Limited fair-trial indulgence permits one defence evidence opportunity, but witness recall is refused for mere change of counsel.

Recall of a complainant witness under Section 311 CrPC was refused where the accused already knew of the relevant agreement before cross-examination, the document was not disputed, and mere change of counsel was held insufficient; the power to recall must be used sparingly and cannot reward delay. In the cheque dishonour proceedings, however, the accused was granted one further, conditioned opportunity to lead defence evidence because the right to defend is part of a fair trial, provided the indulgence did not prolong the matter further and the trial moved expeditiously.

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Issues: (i) Whether recall of the complainant witness under Section 311 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was justified; (ii) Whether the petitioners were entitled to a further opportunity to lead defence evidence in the cheque dishonour complaints.

Issue (i): Whether recall of the complainant witness under Section 311 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was justified.

Analysis: The request for recall was based on the alleged omission of the earlier counsel to confront the witness with an agreement already placed on record by the petitioners themselves. The agreement was admittedly within the petitioners' knowledge before the witness was first cross-examined, and the same document was not disputed by the complainant. The power to recall a witness is to be exercised sparingly and mere change of counsel, by itself, is not a sufficient ground. The petitioners had already taken repeated steps after the closure of evidence, and the record showed prolonged delay in the proceedings.

Conclusion: The request for recall of the complainant witness was rejected.

Issue (ii): Whether the petitioners were entitled to a further opportunity to lead defence evidence in the cheque dishonour complaints.

Analysis: Although the petitioners had delayed the matter and had earlier failed to avail opportunities, the right of the accused to lead defence evidence forms part of a fair trial. The Court balanced the need to prevent delay with the requirement of a just adjudication and found that one further opportunity could be granted, provided it was confined to a single day and accompanied by costs. The direction was also intended to ensure that the trial progressed expeditiously.

Conclusion: A further opportunity to lead defence evidence was granted, subject to conditions.

Final Conclusion: The petitions succeeded only to the limited extent of securing one conditioned opportunity to lead defence evidence, while the prayer for recall of the complainant witness was declined, and the trial was directed to proceed expeditiously.

Ratio Decidendi: Recall of a witness is not warranted merely because the accused changes counsel, but a fair-trial interest may justify a limited opportunity to lead defence evidence where it can be granted without permitting abuse of process.

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