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Issues: (i) whether conviction could be sustained both under Section 7 and Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 for the same transaction of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification; (ii) whether the benefits of Section 360 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 or the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 could be extended to offences punishable under Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
Issue (i): Whether conviction could be sustained both under Section 7 and Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 for the same transaction of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification.
Analysis: Demand and acceptance of illegal gratification may constitute an offence under Section 7, and where acceptance is pursuant to demand, the same conduct also falls within Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2). The Court applied the principle reflected in Section 71 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Section 220 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 that a single act falling within more than one penal definition may be tried and charged for both offences, but punishment cannot exceed the limit applicable to any one of them. The High Court therefore erred in holding that conviction under both provisions was impermissible.
Conclusion: The conviction under both provisions was legally sustainable, subject to the rule against double punishment.
Issue (ii): Whether the benefits of Section 360 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 or the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 could be extended to offences punishable under Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
Analysis: Section 18 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 excludes offences punishable under the corresponding provision of the old anti-corruption law, and by virtue of Section 8 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 the reference must be read as referring to the re-enacted provision in the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. Once the special statute prescribes a minimum sentence and no power to go below it, probationary relief or release under Section 360 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 cannot be invoked to defeat the statutory mandate. The High Court's reliance on probationary relief was therefore unsustainable.
Conclusion: Neither the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 nor Section 360 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 could be applied to dilute the mandatory punishment under Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
Final Conclusion: The High Court's interference with the sentence was set aside, and the trial court's punishment was restored, with the substantive imprisonment to run concurrently.
Ratio Decidendi: Where a single transaction of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification attracts two penal provisions, both convictions may stand but punishment cannot exceed the statutory limit applicable to any one offence, and probationary relief cannot override a special statute prescribing a mandatory minimum sentence.