PMLA proceedings depend on a surviving scheduled offence; summons were quashed after closure of the predicate case.

Section 301(2) CrPC was treated as permitting only limited assistance to the prosecution, not a general right of impleadment, so a third party claiming journalistic status could not enter the proceedings on that basis and the request was rejected. On the PMLA issue, the Court held that money-laundering proceedings under Section 3 depend on a surviving scheduled offence and cannot be sustained on a purely notional predicate once the scheduled offence has been finally closed. Because the underlying dispute had been settled and no material showed proceeds of crime, the ECIR-linked summons were quashed, while liberty was preserved to proceed again if the predicate offence is later revived.

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Issues: (i) Whether a third party claiming to be a journalist had a right to implead himself in the proceedings under Section 301(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. (ii) Whether summons issued in ECIR-based proceedings under the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 were liable to be quashed after closure of the predicate offence.

Issue (i): Whether a third party claiming to be a journalist had a right to implead himself in the proceedings under Section 301(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

Analysis: Section 301(2) was held to operate in the limited sphere of assisting the prosecution and submitting written arguments with permission of the Court. The claim for impleadment was tested against the nature of the applicant's grievance, which was directed essentially against closure of the predicate offence and not against any independent victim-based entitlement in the PMLA proceedings. Authorities on public interest, representative participation, and victim rights were distinguished on facts and on the basis that they did not confer a general right of audience in the present setting.

Conclusion: The impleadment request was rejected.

Issue (ii): Whether summons issued in ECIR-based proceedings under the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 were liable to be quashed after closure of the predicate offence.

Analysis: The Court treated closure of the scheduled offence as the factual basis. It applied the principle that money-laundering under Section 3 of the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 depends on illegal gain from criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence, and that proceedings under the Act cannot be sustained on a purely notional foundation when the predicate offence has attained closure. The Court found the dispute to be a private transaction resolved through arbitration and settlement, with no material showing public funds or demonstrable proceeds of crime. The reasoning also adopted the caveat recognised in later precedent that revival remains open if the predicate offence is resurrected.

Conclusion: The summons were quashed and the main petitions were allowed, subject to preservation of rights if the predicate offence is revived.

Final Conclusion: The Court granted relief against the PMLA summons on the footing that closure of the predicate offence removed the immediate basis for continuation of the ECIR-linked proceedings, while preserving liberty to proceed again if the predicate case is reopened.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the scheduled offence has been finally closed, money-laundering proceedings premised on that offence cannot continue in the absence of a surviving predicate basis, though liberty may remain to revive such proceedings if the predicate offence is later restored.

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