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Issues: Whether the arbitral tribunal was justified in holding that the period of twelve months under Section 29A of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 commenced on 20.05.2023 and that the period during which the arbitral proceedings remained stayed had to be excluded while computing the time limit for making the award.
Analysis: Section 23 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 contemplates completion of claim, defence, counterclaim and objections to counterclaim as the pleadings before the arbitral tribunal. A rejoinder or surrejoinder filed with permission, or pursuant to liberty granted by the Court, forms part of the pleadings. In the present matter, the petitioner was granted liberty to file surrejoinder on 20.05.2023 and filed it accordingly. The arbitral tribunal was therefore justified in treating that date as the date of completion of pleadings for the purpose of Section 29A(1). The proceedings before the arbitral tribunal were also stayed by a judicial order for about 77 days, and such period of stay had to be excluded while computing the statutory time limit.
Conclusion: The arbitral tribunal correctly held that the twelve-month period commenced on 20.05.2023 and that the stay period was excludable; the challenge failed.