Summary suit maintainable for a written-contract debt; section 34 stay application not barred if no decree passed.

A claim for the price of goods under a written contract was treated as a debt for summary-suit purposes because it was an ascertained, presently enforceable sum, so the suit was maintainable as a summary suit. The procedural rules governing summary suits and the Original Side Rules were read as compatible, and the amended summary procedure applied to such a claim. A section 34 stay application was not barred merely because it was filed after the 20-day period under the summary procedure, provided no decree had been passed; the court also accepted sufficient cause to condone the delay under section 5 of the Limitation Act. The decree and order were set aside and the stay application remitted for decision on merits.

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Issues: (i) Whether a suit for recovery of the price of goods was maintainable as a summary suit as a claim for a debt arising on a written contract; (ii) Whether an application for stay under section 34 of the Arbitration Act was barred by the 20-day period under the summary procedure and whether the delay could be condoned.

Issue (i): Whether a suit for recovery of the price of goods was maintainable as a summary suit as a claim for a debt arising on a written contract.

Analysis: The claim was for an ascertained and presently enforceable amount payable under the contract. A debt, for the purpose of the summary procedure, includes a sum that is certain or readily calculable and is presently due, whether with or without interest. The procedural provisions governing summary suits and the Original Side Rules were treated as compatible, and the amended summary procedure was held applicable to such a claim.

Conclusion: The suit was maintainable as a summary suit and the objection to its maintainability failed.

Issue (ii): Whether an application for stay under section 34 of the Arbitration Act was barred by the 20-day period under the summary procedure and whether the delay could be condoned.

Analysis: The summary procedure does not compel rejection of a stay application merely because it is filed after 20 days, so long as no decree has yet been passed. An application under section 34 can be made before the suit is finally decreed, and the arbitration remedy was treated as capable of being invoked without being defeated by the summary timetable. On the facts, the delay was explained and sufficient cause was shown for invoking section 5 of the Limitation Act.

Conclusion: The stay application was not barred by limitation under the summary procedure and the delay was condoned.

Final Conclusion: The decree and order under appeal were set aside and the matter was sent back for decision of the stay application on merits.

Ratio Decidendi: A stay application under section 34 of the Arbitration Act is not defeated merely because it is filed after the summary-suit period, provided no decree has been passed and sufficient cause exists for delay.

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