitution of India unless justified by law.Analysis: The right to privacy was held to be an integral part of life and personal liberty under Article 21. Telephone conversations in private are protected by that right, and interception of such conversations constitutes an intrusion into privacy unless supported by a valid procedure established by law.Conclusion: Telephone tapping infringes Article 21 unless authorised by a valid legal procedure.Issue (ii): Whether the interception order satisfied the jurisdictional preconditions under Section 5(2) of the Telegraph Act, 1885.Analysis: The statutory threshold requires the occurrence of a public emergency or an interest of public safety, and only thereafter can an interception order be made on recorded satisfaction for the specified statutory purposes. The order in question was found to be mechanical, to rest on a covert investigation for detection of crime, and not to disclose facts showing a public emergency or public safety situation apparent to a reasonable person.Conclusion: The interception order did not satisfy Section 5(2) of the Telegraph Act, 1885 and was without jurisdiction.Issue (iii): Whether the mandatory safeguards under Rule 419-A of the Telegraph Rules, 1951 were complied with.Analysis: The intercepted material had to be placed before the Review Committee for scrutiny of compliance with Section 5(2), and the procedural safeguards were mandatory. The record showed that the intercepted material was not placed before the Review Committee at all.Conclusion: Rule 419-A of the Telegraph Rules, 1951 was breached and the interception stood vitiated.Issue (iv): Whether material collected pursuant to unlawful interception can be used for any purpose.Analysis: Once the interception order was found to be unconstitutional and contrary to the mandatory statutory procedure, the resulting material could not be treated as lawfully obtained. The intercepted conversations were therefore excluded from use.Conclusion: The intercepted material collected under the impugned order cannot be used for any purpose whatsoever.Final Conclusion: The Court quashed the interception order, held the interception illegal and unconstitutional, and directed that the intercepted conversations shall not be used, while leaving other independent material unaffected.Ratio Decidendi: Interception of telephone communications is lawful only when the statutory preconditions of public emergency or public safety are satisfied and the mandatory review safeguards are complied with; absent such compliance, the interception is ultra vires and the material obtained from it cannot be used.