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Issues: Whether the sentences imposed in three conviction cases arising out of cheque dishonour complaints should be directed to run concurrently in exercise of inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code read with Section 427 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
Analysis: Section 427 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 ordinarily contemplates consecutive running of sentences, but confers discretion on the Court to order concurrency. The Court noted that a separate proceeding under Section 482 of the Code for seeking such relief is maintainable. The governing consideration is whether the offences form part of the same transaction and whether the facts justify exercise of discretion in favour of the prisoner. The Court accepted that the cheque dishonour matters could be viewed as arising from the same transaction, but held that concurrency is not automatic. The petitioner had not paid the compensation and fine directed in the cases, and that factor weighed against granting judicial discretion.
Conclusion: The request for concurrent running of sentences was rejected, and the application under Section 427 of the Code was rightly declined.
Final Conclusion: The petitions failed because the Court declined to exercise discretion in favour of concurrency of sentences in the connected cheque dishonour cases.
Ratio Decidendi: Even where a separate proceeding under Section 482 of the Code is maintainable for invoking Section 427, concurrency of sentences remains a discretionary relief to be granted only on sound judicial grounds, and may be refused where the circumstances do not justify leniency.