Custodial remand of a non-accused director for representing corporate accused persons is impermissible under criminal procedure.

A person not arrayed as an accused in his individual capacity cannot be remanded to judicial custody merely to represent corporate accused persons in proceedings under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act. The court noted that companies, as juristic persons, may be prosecuted and represented according to law, but the procedural framework does not permit custodial detention of a non-accused director solely for that representative role. The remand order was therefore unsustainable and was set aside, with release from custody directed.

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Issues: Whether a person who is not an accused in his individual capacity could be directed to appear and remain in judicial custody merely as the representative of companies prosecuted under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002.

Analysis: The appellant was not named as an accused in his personal capacity in the ECIR, yet the trial court directed him to represent the companies and remanded him to judicial custody. The companies, being juristic persons, could be represented in accordance with law, and the governing procedural framework did not justify sending a non-accused individual to custody merely because he was a director. The direction was therefore inconsistent with the settled position that a corporation may be prosecuted, but custodial sentence cannot be imposed on a juristic person.

Conclusion: The direction remanding the appellant to judicial custody was unsustainable and was set aside. The appeal was allowed and the appellant was ordered to be released from custody.

Ratio Decidendi: A person who is not an accused in his individual capacity cannot be remanded to judicial custody merely to represent corporate accused persons in prosecution proceedings; juristic persons may be prosecuted, but custodial sentence is inapplicable to them.

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