Limitation for arbitration applications under the residuary article runs from accrual of the right to apply, making belated petitions time-barred.

Where the Arbitration Act, 1940 does not prescribe a specific limitation period for an application to revoke an arbitrator's authority and appoint a fresh arbitrator, Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 applies through section 37. Time begins when the right to apply first accrues. On the facts stated, that right arose when the arbitrators became functus officio on expiry of the extended time for making the award. An application filed several years later was therefore beyond the three-year period and time-barred.

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Issues: Whether the application under Sections 5, 11 and 12 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 for revocation of an arbitrator's authority and appointment of a fresh arbitrator was barred by limitation.

Analysis: Section 37 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 makes the Limitation Act applicable to arbitration proceedings. Since no specific period of limitation is provided for such an application, the residuary provision in Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 applies. The period under Article 137 begins when the right to apply accrues. That right arose when the arbitrators became functus officio on expiry of the extended time for making the award, i.e. on 1 April 1993. The application filed on 3 July 1999 was therefore beyond the three-year period and could not be entertained.

Conclusion: The application was time-barred and the order appointing a sole arbitrator could not be sustained.

Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded, the impugned order was set aside, and the arbitration petition was dismissed as barred by limitation.

Ratio Decidendi: Where no specific limitation period is prescribed for an application under the Arbitration Act, 1940, Article 137 of the Limitation Act applies and time runs from the date the right to apply first accrues.

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