Money-laundering as a distinct and continuing offence defeats double jeopardy and prior-date objections to proceedings.

The constitutional validity of the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 was treated as settled because the Supreme Court had already upheld the statute, so the challenge failed. Money-laundering was held to be a distinct offence from offences under the ULA(P) Act, and the bar against double jeopardy under Article 20(2) did not apply; the parallel prosecution objection was rejected. The court also noted that liability depends on the accused's dealing with proceeds of crime, not merely the date of the predicate offence, so proceedings were not barred because the predicate offence predated its inclusion in the Schedule. The writ petitions were found meritless and the proceedings were sustained.

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Issues: (i) Whether the provisions of the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 were unconstitutional. (ii) Whether prosecution under the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 was barred by double jeopardy on account of pendency of criminal proceedings under the ULA(P) Act. (iii) Whether proceedings under the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 could be initiated when the predicate offence was allegedly committed before the relevant offence was added to the Schedule.

Issue (i): Whether the provisions of the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 were unconstitutional.

Analysis: The constitutional validity of the Act had already been upheld by the Supreme Court. Once that binding declaration was noted, there was no scope to reopen the challenge to the statutory provisions on constitutional grounds.

Conclusion: The challenge to the constitutional validity of the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 failed.

Issue (ii): Whether prosecution under the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 was barred by double jeopardy on account of pendency of criminal proceedings under the ULA(P) Act.

Analysis: Article 20(2) of the Constitution of India prohibits a second prosecution and punishment for the same offence. The offence of money-laundering is distinct from the offences under the ULA(P) Act and is an independent offence concerned with the process or activity connected with proceeds of crime. Since the two sets of proceedings relate to different offences, the bar against double jeopardy does not apply. Section 235 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was also found inapplicable.

Conclusion: The plea of double jeopardy was rejected.

Issue (iii): Whether proceedings under the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 could be initiated when the predicate offence was allegedly committed before the relevant offence was added to the Schedule.

Analysis: The relevant test is the date on which a person indulges in the process or activity connected with proceeds of crime, not merely the date of commission of the predicate offence. Money-laundering may be a continuing offence, and liability can arise even where the criminal activity preceded notification, if the accused continued to deal with the proceeds after the offence became a scheduled offence. The notification adding the relevant offences to the Schedule therefore did not bar action under the Act.

Conclusion: The challenge to jurisdiction on the ground of prior commission of the predicate offence failed.

Final Conclusion: The writ petitions were devoid of merit and the impugned proceedings under the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 were sustained.

Ratio Decidendi: Money-laundering is an independent and continuing offence distinct from the predicate offence, and proceedings under the Act are not barred merely because the predicate offence predates its inclusion in the Schedule or because parallel prosecution exists for different offences.

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