Vested right of appeal survives amendment where delay condonation existed when proceedings began; retrospective effect was rejected.

Amendments to stock exchange bye-laws and regulations that shortened the appeal period and removed condonation of delay were held not to apply retrospectively to proceedings already initiated, because subordinate legislation is presumed to operate prospectively unless clear contrary intent is shown. The Court further affirmed that the right of appeal is a vested substantive right accruing when proceedings commence, and that this right includes the procedural incident of seeking condonation where that remedy existed under the governing law. On that basis, the appellate refusal to entertain the delay application was unsustainable, and the appeals with condonation applications were restored for decision on merits.

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Issues: (i) Whether the amended Bombay Stock Exchange bye-laws and regulations reducing the time for appeal and deleting the power to condone delay applied retrospectively to proceedings already initiated before the amendment. (ii) Whether the petitioner retained a vested right to prefer an appeal with an application for condonation of delay against the arbitral award.

Issue (i): Whether the amended Bombay Stock Exchange bye-laws and regulations reducing the time for appeal and deleting the power to condone delay applied retrospectively to proceedings already initiated before the amendment.

Analysis: The governing framework consisted of the unamended bye-laws and regulations, under which limitation under the Limitation Act, 1963 applied and delay could be condoned on sufficient cause being shown. The amendments later substituted a 30-day appeal period and deleted the provision for condonation of delay. The dispute turned on whether those amendments operated retrospectively. The Court held that subordinate legislation does not operate retrospectively unless such intention is clearly expressed or necessarily implied. Nothing in the amended bye-laws, regulations, or SEBI circular indicated retrospective application.

Conclusion: The amended bye-laws and regulations did not apply retrospectively to the petitioner's already initiated proceedings.

Issue (ii): Whether the petitioner retained a vested right to prefer an appeal with an application for condonation of delay against the arbitral award.

Analysis: The Court applied the settled principle that the right of appeal is a vested substantive right accruing on commencement of proceedings, and that such right includes the procedural incidents necessary to make the remedy effective, including the ability to seek condonation of delay where the governing law so permits. Relying on the principle that accrued rights and remedies are protected unless expressly taken away, the Court held that the petitioner's right to appeal and to seek condonation survived the subsequent amendments. The delay of the arbitrator and the appellate bench could not defeat the petitioner's remedy.

Conclusion: The petitioner retained the vested right to appeal and to seek condonation of delay, and the appellate bench erred in refusing to entertain the delay application.

Final Conclusion: The impugned appellate order was unsustainable, the appeals with the condonation applications were restored, and the appellate forum was directed to decide the delay applications on merits expeditiously.

Ratio Decidendi: Amendments to subordinate arbitral bye-laws affecting limitation and condonation of delay do not apply retrospectively to pending proceedings unless retrospective intent is clearly expressed, and the vested right of appeal includes the incident of seeking condonation where that remedy existed when proceedings were initiated.

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