Corrupt practice by vicarious attribution requires statutory notice and proof of candidate consent before an election can be set aside.

An election could not be voided on the basis of speeches made by persons other than the returned candidate without compliance with the statutory notice-and-inquiry requirement. The candidate's own speeches were found innocuous, and speeches made before she formally entered the contest could not themselves establish corrupt practice against her. Where liability is sought vicariously for another person's act said to have been done with the candidate's consent, a clear finding of consent and observance of the statutory procedure are required before an adverse conclusion can be recorded. As those safeguards were not met, and the candidate's own conduct was not objectionable, the judgment setting aside the election was reversed and remand was unnecessary.

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Issues: Whether an election could be set aside for corrupt practice attributed to speeches made by persons other than the returned candidate without compliance with the statutory notice requirement, and whether the defect required remand for fresh consideration.

Analysis: The returned candidate's own speeches were found to be innocuous, and speeches made before the candidate formally entered the contest could not constitute the basis of corrupt practice against her as a candidate. The only surviving allegation rested on speeches of political leaders said to have been made with the candidate's consent. Where corrupt practice is imputed vicariously for an act done by another person with the candidate's consent, the statutory scheme requires compliance with the notice-and-inquiry procedure before a final adverse finding is recorded. The High Court had not given the requisite notice under the relevant provision to the makers of the speeches, yet treated their speeches as the foundation for voiding the election. In the absence of a clear and proved finding of the candidate's consent, and given that the candidate's own conduct was not found objectionable, remand was considered unnecessary.

Conclusion: The election could not be sustained on the basis of the impugned finding, and the judgment setting aside the election was liable to be reversed.

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