Limitation under PMLA: prima facie view that delayed adjudication may be time-barred despite COVID-19 extension orders.

An adjudicating authority's order under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 was challenged as time-barred because it was passed after the statutory period under Section 8(3). The challenge also questioned whether the Supreme Court's COVID-19 limitation-extension orders could apply to the authority's timeline. A prima facie view was taken that such extension benefit may not have been available, and that the authority may have become functus officio when the order was made. Interim stay was granted on the impugned order, and notice was issued.

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Issues: Whether the order passed by the adjudicating authority under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 was beyond the period of limitation and, if so, whether interim stay of that order should be granted.

Analysis: The impugned order was passed after the expiry of the statutory period under Section 8(3) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, and the petitioners challenged the reliance placed on the Supreme Court's orders extending limitation during the COVID-19 period. A prima facie view was taken that the benefit of such extension may not be available to the adjudicating authority, and that the authority may have become functus officio when the order was made.

Outcome: Interim stay was granted on the impugned order, and notice was issued.

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