Concurrent factual findings require a substantial legal question for interference; automatically applicable eviction safeguards may be enforced during execution.

At the admission stage of a second appeal, a respondent present on caveat may address whether a substantial question of law arises; Section 100 CPC does not impose an absolute bar. Interference with concurrent factual findings is limited to cases involving recognised legal defects, including absence or disregard of evidence, inadmissible evidence, erroneous legal inference, perversity, or incorrect burden of proof. Findings supported by pleadings and evidence on the use of premises and lack of suitable alternate accommodation generally do not meet that threshold. For eviction under Section 12(1)(f) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, Section 12(6) requirements apply mandatorily and automatically; their omission from the decree is treated as a formal defect enforceable by the executing court.

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Issues: (i) Whether the respondent could be heard at the stage of admission of the second appeal; (ii) whether the findings regarding pleadings, evidence and the availability of suitable alternate accommodation disclosed a substantial question of law; (iii) whether omission to expressly mention compliance with Section 12(6) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act in the eviction decree warranted interference in second appeal.

Issue (i): Whether the respondent could be heard at the stage of admission of the second appeal.

Analysis: Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 contains no absolute bar against hearing the respondent at the admission stage, particularly where the respondent is present on caveat. The respondent may address the Court on whether a substantial question of law arises for consideration.

Conclusion: The respondent was entitled to be heard at the admission stage.

Issue (ii): Whether the findings regarding pleadings, evidence and the availability of suitable alternate accommodation disclosed a substantial question of law.

Analysis: In a second appeal, interference with concurrent findings of fact is confined to cases involving a substantial question of law, such as findings based on no evidence, disregard of material evidence, erroneous legal inferences, inadmissible evidence or an erroneous burden of proof. The pleadings and depositions sufficiently established the position and use of the shops and the absence of suitable vacant alternate accommodation. The concurrent findings were supported by the evidence and were neither perverse nor based on misappreciation of material evidence.

Conclusion: No substantial question of law arose from the findings regarding pleadings, evidence or alternate accommodation.

Issue (iii): Whether omission to expressly mention compliance with Section 12(6) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act in the eviction decree warranted interference in second appeal.

Analysis: Where eviction is decreed under Section 12(1)(f) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, the requirements of Section 12(6) apply automatically and are mandatory. Their omission from the judgment is a formal defect. The executing court may ensure compliance with those requirements as an incidental or ancillary matter without going behind or enlarging the decree.

Conclusion: Omission to mention Section 12(6) did not give rise to a substantial question of law or warrant interference.

Final Conclusion: The concurrent findings and decree for eviction under Section 12(1)(f) remained undisturbed, and the second appeal disclosed no basis for admission.

Ratio Decidendi: In a second appeal, concurrent findings of fact cannot be disturbed absent a substantial question of law; mandatory requirements that automatically attach to an eviction decree may be enforced by the executing court notwithstanding their omission from the decree.

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