Sanction challenges and trial delay did not justify quashing criminal proceedings; departmental exoneration also did not bar prosecution.

A challenge to criminal prosecution based on alleged mechanical sanction was rejected because the sanctioning authority's competence was not disputed and objections such as non-application of mind are ordinarily matters for trial, not for quashing at the pre-trial stage. The Court also refused to interfere on merits, noting that earlier challenge orders had attained finality. Delay in trial did not justify termination of proceedings in the absence of demonstrated prejudice, and departmental exoneration did not bar criminal prosecution. The inherent jurisdiction was therefore not exercised, and the case was permitted to proceed to trial.

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Issues: (i) whether the criminal proceedings could be quashed on the ground that the sanction for prosecution was granted mechanically and without application of mind; (ii) whether the proceedings deserved to be quashed on merits or on the ground of delay in trial and departmental exoneration.

Issue (i): whether the criminal proceedings could be quashed on the ground that the sanction for prosecution was granted mechanically and without application of mind;

Analysis: The challenge was directed only to the alleged invalidity of the sanction order on the ground of non-application of mind, without questioning the competence of the sanctioning authority. The settled law, as applied in the judgment, is that where a sanction order exists, objections such as non-application of mind, lack of material, or other defects in validity are matters to be raised during trial and not ordinarily at the pre-trial stage. The Court also noted that the prosecution case had reached an advanced stage and that the sanctioning authority could be examined as a witness during trial.

Conclusion: The sanction-based challenge did not justify quashing of the proceedings and was rejected.

Issue (ii): whether the proceedings deserved to be quashed on merits or on the ground of delay in trial and departmental exoneration.

Analysis: The Court declined to reappreciate the merits because the charge order and earlier quashing challenge had already been considered and had attained finality. On delay, the Court applied the principle that mere lapse of time, without demonstrated prejudice, is not by itself a sufficient ground to terminate prosecution, particularly in a serious corruption case involving alleged manipulation of records and misappropriation of coal. The Court further held that exoneration in departmental proceedings does not bar criminal prosecution.

Conclusion: The merits, delay, and departmental exoneration grounds did not warrant interference and were rejected.

Final Conclusion: The inherent jurisdiction of the Court was held not to be fit for exercise in this case, and the criminal proceedings were allowed to continue to trial.

Ratio Decidendi: A challenge to the validity of an existing sanction order on the ground of non-application of mind is ordinarily to be examined during trial, and criminal proceedings should not be quashed at the threshold on that basis or on mere delay absent demonstrated prejudice.

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