Statutory presumptions in cheque dishonour cases survived where the accused failed to raise a probable defence.

Once execution of the cheque and signature are proved, the presumptions under Sections 118(a) and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act operate in favour of the holder, and the accused must rebut them by raising a probable defence on a preponderance of probabilities. A plea that signed blank cheques were stolen and misused was found improbable because no prompt criminal action was taken, so the presumption of legally enforceable liability remained unrebutted. Revisional interference is confined to patent illegality, manifest error, or total misreading of the record, and none was shown. The concurrent conviction and sentence under Section 138 were therefore upheld.

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Issues: Whether the concurrent conviction under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act warranted interference in revision, in light of the statutory presumptions under Sections 118(a) and 139 and the defence set up by the accused.

Analysis: Once the cheque and signature were established, the presumptions under Sections 118(a) and 139 operated in favour of the holder of the cheque. The burden then shifted to the accused to rebut the presumption on a preponderance of probabilities by raising a probable defence. The accused's version that signed blank cheques were stolen and misused was found improbable, particularly because no prompt criminal action was taken despite the alleged theft. In revisional jurisdiction, interference is warranted only when there is patent illegality, manifest error, or total misreading of the record, none of which was shown here.

Conclusion: The conviction and sentence were upheld, and no revisionary interference was called for.

Final Conclusion: The accused failed to displace the statutory presumption attaching to the cheque, and the concurrent findings of guilt remained undisturbed.

Ratio Decidendi: In a prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, once execution of the cheque is proved, the accused must rebut the statutory presumption of legally enforceable liability by a probable defence on a preponderance of probabilities; a mere improbable explanation does not dislodge the presumption.

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