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Issues: Whether the complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act was barred by limitation and whether any implied condonation of delay could be inferred so as to warrant interference with the dismissal of the complaint.
Analysis: The complaint was filed after expiry of the statutory period and no application for condonation of delay was moved before the trial court. The statutory scheme requires a complaint under Section 138 to be filed within the prescribed time under Section 142(1)(b), and where delay is to be excused, a conscious request must be made and considered after due notice. A mere issuance of process does not amount to implied condonation. The complainant could have filed the complaint himself under Section 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and could not shift the entire blame to counsel. In an appeal against acquittal, interference is warranted only where the trial court's view is illegal or perverse, and a plausible view based on the record cannot be disturbed.
Conclusion: The complaint remained time-barred, no implied condonation arose, and the trial court's view was a reasonable one. The dismissal of the complaint was upheld and the appeal failed.