Liberal condonation of delay under Section 5 requires a pragmatic approach where sufficient cause and substantial justice are shown.

Section 5 of the Limitation Act requires a liberal and pragmatic construction of "sufficient cause", especially where the delay is only a few days and the applicant's conduct shows no mala fides. On those facts, the short seven-day delay, the intervening vacation period, and the prompt filing after recovery supported condonation, while the revisional court should have corrected the appellate court's unduly strict refusal. The refusal to condone was therefore unsustainable, and the matter was restored for decision on merits.

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Issues: Whether the delay of seven days in filing the appeal should be condoned by applying a liberal and pragmatic approach under section 5 of the Limitation Act, and whether the revisional court ought to have corrected the error committed by the appellate court.

Analysis: The shortness of the delay, the vacation period that intervened, and the appellant's conduct in filing the appeal as soon as she felt better showed an absence of mala fides and supported the existence of sufficient cause. In considering section 5 of the Limitation Act, the governing principle is that the expression "sufficient cause" must receive a liberal construction and that the court must prefer substantial justice over a rigid or technical approach, particularly where the delay is only for a few days. The High Court failed to correct the jurisdictional error committed by the appellate court in refusing condonation on an erroneous and unduly strict view of the facts and law.

Conclusion: The delay of seven days ought to have been condoned, and the refusal to do so was unsustainable. The appeal was therefore allowed, the impugned orders were set aside, and the matter was restored for decision on merits.

Ratio Decidendi: "Sufficient cause" under section 5 of the Limitation Act must be construed liberally, and where the delay is minor, courts should adopt a pragmatic approach that advances substantial justice rather than defeat it on technical grounds.

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