Cheque dishonour presumptions under the Negotiable Instruments Act were not rebutted by blank-cheque, capacity, or Section 269SS defences.

Revisional interference in a cheque dishonour matter is limited to testing legality, propriety, regularity, and perversity, and does not permit a fresh reappreciation of evidence. Admission of signatures on the cheques attracted the presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, and the accused failed to rebut them with credible proof that the cheques were not issued for a legally enforceable debt. An unsupported blank-cheque defence, unproved allegations of forged documents, alleged lack of financial capacity, and a claimed breach of Section 269SS of the Income-tax Act were found insufficient to displace liability under Section 138.

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Issues: (i) whether the revisional court should interfere with concurrent findings of conviction and sentence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881; (ii) whether the accused rebutted the statutory presumptions arising from admitted signatures on the cheques and established that they were not issued in discharge of a legally enforceable debt or liability; (iii) whether the complainant's alleged lack of financial capacity or any alleged violation of Section 269SS of the Income-tax Act, 1961 defeated the prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.

Issue (i): whether the revisional court should interfere with concurrent findings of conviction and sentence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881

Analysis: Revisional interference is confined to examining the correctness, legality, propriety, and regularity of the proceedings, and does not permit a reappreciation of evidence as in an appeal. Where the trial court and the appellate court have returned concurrent findings on the basis of the evidence, interference is warranted only if the findings are perverse, illegal, or suffer from material irregularity.

Conclusion: The concurrent findings did not warrant interference in revision.

Issue (ii): whether the accused rebutted the statutory presumptions arising from admitted signatures on the cheques and established that they were not issued in discharge of a legally enforceable debt or liability

Analysis: Once the accused admitted his signatures on the cheques, the presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 arose in favour of the complainant. The defence that the cheques were handed over blank for a property transaction was found unsupported by basic particulars, independent corroboration, or credible documentary proof. The alleged notice seeking return of cheques was not proved, and the defence version was weakened by admissions during cross-examination and the testimony of the defence witness. The allegation that the promissory notes were forged was also left unsubstantiated, as no forensic or other reliable proof was produced.

Conclusion: The accused failed to rebut the statutory presumptions or disprove the existence of a legally enforceable liability.

Issue (iii): whether the complainant's alleged lack of financial capacity or any alleged violation of Section 269SS of the Income-tax Act, 1961 defeated the prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881

Analysis: The challenge to the complainant's financial capacity was not supported by substantive evidence capable of dislodging the presumption under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. A mere assertion regarding income, without proof of incapacity or contrary financial material, was insufficient. A breach of Section 269SS of the Income-tax Act, 1961 does not render the underlying transaction void or unenforceable, since the statutory scheme treats such breach as attracting penalty under Section 271D and not as nullifying the debt itself.

Conclusion: Neither the alleged financial incapacity nor any supposed violation of Section 269SS negated the prosecution case.

Final Conclusion: The conviction and sentence for the cheque dishonour offence were sustained because the accused failed to displace the statutory presumptions and no ground for revisional interference was made out.

Ratio Decidendi: Admission of signature on a cheque attracts the statutory presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, and the drawer can avoid liability only by leading credible rebuttal evidence; an unproved blank-cheque defence or a mere violation of Section 269SS of the Income-tax Act, 1961 does not by itself defeat liability under Section 138.

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