Delegation, statutory substitution, and search authorisation were upheld where customs powers were applied with minor modifications.

Section 12 of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 was construed as a valid power to apply customs provisions with only minor, non-essential modifications, so the excessive delegation challenge failed. The substitution of the Customs Act, 1962 for the repealed Sea Customs Act, 1878 was upheld under the General Clauses Act, and the notification authorising search by an executive officer remained valid. The warrant, search, and seizure were also sustained because the Assistant Collector had relevant material for the required satisfaction under Section 105(1), and the absence of detailed particulars in the warrant did not invalidate the authorisation or the seizure.

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Issues: (i) Whether the power under Section 12 of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 to apply provisions of the Sea Customs Act, 1878 with modifications and alterations involved impermissible excessive delegation; (ii) Whether the substitution of the Customs Act, 1962 for the Sea Customs Act, 1878 under Section 12 was invalid and whether the impugned notification was bad because the search power was exercised by an executive authority; (iii) Whether the warrant and the search and seizure were invalid for want of satisfaction and application of mind under Section 105(1) of the Customs Act, 1962.

Issue (i): Whether the power under Section 12 of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 to apply provisions of the Sea Customs Act, 1878 with modifications and alterations involved impermissible excessive delegation.

Analysis: The delegation challenge was treated as academic because the notifications only applied customs provisions with minor modifications. The word "alterations" was read in a limited constitutional sense, confined to non-essential changes, and no change in legislative policy or essential legislative function was involved.

Conclusion: The challenge to Section 12 on the ground of excessive delegation was rejected.

Issue (ii): Whether the substitution of the Customs Act, 1962 for the Sea Customs Act, 1878 under Section 12 was invalid and whether the impugned notification was bad because the search power was exercised by an executive authority.

Analysis: Section 8(1) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 permitted reference to the repealed enactment to be read as a reference to the re-enacted provision. Section 12 was held to be a limited power of application, not incorporation by reference. The notification applying Section 105(1) of the Customs Act, 1962 was therefore valid, and the change from a Magistrate to an Assistant Collector as the authorising authority did not invalidate it.

Conclusion: The challenge to the notification and to the authority exercised under it was rejected.

Issue (iii): Whether the warrant and the search and seizure were invalid for want of satisfaction and application of mind under Section 105(1) of the Customs Act, 1962.

Analysis: The warrant and the material before the Assistant Collector were examined, and the finding was that there was relevant material to support the belief required by Section 105(1). The absence of detailed particulars in the warrant did not vitiate the authorisation or the seizure.

Conclusion: The challenge to the warrant, search, and seizure failed.

Final Conclusion: The judgment upheld the legality of the impugned customs-excise procedure and left the appellant without relief.

Ratio Decidendi: A statutory power to apply another enactment with modifications and alterations is valid when confined to minor, non-essential changes; a repealed statute may be read as re-enacted under the General Clauses Act; and a search authorisation issued on recorded satisfaction will not fail merely because the warrant is not detailed in form.

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