Cartelisation and bid rigging require plus factors beyond parallel pricing; tender eligibility terms were not abusive absent dominance.

Parallel pricing in the tender process, without additional material showing collusion, concerted action or a meeting of minds, was held insufficient to support an inference of cartelisation or bid rigging under the Competition Act; no prima facie case under Section 3 was made out. The Commission also held that a procurer may set eligibility and technical conditions to suit procurement needs, and such specifications are not anti-competitive merely because they limit participation; on the record, dominance and abuse under Section 4 were not established. Accordingly, no prima facie contravention was found and the matter was closed.

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Issues: (i) Whether the tender conditions and the bidding pattern disclosed a prima facie case of cartelisation or bid rigging under Section 3 of the Competition Act, 2002. (ii) Whether the procurer's eligibility criteria in the tender amounted to abuse of dominant position under Section 4 of the Competition Act, 2002.

Issue (i): Whether the tender conditions and the bidding pattern disclosed a prima facie case of cartelisation or bid rigging under Section 3 of the Competition Act, 2002.

Analysis: The record showed only a price difference between two bidders in some tenders, while other bidders quoted in the same or higher range. The Commission found no additional material indicating collusion, concerted action, or a meeting of minds. Mere price parallelism, without plus factors, was held insufficient to infer cartelisation.

Conclusion: No prima facie case of cartelisation or bid rigging was made out.

Issue (ii): Whether the procurer's eligibility criteria in the tender amounted to abuse of dominant position under Section 4 of the Competition Act, 2002.

Analysis: The Commission held that a procurer has the freedom to prescribe eligibility conditions and technical requirements according to its procurement needs. The tender conditions, by themselves, were not anti-competitive, and the material did not establish dominance in the relevant market or abuse of such position.

Conclusion: No contravention of Section 4 was found.

Final Conclusion: The Commission found no prima facie contravention against any opposite party and closed the matter under Section 26(2) of the Competition Act, 2002.

Ratio Decidendi: Allegations of cartelisation require more than parallel pricing and must be supported by plus factors showing collusion, while a procurer's tender specifications are not anti-competitive merely because they restrict participation unless abuse of dominance is otherwise established.

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