Just a moment...
Press 'Enter' to add multiple search terms. Rules for Better Search
Use comma for multiple locations.
---------------- For section wise search only -----------------
Accuracy Level ~ 90%
Press 'Enter' after typing page number.
Press 'Enter' after typing page number.
No Folders have been created
Are you sure you want to delete "My most important" ?
NOTE:
Press 'Enter' after typing page number.
Press 'Enter' after typing page number.
Don't have an account? Register Here
Press 'Enter' after typing page number.
Issues: (i) Whether the reference and consequential proceedings before the Industrial Tribunal were proceedings against the company in liquidation so as to require leave of the winding-up court under section 171 of the Indian Companies Act. (ii) Whether the appellant lessee was the "employer" within sections 33 and 33A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and whether the complaints under section 33A were maintainable.
Issue (i): Whether the reference and consequential proceedings before the Industrial Tribunal were proceedings against the company in liquidation so as to require leave of the winding-up court under section 171 of the Indian Companies Act.
Analysis: The reference under section 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act was made to the management of the sugar factory, not to the company in liquidation as such. The company's name in the appendix only identified the factory, while actual management had passed to the lessee under a court-sanctioned lease. The liquidator was no longer in management and the Tribunal's proceedings were, in substance, directed against the then management of the factory. On that construction, the proceedings were not proceedings against the company in liquidation.
Conclusion: The proceedings were not against the company in liquidation, and the question of leave under section 171 did not arise.
Issue (ii): Whether the appellant lessee was the "employer" within sections 33 and 33A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and whether the complaints under section 33A were maintainable.
Analysis: The expression "employer" in sections 33 and 33A was held to mean the employer who was a party to the industrial dispute and whose relationship with the workmen existed when the reference commenced. A stranger to that dispute, or a later lessee who had not been brought before the Tribunal and was not a successor, assign, or benamidar of the earlier management, could not be bound by the reference. Since the appellant came into possession after the reference and had not been served or impleaded, it was not bound by the reference or the award. Consequently, no obligation to obtain permission under section 33 arose, and the complaints under section 33A could not be entertained.
Conclusion: The appellant was not the relevant employer for sections 33 and 33A, and the section 33A complaints were not maintainable.
Final Conclusion: The Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to proceed on the complaints, the High Court's order was set aside, and the writ quashing the miscellaneous cases was granted.
Ratio Decidendi: For sections 33 and 33A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the employer must be the identical employer concerned in the industrial dispute and in subsisting relationship with the workmen at the commencement of the reference; a later transferee or lessee who is not party to the reference is not bound by those sections.