Cheque dishonour presumptions survive absent probable rebuttal; Section 269SS breach does not by itself defeat enforceable debt.

On admitted execution of a cheque, the presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act arise in favour of the complainant and can be displaced only by a probable defence supported by material on record. Revisional courts cannot disturb concurrent findings of conviction unless perversity or jurisdictional error is shown. A challenge based on the complainant's financial capacity failed on the facts, and a breach of Section 269SS of the Income-tax Act does not by itself render the underlying debt unenforceable for Section 138 purposes. The defence of a signed blank cheque, coupled with non-reply to statutory notice and no prompt supporting action, was treated as insufficient to rebut liability.

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Issues: (i) Whether, on admitted execution of the cheque, the presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 arose and were rebutted by the accused; (ii) whether the High Court, in revisional jurisdiction, could upset concurrent findings of conviction in the absence of perversity; (iii) whether the complainant's financial capacity and the alleged cash-transaction violation under Section 269SS of the Income-tax Act, 1961 destroyed the existence of a legally enforceable debt; and (iv) whether the accused's defence of issuance of a signed blank cheque and the non-reply to statutory notice displaced liability.

Issue (i): Whether, on admitted execution of the cheque, the presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 arose and were rebutted by the accused.

Analysis: Once the cheque and signature were admitted, the statutory presumptions that the cheque was issued for consideration and in discharge of a legally enforceable debt arose. The presumption under Section 139 is rebuttable, but the initial burden lies on the accused to raise a probable defence. The accused did not adduce independent evidence or documents to show that the cheque was not issued towards liability, and the material brought on record did not establish rebuttal of the statutory presumptions.

Conclusion: The presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 operated in favour of the complainant and were not rebutted.

Issue (ii): Whether the High Court, in revisional jurisdiction, could upset concurrent findings of conviction in the absence of perversity.

Analysis: Revisional jurisdiction is limited and does not authorise reappreciation of evidence to disturb concurrent factual findings unless those findings are perverse or suffer from jurisdictional error. The Trial Court and the Sessions Court had both accepted the complainant's case and found the accused guilty. No perversity was shown so as to justify revisional interference.

Conclusion: The High Court ought not to have interfered with the concurrent findings of fact.

Issue (iii): Whether the complainant's financial capacity and the alleged cash-transaction violation under Section 269SS of the Income-tax Act, 1961 destroyed the existence of a legally enforceable debt.

Analysis: The complainant's evidence, read as a whole, did not show incapacity to advance the loan. The accused failed to produce convincing material to establish that the complainant lacked means. A breach of Section 269SS of the Income-tax Act, 1961 attracts penalty under Section 271D of that Act, but the statute does not declare the transaction void or unenforceable. Therefore, such a breach does not by itself defeat a prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 or negate the statutory presumptions.

Conclusion: The complainant's financial capacity was not disproved, and a Section 269SS violation did not render the debt legally unenforceable.

Issue (iv): Whether the accused's defence of issuance of a signed blank cheque and the non-reply to statutory notice displaced liability.

Analysis: The defence that a signed blank cheque had been issued merely to facilitate a bank loan was found improbable on the facts. The accused also failed to reply to the statutory notice and took no prompt legal action after receiving notice, which supported the complainant's version. The absence of a reply and the lack of any supporting action or material weakened the defence and reinforced liability.

Conclusion: The defence was not accepted, and non-reply to the notice supported the complainant's case.

Final Conclusion: The impugned acquittal was set aside, the conviction and concurrent findings were restored, and the complainant succeeded with the monetary directions and broader procedural guidelines issued for cheque dishonour cases.

Ratio Decidendi: On admitted execution of a cheque, the presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 arise and can be displaced only by a probable defence supported by material on record; revisional interference with concurrent findings is impermissible absent perversity, and a violation of Section 269SS of the Income-tax Act, 1961 does not by itself render the underlying debt unenforceable for the purposes of Section 138.

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