Tariff classification and writ maintainability: erroneous classification of metallised polyester yarn allowed direct challenge despite alternative remedy.

Metallised yarn in the form of thin stripes of laminated polyester film was treated as an article of polyester falling under tariff entry 15A(2), not as synthetic fibrous yarn under entry 18, because the two entries had to be confined to their own fields and the classification had already been settled in earlier decisions. The demand based on that mistaken classification was therefore without jurisdiction and ultra vires. On that footing, the existence of an alternative remedy did not bar writ relief where the challenge went to lack of jurisdiction. The demand notices were quashed and further action on that basis was restrained.

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Issues: (i) Whether metallised yarn in the form of thin stripes of laminated polyester film fell under entry 15A(2) or entry 18 of the relevant tariff; (ii) whether the existence of an alternative remedy barred the petition against the demand notices.

Issue (i): Whether metallised yarn in the form of thin stripes of laminated polyester film fell under entry 15A(2) or entry 18 of the relevant tariff.

Analysis: The classification issue had already been settled in earlier decisions of the Court. On a harmonious construction of entries 15A(2) and 18, each entry was required to be kept within its own field. The material in question, being metallised yarn in the form of thin stripes of laminated polyester film, was held to be an article of polyester covered by entry 15A(2) and not synthetic fibrous yarn under entry 18. Fresh affidavits did not justify a different interpretation once the scope of the entry had already been determined.

Conclusion: The goods were classifiable under entry 15A(2) and not under entry 18.

Issue (ii): Whether the existence of an alternative remedy barred the petition against the demand notices.

Analysis: The demand was held to be without jurisdiction and based on a misconception of the applicable tariff entry. A demand that is ultra vires the Act and constitutes a threat to property does not compel the petitioner to pursue an alternative remedy before seeking constitutional relief, especially where the challenge is founded on lack of jurisdiction.

Conclusion: The petition was maintainable despite the availability of an alternative remedy.

Final Conclusion: The demand notices were quashed and further proceedings on that basis were restrained, granting complete relief to the petitioner.

Ratio Decidendi: A demand founded on an erroneous tariff classification and therefore ultra vires or without jurisdiction can be challenged directly in writ proceedings, and the existence of an alternative remedy does not bar such relief.

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