Just a moment...
Press 'Enter' to add multiple search terms. Rules for Better Search
Use comma for multiple locations.
---------------- For section wise search only -----------------
Accuracy Level ~ 90%
Press 'Enter' after typing page number.
Press 'Enter' after typing page number.
No Folders have been created
Are you sure you want to delete "My most important" ?
NOTE:
Press 'Enter' after typing page number.
Press 'Enter' after typing page number.
Don't have an account? Register Here
Press 'Enter' after typing page number.
Issues: (i) whether an inspector appointed under the repealed Companies Act, 1913 could, by virtue of the saving provisions of the Companies Act, 1956, exercise powers under the new Act and validly issue notices for examination on oath and production of documents; (ii) whether section 240 of the Companies Act, 1956 offended Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India; and (iii) whether sections 239 and 240 of the Companies Act, 1956 violated Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
Issue (i): whether an inspector appointed under the repealed Companies Act, 1913 could, by virtue of the saving provisions of the Companies Act, 1956, exercise powers under the new Act and validly issue notices for examination on oath and production of documents.
Analysis: The saving provision preserved orders, appointments, proceedings and things done under a previous company law and deemed them to continue in force as if made under the new Act. The continuation clause in section 646 was treated as an additional saving provision and not as a proviso cutting down section 645. The scheme of the repeal and savings provisions showed that an appointment made under the old Act could, by legal fiction, operate under the corresponding provisions of the new Act. The inspector's authority to require attendance and documents therefore continued under the new statutory regime.
Conclusion: The notices were within jurisdiction and were validly issued in favour of the respondent.
Issue (ii): whether section 240 of the Companies Act, 1956 offended Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India.
Analysis: The protection against self-incrimination applies only where a person is accused of an offence and is compelled to be a witness against himself. An investigation into the affairs of a company under sections 239 and 240 is a fact-finding enquiry into management and irregularities; it does not begin with a formal accusation against any specified individual. The possibility that the enquiry may later reveal offences and lead to prosecution does not convert the enquiry itself into a criminal accusation. The notices requiring attendance and production of documents were therefore not issued to a person already accused of an offence.
Conclusion: Section 240 did not violate Article 20(3) and the challenge failed in favour of the respondent.
Issue (iii): whether sections 239 and 240 of the Companies Act, 1956 violated Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
Analysis: The impugned provisions applied to companies and persons connected with their management, a class distinct from ordinary citizens because of the statutory nature of companies and the need to protect contributories, creditors and other holders. The classification had an intelligible differentia and a rational relation to the object of investigating company affairs and preventing abuse by persons in control. The provisions were thus not instances of class legislation.
Conclusion: Sections 239 and 240 were not unconstitutional under Article 14 and the challenge failed in favour of the respondent.
Final Conclusion: The impugned notices and the statutory provisions supporting them were upheld, and the appeal was dismissed with costs.
Ratio Decidendi: A saving provision in a repealing statute may deem an appointment under the old Act to continue under the new Act, and an investigation into company affairs is not an Article 20(3) accusation unless a formal charge of offence has been levelled against the person compelled to answer.