Income-tax summons under Section 131(1A) upheld where no cogent proof of mala fide or lack of authorisation was shown.

A summons issued under Section 131(1A) of the Income-tax Act was upheld because the record did not show cogent evidence of personal malice, improper motive, or colourable exercise of power; the complaint had been received and processed through departmental procedure before approval and issuance. The jurisdictional challenge also failed because an Income Tax Officer authorised under the statutory scheme, read with Section 132, was competent to issue the summons. As no prior pleading or contemporaneous objection established lack of authority, the summons remained valid and the writ petition failed.

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Issues: (i) Whether the summons issued under Section 131(1A) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 to call for documents and evidence can be quashed on the ground of mala fide/colourable exercise of power; (ii) Whether the Income Tax Officer (Investigation) who issued the summons was without jurisdiction or not an authorised officer under Section 131(1A) read with Section 132 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Issue (i): Whether the summons under Section 131(1A) is vitiated by mala fide or colourable exercise of power.

Analysis: The material relied upon to establish mala fide was examined, including timing of the tax evasion petition, the interim civil injunction predating the petition, and the affidavit introduced after issuance of the summons. The record shows an anonymous Tax Evasion Petition received and processed under departmental procedure leading to issuance of the summons after approval. There is no direct or sufficiently cogent evidence of personal ill will, improper motive, or use of statutory power for an extraneous purpose. The petitioner's allegations were not raised before the authorities at the relevant time and the primary documentary material relied upon was produced after the summons. Authorities acted pursuant to a received complaint and internal procedure.

Conclusion: The plea of mala fide and colourable exercise of power is not established and does not invalidate the summons.

Issue (ii): Whether the Income Tax Officer (Investigation) who issued the summons lacked jurisdiction or was not an authorised officer under Section 131(1A) read with Section 132.

Analysis: Section 131(1A) identifies specified ranks and authorised officers; Section 132 permits authorisation of income tax officers by designated senior officers. Reading the provisions together, an Income Tax Officer authorised under Section 132 falls within the class of officers competent to issue summons under Section 131(1A). No pleadings or contemporaneous replies challenged or demonstrated absence of requisite authorization; the jurisdictional objection was raised only at oral argument and not pleaded earlier.

Conclusion: The issuing Income Tax Officer, being authorised under the statutory scheme, was competent to issue the summons and the jurisdictional objection fails.

Final Conclusion: The summons under Section 131(1A) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was validly issued, the challenges on mala fide and lack of jurisdiction are negatived, and the writ petition fails.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a statutory complaint is received and processed under departmental procedure and the record does not disclose cogent proof of personal malice or exercise of power for extraneous purposes, a summons issued under Section 131(1A) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 by an income tax officer authorised under Section 132 cannot be quashed for mala fide or want of jurisdiction.

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