Notice uploaded on portal constitutes valid service under Section 169(1)(d) WBGST/CGST Act, personal service not mandatory

HC held that service of notice under WBGST/CGST Act, 2017 through uploading on portal constitutes valid service under Section 169(1)(d), as the provision allows service by any of the modes specified in clauses (a) to (f). Personal service under clauses (a) to (c) is not mandatory. The appellate authority erred in mechanically rejecting the appeal for delay without considering condonation powers beyond the one-month extended period, as established in S.K. Chakraborty case. The impugned order was set aside and petition disposed of.

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1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED

The core legal questions considered by the Court in this matter are:

(a) Whether service of an order under the WBGST/CGST Act, 2017 by uploading it on the common portal as per Clause (d) of Section 169(1) constitutes valid and complete service, especially when service by modes under Clauses (a) to (c) has not been effected;

(b) Whether the State is obligated to first exhaust the modes of service specified in Clauses (a) to (c) of Section 169(1) before resorting to service by uploading on the portal under Clause (d);

(c) Whether the appellate authority was correct in rejecting the petitioner's appeal on the ground of delay without appropriately considering the petitioner's application for condonation of delay;

(d) The interpretation and application of Section 169 of the WBGST/CGST Act, 2017, particularly the hierarchy and permissibility of various modes of service;

(e) The applicability and effect of precedents, specifically the decision of the Madras High Court in P.N. Traders vs. Deputy State Tax Officer, on the mode of service under Section 169.

2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS

Issue (a) and (b): Validity of service by uploading on the portal under Section 169(1)(d) without prior service under Clauses (a) to (c)

Relevant legal framework and precedents: Section 169(1) of the WBGST/CGST Act, 2017 prescribes six alternative modes of service for any decision, order, summons, notice or other communication under the Act. These are:

• (a) Direct or messenger service to the addressee or authorized representatives;
• (b) Registered post, speed post or courier with acknowledgement;
• (c) Sending communication to the registered e-mail address;
• (d) Making the communication available on the common portal;
• (e) Publication in a newspaper circulating in the relevant locality;
• (f) Affixing the communication in a conspicuous place at the last known place of business or residence, but only if none of the modes (a) to (e) are practicable.

Subsections (2) and (3) clarify the date of deemed service and presumption of receipt in case of registered post.

The Madras High Court in P.N. Traders held that service under Section 169 mandates personal service or service by registered post or e-mail at the first instance, and only if these modes fail, can service by uploading on the portal or publication in newspapers be resorted to.

Court's interpretation and reasoning: The Court carefully examined the language of Section 169(1), noting the use of the word "or" after each clause, indicating that the modes of service are alternative and not hierarchical, except for Clause (f) which expressly applies only "if none of the modes aforesaid is practicable." The Court emphasized that Clause (f) contains a clear precondition, but no such restriction exists for Clauses (a) to (e).

Therefore, service by making the order available on the common portal under Clause (d) is a valid mode of service without the necessity to first attempt service under Clauses (a) to (c). The Court rejected the petitioner's contention that service by uploading on the portal is incomplete or invalid unless preceded by service under Clauses (a) to (c).

The Court respectfully disagreed with the Madras High Court's interpretation in P.N. Traders, holding that the plain and unambiguous language of Section 169 does not support the hierarchical approach suggested therein.

Key evidence and findings: The order under Section 73(9) was uploaded on the common portal as per Clause (d). The petitioner had notice of the proceedings, having responded to the show-cause notice also uploaded on the portal. There was no evidence that service by other modes was attempted or necessary.

Application of law to facts: The Court applied the statutory language strictly and held that uploading the order on the portal sufficed as valid service. Therefore, the petitioner's appeal was not delayed due to failure of service.

Treatment of competing arguments: The petitioner argued that service must be personal or by registered post or e-mail first, relying on P.N. Traders. The State contended that service by uploading on the portal is an independent and valid mode. The Court sided with the State, emphasizing the plain statutory language and rejecting the hierarchical interpretation.

Conclusions: Service of notice by uploading on the portal under Section 169(1)(d) is valid and complete. The petitioner's claim of defective service and consequent delay in filing the appeal is untenable.

Issue (c): Consideration of the application for condonation of delay by the appellate authority

Relevant legal framework and precedents: Section 107(4) of the WBGST/CGST Act, 2017 deals with the time limit for filing appeals and the power of the appellate authority to condone delay. The appellate authority had rejected the appeal on the ground of delay, holding it lacked power to condone delay beyond the extended period of one month.

A Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in S.K. Chakraborty & ors. vs. Union of India (MAT 81 & 82 of 2022) has taken a view on the power of the appellate authority to condone delay beyond the extended period.

Court's interpretation and reasoning: The Court found that the appellate authority mechanically rejected the appeal relying on a restrictive interpretation of Section 107(4), without properly considering the petitioner's application for condonation of delay. The Court held that the appellate authority's reasoning was flawed and inconsistent with the Division Bench precedent.

Key evidence and findings: The appellate authority did not examine the merits of the petitioner's explanation for delay and summarily dismissed the appeal.

Application of law to facts: The Court set aside the appellate authority's order dated 24th December 2024 and directed the appellate authority to hear the appeal on merit, subject to the petitioner making a payment of Rs. 25,000/- to the High Court Legal Services Committee within four weeks.

Treatment of competing arguments: The petitioner urged for consideration of the condonation application; the State relied on the statutory time limits. The Court favored a fair hearing on merits rather than a mechanical rejection.

Conclusions: The appellate authority erred in rejecting the appeal solely on the ground of delay without proper consideration of the condonation application. The appeal must be heard on merits.

3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS

The Court held:

"The unambiguous and plain language employed in Section 169(1) read with sub-Sections 2 and 3 makes it amply clear that the service of notice can be effected by any of the modes provided for in Clauses (a) to (f) of Section 169(1) of the said Act. The only restriction in my view in effecting service, is found in Clause 169(1)(f) since, the opening words of the said Clause requires that 'if none of the modes as aforesaid is practicable', that is to say modes of service provided for in Clauses (a) to (e) is not practicable, then the mode of service as provided in Clause (f) can be applied."

"No view, contrary to the intention expressed in the above section is acceptable. As such I respectfully disagree with the view expressed by the Hon'ble Madras High Court in the case of P.N. Traders (supra)."

"The appellate authority had mechanically by relying on the provisions of sub-Section 4 of Section 107 of the said Act and by treating that it has no power to condone the delay beyond the extended period of one month, had rejected the appeal. In this context, I may note a Division Bench of our High Court in the case of S.K. Chakraborty & ors. vs. Union of India ... has already taken a view on the power of the appellate authority to condone the delay beyond the extended period of one month. Having regard thereto, I am unable to accept the reasoning provided by the appellate authority."

Core principles established include:

• The modes of service under Section 169(1) are alternative and not hierarchical except Clause (f), which applies only if other modes are impracticable;
• Service by uploading on the common portal under Clause (d) is valid and sufficient service;
• The appellate authority must consider applications for condonation of delay on their merits and cannot mechanically reject appeals solely on delay grounds beyond the extended period;
• Precedents must be interpreted in light of the plain language of the statute, and conflicting views must yield to statutory clarity.

Final determinations on each issue:

(a) Service by uploading on the portal is valid and complete service under Section 169(1)(d);

(b) The State is not required to first attempt service under Clauses (a) to (c) before resorting to Clause (d);

(c) The appellate authority erred in rejecting the appeal for delay without proper consideration of condonation; the order dated 24th December 2024 is set aside;

(d) The appeal shall be heard on merit upon payment of Rs. 25,000/- to the High Court Legal Services Committee within four weeks.

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