Section 14 arbitration mandate challenges cannot decide tribunal-referable objections; Section 16 issues remain for the arbitral tribunal.

Section 14 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 permits termination of an arbitrator's mandate only where the arbitrator is de jure or de facto incapable of acting, or withdraws from office. Objections based on limitation, composite claims, non-joinder of parties, and non-compliance with pre-arbitral procedure fall within the tribunal's remit under Section 16 and are not for detailed determination at the referral stage. The court also noted the later Supreme Court approach that referral courts should generally confine themselves to a prima facie inquiry into the arbitration agreement and timeliness of the Section 11 reference, leaving arbitrability-related objections to the tribunal. The appointment mechanism issue was treated as debatable and left open for notice.

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Issues: Whether the mandate of the arbitral tribunal was liable to be terminated under Section 14 on the grounds that the arbitration clause or appointment mechanism was vulnerable to challenge, and whether objections regarding limitation, composite claims, non-joinder and pre-arbitral procedure could be decided by the Court at this stage.

Analysis: Section 14 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 permits termination of an arbitrator's mandate only where the arbitrator becomes de jure or de facto incapable of acting, or withdraws from office. Objections concerning limitation, composite reference, impleadment of parties and compliance with the contractual pre-arbitral steps fall within the arbitral tribunal's domain under Section 16, and are not matters for detailed adjudication in proceedings of this nature. The Court also noted the later approach of the Supreme Court that the referral court should confine itself, at best, to a prima facie inquiry on the existence of an arbitration agreement and the timeliness of the Section 11 reference, leaving issues of arbitrability and similar objections to the tribunal. On the appointment mechanism, the Court found a real distinction between the present clause and the clauses considered in the Perkins line of cases, but treated that question as debatable and fit for notice rather than final rejection.

Conclusion: No ground was made out for terminating the mandate or interdicting the arbitral proceedings on the other objections raised, though the challenge based on the appointment clause was left open for consideration after notice.

Ratio Decidendi: A court dealing with a Section 14 challenge should not decide issues that properly fall within Section 16 of the Act, and de jure incapacity to act as an arbitrator is not established merely by raising objections that are debatable or tribunal-referable.

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