Composite customs penalty and post-order corrigendum were held unsustainable; retracted statements without corroboration failed to prove the charge.

A composite penalty under the Customs Act and the Gold (Control) Act was treated as impermissible because the adjudicating authority had to specify the quantum attributable to each statute separately. A later corrigendum substituting a paragraph in the original order was regarded as an invalid review once the authority had become functus officio, except for correction of clerical or apparent errors. On the evidence, the charge was not established because the only incriminating statement had been retracted, there was no independent corroboration, and penal proceedings required proof at least on a preponderance of probabilities, with benefit of doubt going to the appellant.

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Issues: (i) Whether a joint penalty could be imposed under the Customs Act, 1962 and the Gold (Control) Act, 1968 and whether the subsequent corrigendum was legally sustainable; (ii) whether the charge was proved on the evidence available.

Issue (i): Whether a joint penalty could be imposed under the Customs Act, 1962 and the Gold (Control) Act, 1968 and whether the subsequent corrigendum was legally sustainable.

Analysis: A composite penalty for offences under two different enactments was held impermissible, and the adjudicating authority was required to specify the quantum relatable to each statute. The later corrigendum, which substituted a paragraph in the original order, was treated as an impermissible review after the authority had become functus officio, except for correction of apparent errors or clerical mistakes.

Conclusion: The joint penalty and the corrigendum were held not sustainable in law.

Issue (ii): Whether the charge was proved on the evidence available.

Analysis: The only incriminating material was a statement that had been retracted and contradicted later, and there was no independent investigation or corroborative evidence linking the appellant to the alleged contraband. In penal proceedings, the Department was required to establish the charge at least by preponderance of probabilities, and the appellant was entitled to the benefit of doubt.

Conclusion: The charge was held not proved on the evidence on record and was not sustainable.

Final Conclusion: The penalty order was set aside, and the appellant succeeded on both the legality of the adjudication and the merits of the charge.

Ratio Decidendi: A penalty under separate statutes cannot be imposed as a single composite levy, and in penal adjudication the charge must be proved by reliable evidence meeting at least the standard of preponderance of probabilities, failing which the accused is entitled to the benefit of doubt.

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